Kevin Gibson

The Moral Basis of Stakeholder Theory

Stakeholder theory is an important and commonly used framework for business ethics. Several of the most popular business ethics and business and society texts such as Archie Carrolls Business and Society: Ethics and Stakeholder Management (1993) and Joseph Weisss Business Ethics: A Managerial, Stakeholder Approach (1994) rely on the concept. In the past two years, over two hundred articles on stakeholder theory have appeared in philosophical and business journals.1 In this paper I will examine the claim that businesses should consider the interests of stake holders, and question whether there is a moral basis for that claim. I will point out three approaches to stakeholder theory: prudence, agency, and deontological views. Of these, deontology has offered the strongest arguments for a normative stakeholder approach. However, on examination it turns out that deontology in this context relies on an embedded notion of corporate personhood. When this is made explicit, it both underwrites duties to some, but not all, stakeholders, and provides a way to distinguish between competing stakeholder claims.

Once Bitten: Defection and Reconciliation in a Cooperative Enterprise

Business negotiations often involve cooperative arrangements. Sometimes one party will renege on a cooperative enterprise for short-term opportunistic gain. There is a common assumption that such behavior necessarily leads to a spiral of mutual antagonism. We use some of the philosophical literature to frame general research questions and identify relevant variables in dealing with defection. We then describe an experimental approach for examining the possibility of reconciliation and discuss the results of one such experiment where participants were the victims of defection. In contrast to the initial assumptions we found that many participants were willing to reconcile, and that penance conditions, when demanded, were less stringent than expected. We suggest that these findings warrant further study and have implications for business dealings. Very little can be learnt about [retribution] from Aristotle’s Politics or his three ethics. In modern ethico-political concepts of justice (in Hobbes, Rousseau and Hegel), the problem of retribution appears in conjunction with other problems and is not of central importance.—Agnes Heller

Shortcomings of Neutrality in Mediation: Solutions Based on Rationality

The authors argue that much of the conventional wisdom about mediation is based on the concept of neutrality — a concept difficult to operationalize. They replace this approach with the goal of providing Symmetric Prescriptive Advice (SPA). SPA is based on Raiffas decision theoretic approach to negotiation and mediation, coupled with an analysis of common cognitive errors that occur in mediation. SPA requires mediators to: (1) only push for agreements when a positive bargaining zone exists; (2) search for fully efficient agreements; and (3) help the parties think through the issue of fairness.

Contrasting Role Morality and Professional Morality: Implications for Practice

The notion of role morality suggests individuals may adopt a different morality depending on the roles they undertake. Investigating role morality is important, since the mentality of role morality may allow agents to believe they can abdicate moral responsibility when acting in a role. This is particularly significant in the literature dealing with professional morality where professionals, because of their special status, may find themselves at odds with their best moral judgments. Here I tell four stories and draw out some distinctions. I conclude that role morality is a genuine and useful distinction. However, I suggest that the purported distinction between role morality and professional morality is over-determined. Therefore, alleged conflicts between the demands of role and profession (such as the different pressures on Pinto designers as employees and as engineers) are not conflicts between different kinds of demands, but rather conflicts arising from divergent roles that most workers will encounter regularly. Another analytical perspective is to look at moral choices at work in terms of power and the ability to bring about change. Finally, I draw the implication that we should stress moral awareness at a fairly abstract level for all employees and reinforce the moral primacy of individual choice.

Fictitious persons and real responsibilities

I believe that corporations should be held responsible for their actions. Traditional discussions about the moral responsibility of an organization have relied on a model of criminal intent. Demonstrating intent demands that we find a moral agent capable of intending, and this has led to problems. Here I replace the analysis based on criminal law by one based on tort law. Under this framework I suggest that corporations can be held responsible for the harms caused by their activities even if no person or persons in their decision making structure had formed malicious intent, since the sheer fact that the corporate environment encouraged or allowed negligence will be sufficient.

