Keishi Tanimoto

Air Service Development of Local Airports and its Influence on the Formation of Aviation Networks

This chapter focuses on strategic actions of local governments to enrich aviation services to their local airports, and analyzes the influence of these actions on the formation process of aviation networks. Air service development action gives an influence not only on the airport but also on other airports because of the existence of network externality. This study models such an interdependent and path-dependent situation as a repeated n-person non-cooperative game. Numerical analysis shows that competition between local governments using subsidies for petition flights forms a regional hub endogenously under certain conditions.

Information Basis for Public Transportation Planning in Rural Areas

This study discusses the appropriate information required for public transportation planning in rural areas. The needs satisfaction which has been widely used as an information basis is arbitrary because a person may adapt to the poor transportation accessibility and thereby comprising the level of needs for the service. We argue that the accessibility measurement is more appropriate than the needs satisfaction measurement. We formulate the accessibility measurement method for public transportation planning in rural areas. Based on space-time prism, a measurement method is developed to calculate the possible plans of daily life activities subjected to constraints caused by the public transportation services.

Cost Allocation in Joint Replacement for Multi-State Deteriorating Systems

We study the problem concerning the allocation of cost incurred by owners of deteriorating systems. The cost allocation mechanism is designed using a dynamic cooperative game of joint replacement of the systems. Analyzing the game, it is found to be characterized by the instantaneous cost saving function. We suggest that the cost allocation method must satisfy several axioms such as additivity and dummy in this context. As a result, the class of additive cost methods such as Shapley value is useful. However, each method in this class has different disadvantage

Bargaining over cost allocation rule under uncertainty of project cost

Once the infrastructure project plan has been made, the design and construction will be carried out with so much sunk cost. Thus, each agent may commit to the project when the project plan is made. At a point of the agents commitment, however, the project cost may be uncertain; each agent has to decide whether or not to commit to the project under an uncertain project cost. Although the allocated cost will be a critical factor for the agents commitment, the agent cannot determine the true allocated cost because it is uncertain. In this case, the cost allocation rule which determines the allocated cost when the project cost is realized can be used by the agent. This study models the mechanism of choosing the cost allocation rule by the agent and discusses which coalition and cost allocation rule can be realized under the cost structure.

Project risk allocation through contingent cost allocation

In a joint project, the project cost is allocated to the participants. How to allocate the cost has been discussed mainly in cooperative game theory assuming that the cost is certain. If the project cost is uncertain, each participant is exposed to the risk of allocated cost. Thus the risk should be allocated according to the risk acceptance level for each participant. For this risk allocation, a stochastic cooperative game is useful rather than a cooperative game based on the certainty of cost. We develop a contingent cost allocation scheme in which the risk is transferred mutually in order to attain efficient risk allocation by a stochastic cooperative game. As a result, the efficient risk allocation is derived so that all participants are better off than the allocation which does not transfer the risk mutually.

Risk assessment on agricultural products by inter-regional flow estimation in disaster

In most countries, agricultural products are produced in countryside. When a disaster attacks these producing districts, the influence on urban areas as large consumer cities might be able to become serious. Moreover, agricultural products have space (producing district) deviation, time (shipping period) deviation, and the influence on consumer cities may change greatly with the developmental time term of a disaster. In such a situation, the existence value of a district with possibility as a source of supply becomes more important. This research aims at acquiring fundamental knowledge about the risk management of food supply by measuring the turn volume before and after a disaster, taking into account the situation where a part of supply of agricultural products becomes difficulty according to a disaster.

Analysis of cooperative alliance constituted by companies with different technology levels by using Shapley value

This paper focuses on the cost function influenced by sharing the technology among the companies possessing different technology levels rather than economy of scale. Based on the game with this cost function, shapley value can be simplified by using its axioms. Thus we show simplified version of shapley value and examine the stability of solutions in three-person game. Then modified Shapley value is also discussed so as to give stable solution by relaxing some of the axioms.

Adaptive needs formation for public transportation service in rural areas

The needs satisfaction as an information basis for planning the public transportation service may be arbitrary if a person adapts to the poor transportation accessibility and thereby compromise the level of needs for the service. The mechanism of this adaptation is called adaptive needs formation. In rural areas, the service level is so low such that the person may adapt his/her lifestyle and the needs to the public transportation service. However, adaptive needs formation has yet to be observed as part of public transportation planning. This study conducts the questionnaire survey and shows that adaptive needs formation does indeed occur.

A data analysis of equilibrium selection

A commonly accepted criterion of equilibrium selection has not been established. This situation exists because we do not have sufficient information about what sort of equilibrium is selected in real games. In this experimental study, we investigate a set of games and estimate the selected equilibrium of each game by using an estimation model of equilibrium selection. Through the analysis, a criterion that rules these games in the experiments is identified, and the usefulness of the approach is demonstrated.

On the maximum design earthquake in disaster prevention planning

After the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, researchers have generally agreed that a disaster prevention plan should take into account a strong seismic motion which exceeds the maximum past level and destroys the city or region. However, many of the issues discussed remain on the methodology of how to determine the reasonable level. This study proposes a methodology to determine the level from a socio-economic viewpoint by focusing the level of remaining functions for reconstruction. Through numerical examinations on the model performance under several kinds of utility functions and loss functions, the usefulness of the proposed model is confirmed. The proposed model gives a framework for further detailed discussion, including an introduction of a policy mix of seismic improvement and inter-regional seismic insurance.