Keith F. Joiner

Assessment of Classroom Environments in Reformed Calculus Education

Research was conducted to determine if current reforms in calculus education are more inclusive of students of different genders, personalities, attributional beliefs, mathematical abilities, and computer attitudes. Two types of calculus reform are examined: a computer-assisted, student-centred and inductive reform based on the Calculus and Maple (C&M) package; and a teacher-only, teacher-centred and deductive reform. Both methods emphasise student participation in the learning and employ collaborative-learning groups mixed by ability and the assessed sociometric measures, but not mixed by gender. The classroom environments of the reform classes were assessed qualitatively using free-form surveys, interviews and classroom observations, and assessed quantitatively using the College and University Classroom Environment Inventory (CUCEI). The classroom environment of reform classes was compared qualitatively to the normal lecture environment. Students assessed the classroom environment as being significantly less favourable than preferred, confirming general dissatisfaction with socio-emotional aspects of university classes, even when adopting modern educational reforms. Differences in the actual and preferred classroom environments were observed in all class sub-divisions (i.e. gender, personality) and across all environment scales of the CUCEI. The research illustrates the psychosocial diversity of reforms for university classrooms and the desirability of evaluating such reforms using a learning environment inventory as well as conventional qualitative measures.

A tale of two allied defence departments: new assurance initiatives for managing increasing system complexity, interconnectedness and vulnerability

Abstract Over the last three decades, defence communication and information systems have been increasing the complexity and interconnectedness of systems that has pervaded society more broadly throughout the Information Age. Even more than society in the broad, Western Departments of Defence (DoDs) have sought to attain information dominance. The result has been a large number of complex systems, system-of-systems and families-of-system-of-systems. In seeking to assure such interconnected systems, defence forces initially focused on specifying the high-level functions that this interconnectivity enabled: first command and control (1970s), then adding communications and computers (1980s) and finally adding intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (1990s); all while defining connections through interoperability protocols. The ability of highly interconnected systems to enable higher order human thinking has arguably gone beyond functions and even the informational, leading to synthetic systems. Furthermore, evolving cyber threats are now seeking to exploit the vulnerabilities of the broad informational attack surfaces of these complex DoD systems. This paper examines the key assurance initiatives pursued by the U.S. DoD to effect these more integrated, interoperable and information-assured (I3) capabilities while ensuring resilience to cyber threats. These approaches are compared to the Australian DoD’s assurance strategies and recommendations made on how Australia could substantially recover I3 assurance with the U.S. and other allied forces. The contrast between the two allies makes this a useful reflection for DoDs in other countries, and more generally to society’s assurance strategies.

How Australia can catch up to U.S. cyber resilience by understanding that cyber survivability test and evaluation drives defense investment

ABSTRACT The cyber threat to Australia’s Department of Defense (DoD) is not only information security, but includes preventing its platforms from being crippled. This threat is increasing and Australia is not keeping pace with its allies. Since 2009, the United States has used test and evaluation (T&E) policy and practice to inculcate the threat posed by cyber warfare into the development, acquisition, and fielding of all of its DoD platforms. As a result, U.S. defense chiefs understood early the operational vulnerability of their systems to cyber warfare, and of the necessity of designing more cyber-resilient systems. Australia has not required such cyber-security T&E and therefore may be blind to the operational vulnerabilities of its major platforms to cyber attack and is therefore likely to continue to underinvest in the cyber resilience of its capabilities. This article argues that the Australian DoD needs to urgently conduct operationally-focused cyber-survivability trials that leverage its alliance with the United States. In studying the growing divide in cyber security between these two close allies, this article’s contribution is concluding that representative cyber threats in operational T&E is a crucial first step for any country to gain understanding and appropriate investment in DoD cyber security.

Australia’s future submarine: shaping early adaptive designs through test and evaluation

Abstract The Australian Government selected France’s Direction des Constructions Navales Services to design Australia’s future submarine, the Shortfin Barracuda. This paper evaluates different system developmental approaches that can be applied, such as the U.S. acquisition life cycle and a research, engineer, design, adapt, reflect (RADER) model. The evaluation showed a need for deliberate regard for the significant philosophical, political, military, cultural and economic differences of the French practices compared to U.S., U.K. and Australian. The paper reviews major lessons learned in Australian acquisitions regarding early preview test and evaluation (T&E), including the Collins Class Submarine, and proposes 11 T&E goals, especially early commitment to an estimated seven test sites needed to ensure the early design is proven and low risk. To save substantial overall time and rework, greater investment is needed in the social spaces for critical thinking and T&E to guide the submarine towards a continuously evolving design and build.