From theory to practice: Messick and morality

A.P. Brief, J.P. Walsh, Series Foreword. R.M. Kramer, A.E. Tenbrunsel, M.H. Bazerman, Social Dilemmas, Social Values, and Ethical Judgments: Touchpoints and Touchdowns in a Distinguished Scholarly Career. Part 1. Social Dilemmas. C.D. Samuelson, K. Watrous-Rodriguez, Group Discussion and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: Does the Medium Matter? E. van Dijk, A. Wit, H. Wilke, E.W. de Kwaadsteniet, On the Importance of Equality in Social Dilemmas. P.A.M. Van Lange, J.A. Joireman, Social and Temporal Orientations in Social Dilemmas. A.E. Tenbrunsel, G. Northcraft, In the Eye of the Beholder: Payoff Structures and Decision Frames in Social Dilemmas. R.M. Kramer, Dilemmas and Doubts: How Decision Makers Cope with Interdependence and Uncertainty. Part 2. Social Values, Social Control, and Cooperation. G.P. Shelley, M. Page, P. Rives, E. Yeagley, D.M. Kuhlman, Nonverbal Communication and Detection of Individual Differences in Social Value Orientation. T. Boles, H. Le, H. Nguyen, Persons, Organizations, and Societies: The Effects of Collectivism and Individualism on Cooperation. J.L. Grzelak, D.M. Kuhlman, E. Yeagley, J.A. Joireman, Attraction to Prospective Dyadic Relationships: Effects of Fate Control, Reflexive Control, and Partners Trustworthiness. Part 3. Ethical Judgments, Fairness, and Equality. F. Gino, D.A. Moore, M.H. Bazerman, See No Evil: When We Overlook Other Peoples Unethical Behavior. K. Gibson, J.K. Murnighan, From Theory to Practice: Messick and Morality. S.T. Allison, J.L. Burnette, Fairness and Preference for Underdogs and Topdogs. S. Desal, A.P. Brief, J.George, Meaner Managers: A Consequence of Income Inequality. Part 4. Commentary and Reflections. R. Dawes, Appreciation for Professor David M. Messick: Peanuts, Ping Pong, and Naivete. D. Messick, Retrospection on a Career in Social Psychology.University of Minnesota Ph.D. dissertation. June 2009. Major: Economics. Advisor: Aldo Rustichini. 1 computer file (PDF); viii, 94 pages.

Profit from the Priceless: Heritage Sites, Property Rights and the Duty to Preserve

This article suggests that corporate responsibility should be interpreted to include concern about resources that cannot easily be treated as commodities. Heritage Sites are places of historical and cultural importance. Given the primacy of contingent valuation methods in creating policy, these sites are often at risk from development or tourism since there is pressure to treat them as revenue centers. The article moves to looking at the status of sites in terms of property rights, drawing on Lockes original formulation. The article concludes that there is a normative justification for treating these sites as collective property that may warrant maintenance, preservation and restricted access.

Going Beyond Intuitions: Reclaiming the Philosophy in Business Ethics

Business ethics texts often have sections on ethical theory, but typically little or no discussion of foundational philosophical concepts like cause, personhood, or responsibility. Here I use the Love Canal case as an example of how discussion could be enriched by reference to issues such as these. I advocate that we foster deliberation about these kinds of core metaphysical issues as well as ethical theory in case analysis, and believe that doing so would move students from intuitive gainsaying to a richer and more subtle examination of cases.

Biases and Rationality in the Mediation Process

The primary goal of this chapter is to provide a prescriptive framework for the mediation process based upon existing descriptive research. We believe there is a chasm between current dispute resolution research and the mediation practitioner that is similar to the one between negotiation researchers and practitioners up until the early 1980s. Negotiation research then had two major, unrelated directions: the game-theoretic (economic) perspective and the social-psychological perspective. The game-theoretic perspective assumed that negotiators were rational and developed their prescriptions based upon this assumption. Meanwhile, the social-psychological perspective described the interaction of negotiators, dispositional characteristics, and situational influences. The economic models offered untested theoretical prescriptions based on an unrealistic set of expectations of the rationality of decision makers, while descriptive models lacked the insight necessary to tell negotiators how to change their behavior. Thus descriptions lacked prescriptive value and prescriptions were not based on evidence.

Stakeholder Management, Sustainability and Phronesis

In this conceptual paper I address the question of how business should approach issues of sustainability. I present a theoretical perspective marrying three elements: First, the realization that economic metrics alone are an inadequate basis for environmental choices. Second, I contend that management should adopt stakeholder theory which views the corporation as a vehicle to improve the welfare of all those affected by its actions. Finally, I contend that leaders holding stakeholder views are best served by the Aristotelian notion of practical wisdom – phronesis. Phronesis is a quality of character that applies well in the case of managerial attitudes to environmental concerns, since incorporating sustainability imperatives into corporate decision-making requires practical discernment and leadership in addition to technical skill. I will briefly illustrate my case by examining the values exhibited by Ray Anderson, CEO of the international carpet manufacturer, Interface.