Kenneth Evan Sharpe

Agenda Setting and Bargaining Power: The Mexican State Versus Transnational Automobile Corporations

The authors explore the often conflictual bargaining relations between transnational corporations and host governments of less developed countries. They focus particular attention on the conflict that surrounded the creation of the Mexican automobile industry (1960–1964), criticizing and reformulating a current approach to these issues. The argument proceeds in two parts—agenda setting and bargaining power. Each part is organized around a central criticism of the bargaining power approach and provides an alternative formulation which is then applied to an analysis of the bargaining relationship between the Mexican Government and the transnational automobile corporations.

Transnational corporations and the political economy of export promotion: the case of the Mexican automobile industry

Export promotion has replaced import substitution as the orthodox strategy for economic development. In sectors dominated by transnational corporations, however, such a strategy may run afoul of difficulties not immediately apparent from the neo-classical comparative-advantage perspective that has provided its principal theoretical support. Evidence from the Mexican automobile industry shows that an export promotion policy may face problems of a) demand rigidities in TNC intracompany transfers, b) decision dependency, c) difficulties in enforcing sanctions in cases of recalcitrance, and d) an unequal distribution of benefits between foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms.

Voice And Consequence: Direct Participation And Democracy In Latin America

A remarkable transformation has swept Latin America. During the last three decades, in country after country, authoritarian governments have given way to democratically elected ones. Moreover, there are signs, especially in the last decade, that some democratic institutions are themselves being refashioned; institutions of direct, popular participation are emerging that are quite different from the elected, representative institutions normally associated with democracy in Western Europe and North America.’ These new forms of popular political participation are giving voice to groups that are often not heard in the elections, or through the parties that are at the heart of representative democracy. They are far more institutionalized than many of the traditional ways through which the excluded project their concerns and demands, such as public hearings, petitions, sit-ins, demonstrations, strikes, and land seizures. These new forms of voice allow for the inclusion of not only legitimate but also frequently marginalized perspectives. They also encourage more deliberation among the citizenry and between the citizenry and elected officials.

The Post-Vietnam Formula Under Siege: The Imperial Presidency And Central America

The Iran-contra affair made public an abuse of executive authority that began in 1981. The deeper issues raised by the trading of arms for hostages and the diversion of profits to the contras, however, harken back to the Vietnam period. The impact of the Vietnam war on our constitutional democracy, which culminated in the Watergate scandal and Richard Nixons resignation, served as a warning of the dangers of an imperial presidency. This article evaluates the lessons learned, the reforms instituted in the aftermath of Vietnam, and indicates what it is necessary to do now. Different people drew different lessons from the Vietnam-Watergate scandals. Some blamed the abuse of executive power on the character flaws of the President and his closest advisers, and saw the solution as their removal from office. Others saw the problem as weak laws and sought legislation to strengthen Congresss power to check executive abuses and to legislate foreign and domestic policy. Reforms that I loosely call the post-Vietnam-Watergate formula were enacted to ensure that presidential abuse of power would be less likely to again endanger constitutional democracy in the United States. Others, like Senator J. William Fulbright, supported legislative action but argued that this was not enough. The problem, they argued, was political, not legal. Congress lacked the will to enforce its constitutional authority in foreign policy. An exercise of that will required a challenge to the direction of foreign policy, and the president, drawing on his often self-

Institutionalized Voice In Latin American Democracies

Latin America has made progress toward more open and democratic political systems over the last three decades, but the quality and performance of democratic institutions remain uneven (O’Donnell et al., 2003; Dagnino et al., 2006; Organizacion de Estados Americanos, Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 2010). In one respect, however, Latin America is emerging as a pioneer: there has been an explosion in democratic participation. Citizens have begun to demand more say in the decisions that affect them directly. One consequence has been a wide range of participatory innovations designed to reinforce the option of “voice” (as opposed to “loyalty” or “exit,” in Hirschman’s [1970] argot).

The Real Cause Of Irangate

bedeviled the country: the secret bombing of Cambodia, Watergate, and the ongoing Iran-contra affair. Each had its genesis in a policy aimed at imposing U.S. political will on a Third World country. Each involved serious violations of law, the Constitution, and American democratic practice. And each prompted an effort to change the people and laws that had promoted or allowed the abuses. But most important, each scandal pointed to a deeper problem for constitutional democracy--one whose source was not merely bad people or bad laws, but the chronic tension between Americas democratic domestic political system and its nondemocratic national security system. On April 30, 1970, President Richard Nixon astonished the country with his televised announcement that the United States had invaded

Transnational Corporations versus the State: The Political Economy of the Mexican Auto Industry . By Bennett Douglas C. and Sharpe Kenneth E. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. xiii, 300 p.

The historical-structural method employed here rejects analyses that are excessively voluntaristic or deterministic. The authors show that while the state was able to mitigate certain adverse consequences of TNC strategies, new forms of dependency continued to limit Mexicos options.Originally published in 1985.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.