Kenneth R. Hammond

Computer Graphics as an Aid to Learning

Departing from the traditional model for teaching and learning, this article deals with the problem of teaching and learning the effective application of knowledge already acquired. To this end, a model for the process of exercising judgment was outlined, and the results of an empirical study of judgmental learning were employed to show the inadequacy of the traditional outcome feedback procedures. Computer graphics techniques were used to provide new forms of information to the learner; the results are promising for the rapid learning of a task that would otherwise be difficult to learn.

Negative effects of outcome-feedback in multiple-cue probability learning☆

Abstract Performance in a probabilistic learning task was studied under conditions in which learners received (1) knowledge of results after every trial (outcome-feedback), (2) information about task properties, and (3) both outcome-feedback and information about task properties. Outcome-feedback was not only unnecessary for improved performance, but was found to impede performance as well.

The Application of Signal Detection Theory to Weather Forecasting Behavior

Abstract A variety of measures are used to judge the skill and accuracy with which forecasters predict the weather and to verify forecasts: Such measures can confound accuracy with decision strategy and sometimes give conflicting indications of performance. Signal detection theory (SDT) provides a theoretical framework for describing forecasting behavior and minimizing these problems. We illustrate the utility of signal detection theory in this context, show how it can be used to understand the effects of time pressure created by frequent weather activity on forecasting judgments, and illustrate how to achieve a specific social policy.

Fundamental obstacles to the use of scientific information in public policy making

In contrast to the prevailing view that more effective use can be made of scientific information in public policy formation, several fundamental obstacles to the effective use of science are identified and described. It is argued that any effort to bring scientific information to bear on public policy must show how these obstacles have been removed.

Generalizing Over Conditions by Combining the Multitrait Multimethod Matrix and the Representative Design of Experiments

Abstract : Analytical methods should be substituted for the current largely intuitive methods for generalizing results over conditions. Toward that end we present a methodology that combines Campbell and Fiskes (1959) multitrait multimethod matrix and Brunswiks (1956) representative design of experiments. A description of a study of expert judgement and a critique of current practices illustrate the methodology. Keywords: Multitrait multimethod; Representative design; Expert judgement; Generalization; Methodology.

Cognitive conflict between persons: Application of the “lens model” paradigm

Abstract Three empirical examples of the application of the lens model paradigm for studying cognitive conflict between persons are provided. These studies concerned the effect of (1) early vs. late confrontation of large cognitive differences between pairs, (2) different types of verbal interchange, and (3) differences in cognitive complexity induced in the subjects. The results are to be taken as indicative rather than definitive.

Linking Environmental Models with Models of Human Judgment: A Symmetrical Decision Aid

Policy formation involves the interaction of two systems, the environmental system and the human cognitive system which attempts to form a judgment about it. At present, the interaction between these two systems is not under rational control. That is, although a) interactive computer models of environmental systems have been constructed and are in increasing use, and b) interactive computer models of human judgment have been constructed and have been found to be of practical use, c) links between the two until recently have not been considered. The specific aim of this article is to describe such a link for the purpose of developing an aid for planners and policy makers.

A case history of the application of social judgment theory to policy formulation

Social judgment theory provides (1) a theoretical framework for understanding the origin of policy quarrels and (2) methods for their resolution. Social judgment theory asserts that differences in policy are often cognitive in origin. Such cognitive differences are produced by the highly interdependent aspects of the more or less unreliable environments within which policies are made. Discussion alone is often insufficient for resolving policy differences because the covert, inconsistent nature of human judgment prevents individuals from accurately describing their cognitive processes. Consequently, judgmental aids, such as computer graphics technology and input-output analysis, are necessary in order to externalize and thus to clarify the causes of disagreement. Social judgment theory, computer graphics technology, and input-output analysis were successfully employed both in formulating an agency-wide policy as well as specifying how this policy would be implemented. Empirical support for the theoretical position was thus obtained.

A note on intuitive vs analytic thinking

Abstract Brunswiks propositions concerning intuitive vs analytic thinking were investigated by assessing performance in a three-cue inference task presented in one of three ways. In the first condition, cues were presented only as points on a blank, two-dimensional field, thus encouraging an intuitive, or perceptual, mode of thinking. In the second condition, subjects were given only the numerical equivalents of the three cues. Finally, in the third condition, the cues were presented both perceptually and numerically. The resulting error distributions were consistent with Brunswiks theoretical propositions.

Making Better Use of Scientific Knowledge: Separating Truth From Justice

One major reason that scientific information is not often effectively applied in the formation of social policy is that available methods for coping with the uncertainty in scientific judgments are overlooked. Application of such methods is as necessary as reducing uncertainty through the acquisition of more knowledge for these methods result in the more effective use of knowledge already at hand. Furthermore, failure to cope with uncertainty through explicit, analytical methods results in failure to separate fact (truth) from value (justice), which in turn results in wasted knowledge and unnecessary dispute. We present four concrete examples of how such circumstances can be avoided.