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Dive into the research topics where Kim Lane Scheppele is active.

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Featured researches published by Kim Lane Scheppele.


Social Problems | 1979

Salience of Crime and Support for Harsher Criminal Sanctions

D. Garth Taylor; Kim Lane Scheppele; Arthur L. Stinchcombe

This paper examines the relation between the salience of crime and support for harsher legal sanctions (capital punishment, harsher courts) in American public opinion. Many of the “simple theories” of effect are not supported. People who are more afraid or who have been victimized do not necessarily favor harsher sanctions. At the ecological level, in environments which are characterized by higher rates of crime and greater fear of crime, respondents do not express a greater demand for harsher sanctions. However, public opinion and the “ideology” of crime and punishment are much more consistent in high risk areas.


International Journal of Sociology | 1996

Rules of Law: The Complexity of Legality in Hungary

Antal Örkény; Kim Lane Scheppele

Abstract:The paper posits the existence in Hungary of three levels of legalism, defined as legal consciousness and legal compliance: the constitutional level, the level of relations between state a...


Rationality and Society | 1991

Fairness and Secrecy: A Contractarian Approach

John R. Chamberlin; Kim Lane Scheppele

This article examines the law pertaining to secrecy in contractual bargaining and argues that courts decide cases more consistently with contractarian principles than with economic ones. The economic theory of law claims that courts ought to require people to disclose secret information when that information was acquired as a by-product of other productive activity and to allow people to keep information secret when it was the product of significant investment. The contractarian theory argues that courts ought to (a) protect people from catastrophic losses, (b) require disclosure of secrets whose existence is not known to others, and (c) allow bargainers to keep visible secrets provided that their bargaining partners face roughly equal costs of acquiring the same information. A model is developed that specifies the effects of various information asymmetries in bargaining and shows how the courts focus on correcting the sorts of asymmetries that a contractarian would worry about rather than on correcting those asymmetries that an economic analyst would find most important.


Contemporary Sociology | 1982

Advanced Questionnaire Design.

Kim Lane Scheppele; Patricia J. Labaw


Journal of Social Issues | 1983

Through women's eyes: Defining danger in the wake of sexual assault.

Kim Lane Scheppele; Pauline B. Bart


Law & Society Review | 2004

Constitutional Ethnography: An Introduction

Kim Lane Scheppele


University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law | 2004

Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11

Kim Lane Scheppele


Review of Sociology | 1994

LEGAL THEORY AND SOCIAL THEORY

Kim Lane Scheppele


Archive | 1988

Legal secrets : equality and efficiency in the common law

Kim Lane Scheppele


Icon-international Journal of Constitutional Law | 2003

Aspirational and aversive constitutionalism: The case for studying cross-constitutional influence through negative models

Kim Lane Scheppele

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Antal Örkény

Eötvös Loránd University

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György Csepeli

Eötvös Loránd University

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Kriszta Kovács

Eötvös Loránd University

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