Kevin Kuhn

Elemental composition in sealed plutonium-beryllium neutron sources.

Five sealed plutonium-beryllium (PuBe) neutron sources from various manufacturers were disassembled. Destructive chemical analyses for recovered PuBe materials were conducted for disposition purposes. A dissolution method for PuBe alloys was developed for quantitative plutonium (Pu) and beryllium (Be) assay. Quantitation of Be and trace elements was performed using plasma based spectroscopic instruments, namely inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) and atomic emission spectrometry (ICP-AES). Pu assay was accomplished by an electrochemical method. Variations in trace elemental contents among the five PuBe sources are discussed.

Forensic investigation of plutonium metal: a case study of CRM 126

In this study, a certified plutonium metal reference material (CRM 126) with a known production history is examined using analytical methods that are commonly employed in nuclear forensics for provenancing and attribution. The measured plutonium isotopic composition and actinide assay are consistent with values reported on the reference material certificate. Model ages from U/Pu and Am/Pu chronometers agree with the documented production timeline. The results confirm the utility of these analytical methods and highlight the importance of a holistic approach for forensic study of unknown materials.

Chemical investigation of three plutonium–beryllium neutron sources

Thorough physical and chemical characterization of plutonium–beryllium (PuBe) neutron sources is an important capability with applications ranging from material accountancy to nuclear forensics. Characterization of PuBe sources is not trivial owing to range of existing source designs and the need for adequate infrastructure to deal with radiation and protect the analyst. This study demonstrates a method for characterization of three PuBe sources that includes physical inspection and imaging followed by controlled disassembly and destructive analysis.

Nuclear forensic analysis of a non-traditional actinide sample

Nuclear forensic publications, performance tests, and research and development efforts typically target the bulk global inventory of intentionally safeguarded materials, such as plutonium (Pu) and uranium (U). Other materials, such as neptunium (Np), pose a nuclear security risk as well. Trafficking leading to recovery of an interdicted Np sample is a realistic concern especially for materials originating in countries that reprocesses fuel. Using complementary forensic methods, potential signatures for an unknown Np oxide sample were investigated. Measurement results were assessed against published Np processes to present hypotheses as to the original intended use, method of production, and origin for this Np oxide.