Konstantinos Angelopoulos

The optimal distribution of the tax burden over the business cycle

This paper analyses optimal income taxes over the business cycle under a balanced-budget restriction, for low, middle and high income agents. A model incorporating capital-skill complementarity in pro- duction and differential access to capital and labour markets is de- veloped to capture the cyclical characteristics of the US economy, as well as the empirical observations on wage (skill premium) and wealth inequality. We fi nd that the tax rate for high income agents is opti- mally the least volatile and the tax rate for low income agents the least countercyclical. In contrast, the path of optimal taxes for the middle income group is found to be the most volatile and counter-cyclical. We further fi nd that the optimal response to output-enhancing capi- tal equipment technology and spending cuts is to increase the progres- sivity of income taxes. Finally, in response to positive TFP shocks, taxation becomes more progressive after about two years.

Fiscal Policy, Rent Seeking, and Growth under Electoral Uncertainty: Theory and Evidence from the OECD

We construct a general equilibrium model of economic growth and optimally chosen fiscal policy, in which individuals compete with each other for a share of government spending and two political parties alternate in power according to exogenous electoral uncertainty. The main prediction is that uncertainty about remaining in power results in increased fiscal spending, which in turn distorts incentives by pushing individuals away from productive work to rent-seeking activities; then, distorted incentives hurt growth. This scenario receives empirical support in a dataset of 25 OECD countries over the period 1982-96. In particular, uncertainty about remaining in power leads to larger government shares in GDP, which in turn exert an adverse effect on the ICRG index measuring incentives and this is bad for growth.

Do political incentives matter for tax policies? Ideology, opportunism and the tax structure

This paper investigates the importance of political ideology and opportunism in the choice of the tax structure. In particular, we examine the effects of cabinet ideology and elections on the distribution of the tax burden across factors of production and consumption for 21 OECD countries over the period 1970-2000 by employing four alternative cabinet ideology measures and by using the methodology of effective tax rates. There is evidence of both opportunistic and partisan effects on tax policies. More precisely, we find that left-wing governments rely more on capital relative to labor income taxation and that they tend to increase consumption taxes. Moreover, we find that income tax rates (but not consumption taxes) tend to be reduced in pre-electoral periods and that capital effective tax rates (defined broadly to include taxes on self-employed income) are reduced by more than effective labor tax rates.

Human Capital Accumulation and Transition to Skilled Employment

This paper assesses the impact of investment- and education-specific technical change on occupational transition and the skill premium in a model with human capital. In this framework, human capital augments labor productivity and also facilitates the transition to skilled employment. In line with empirical evidence, this setup predicts that an increase in the productivity of physical capital (investment-specific change) leads to very small increases in the relative supply of skilled workers and to significant and rising increases in the skill premium. Additionally, reforms that improve the productivity of resources used in education (education-specific change) reduce wage inequality and increase mobility.

Rent Seeking,Growth and Pre-election Policies

We construct an otherwise standard general equilibrium model of economic growth and optimally chosen fiscal policy, in which individuals compete with each other for extra fiscal transfers and two political parties compete with each other for staying in power. The main prediction is that relatively large public sectors in pre-election periods distort incentives by pushing individuals away from productive work to rent seeking activity; in turn, distorted incentives hurt growth. We test this prediction by using a panel data set of a group of 25 OECD countries over the period 1982-1996, as well as a cross-section of 108 industrial and developing countries over the decade 1990-2000. Indeed, there is evidence that measures of electoral and political instability cause high government shares in GDP, which in turn exert an adverse effect on the ICRG index measuring incentives, and all this is bad for growth.