Kevin J. Davis

How Swift Starting Action Teams Get off the Ground What United Flight 232 and Airline Flight Crews Can Tell Us About Team Communication

In 1989, United Airlines Flight 232 survived a catastrophic in-flight engine explosion because of, in part, the crew’s ability to communicate while under crisis conditions. Drawing on the experience of Flight 232, other flight deck crew research, and the authors’own flying experiences, the authors develop a descriptive, proposition-based model of the communication process dynamics found in such groups, which they call swift starting action teams. They argue that swift starting action teams, composed of highly trained strangers within one organization, must use communication processes that enable them to perform well immediately and manage crises in high risk environments. These processes depend on each team’s use and awareness of communication values and communication interactions. The authors discuss the communication dynamics of swift starting action teams and the implication of considering such teams in future research.

The role of communication values in swift starting action teams: IT insights from flight crew experience

We define a new subset of action teams termed swift starting action teams. These high technology groups of professional, well trained strangers perform from the moment they start working and face high stakes from the beginning. For these teams, we present evidence that the expression of communication values precedes effective task communication and team performance. IT professionals increasingly team with other professionals in high technology environments, such as swift starting action teams. Communication and communication values are important to the success of action team interactions common to IT professionals, such as requirements analysis, knowledge discovery interviews, and end user service engagements.

Effects of deliberate practice on crisis decision performance

This study examined the impact of deliberate practice on pilot decision making in once-in-a-career crisis decision scenarios. First we explored the impact of deliberate practice on pilot decision-making performance for crisis flying scenarios that had been practiced in their entirety. Then we looked at the impact of deliberate practice in which one aspect of the crisis scenario - the particular malfunction - was unpracticed. We analyzed pilot decision-making performance in response to 160 airborne mechanical malfunctions. We initially found that deliberate practice significantly improves decision-making performance for wholly practiced crises but does not improve decision-making performance when the specific malfunction has not been practiced. We then split decision making for each crisis into two phases: assessment and action selection. For wholly practiced crisis scenarios, additional deliberate practice positively impacts each decision-making phase. However, for part-practiced scenarios, deliberate practice appears to differentially affect phase of error. Specifically, pilots with more deliberate practice erred in action selection, whereas less-practiced pilots erred in assessment. Actual or potential applications of this research include training proscriptions for crisis decision making.

Executive coaching by proxy in a large organization: a leadership development tool

Executive Summary The area of executive coaching is gaining rapid interest in the field of organizational consultation. It has expanded beyond the role of helping an executive get back on track, to developing managerial skills and leadership development. Some of the potential benefits of executive coaching have not yet been fully utilized by many organizations in part due to cost. Resource constraints have made it difficult to implement executive coaching across a large group of managers in large organizations. This paper describes how one very large, geographically dispersed organization implemented a comprehensive coaching by proxy program through the use of in-house resources. The specific application content coaching was aimed at helping managers better utilize and benefit from organizational climate surveys.

Comparing Institutional Level and Technical Core Leaders: How Personality and Organizational Roles Affect Leadership Choices

Conventional wisdom suggests that leaders should conform to a style best suited for one’s organization, or at least the best style for a particular role. Yet, this approach implies a unitary approach to leadership and assumes chameleon-like capabilities. (Conger 2004) Recent work on the power of authenticity (e.g., George, et al, 2007) and the persistence of personality make it seem unlikely that would-be leaders are sufficiently malleable to change his or her leadership style at will. Instead, we should expect leaders to gravitate toward the roles in which they can be most authentic. We demonstrate this expected, natural sorting by examining US military organizations using Thompson’s (1967) division of responsibility and control within organizations. In particular, we apply Yukl’s (2008) leadership dimensions and Gangestad and Snyder’s (2000) self-monitoring scale to demonstrate that technical core and institutional level leaders rely on very different leadership styles. We then show that the need for authenticity drives different personalities into very different leadership roles.

Style and de Stijl, or Morningstar and Mondrian: Use and Misuse of Style Boxes

Graphics distill and convey information. The clarity and power of the simple style box efficiently convey two vital dimensions of investment style for equities valuation and size. In promoting awareness of style variations, style boxes—Morningstars particularly—have advanced investment literacy. However, as currently constructed, the style box misleads and can induce unwanted behavior and unintended consequences.