Kristin Reichborn-Kjennerud

Auditors' understanding of evidence: A performance audit of an urban development programme

This article uses a case study to analyse two main dilemmas that performance auditors face when auditing complex interventions in governance. The first dilemma, concerning the performance auditors’ roles as improvement agents and independent controllers, is that the improvement agenda often implies interacting closely with the auditees whereas controlling requires independence. The second dilemma pertains to the auditors’ choice of pre-planned audit criteria which limit what evidence the auditors can document. This choice affects the auditors’ role of holding a government to account. It also affects the type of information divulged to stakeholders concerning the social intervention that is evaluated.

Performance audit and the importance of the public debate

The purpose of this article is to explore the impact of performance audit on public policy. The article investigates performance audit reports and the debates they trigger in the public realm. The case of Norway is analysed using mixed methods including a questionnaire, mapping and categorizing of reports, document studies and interviews. The results show that the Norwegian Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) is primarily preoccupied with managerial issues. It is nevertheless open to interpretation whether the preoccupation with managerial issues primarily implies an efficiency and effectiveness focus or an assessment of compliance to managerial standards. Most reports receive moderate attention from the media and the parliamentary control committee. Therefore direct dialogue with the ministries appears to be important to ensure that performance audits are influential. In the public debate the SAI, the ministries and the members of parliament base their argumentation on different institutional logics. These logics can lead to different interpretations of the control system, laws and regulations and hamper the SAI’s influence.

Auditee Strategies: An Investigation of Auditees' Reactions to the Norwegian State Audit Institution's Performance Audits

This article contributes to theory on accountability—how it is played out and responded to. It uses the Norwegian State Audit Institution as an illustration. The responses of the audited entities to the SAI’s institutional pressure were identified through an analysis of four different cases. Four auditee strategies were identified. They indicate that the performance audit has impact when the auditees agree with the conclusions of the SAI. Sanctions from the control committee and the Parliament are equally important. Even though the extent of sanctions and conflict of opinion matter for the auditees’ responses, the effects are context dependent.

Performance Audits and Supreme Audit Institutions’ Impact on Public Administration The Case of the Office of the Auditor General in Norway

Performance audit is widespread but contested. The “audit society” proposition holds that audits are rituals producing comfort, whereas the “mandatory audit” proposition in public policy presumes that audits have positive impacts. Common to both propositions is the lack of empirical evidence of audit impact. This article analyzes survey data of the auditees’ tendency to make changes as a consequence of Supreme Audit Institutions’ performance audits. Civil servants who had experienced performance audits responded that ministries and agencies tend to make changes, but instrumental, institutional, and political factors have an effect on the institution’s propensity to make changes.

Performance audit as a contributor to change and improvement in public administration

The last 30 years of the New Public Management ‘regime’ in many western countries have resulted in increased use of audit and other control mechanisms. These mechanisms are supposed to contribute both to accountability and improvement. In this article, theories of evaluation and organizational learning are used to understand how the dynamics of control affect change processes. We analyse responses to performance audit reports carried out by the country’s Supreme Audit Institution – an important control institution in Norway, as in most other countries. The findings are primarily based on survey data from 353 Norwegian civil servants. The auditees reported that they were mostly positive towards the reports and used them to make improvements in their control systems; however, civil servants also perceived the reports to be unbalanced. The results indicate that the performance audits’ contributions to improvements are less clear than they appear to be at first glance, and that personal and political factors may affect civil servants’ responses.

Control and Autonomy—The SAIs in Norway, Denmark, and Germany as Watchdogs in an NPM-Era?

New public management (NPM) reforms have weakened the direct steering capacity within state bureaucracy. This article looks into how supreme audit institutions in three countries (Norway, Denmark, and Germany) assess these types of reforms. The analysis shows that all three SAIs have taken on an evaluative role when judging NPM instruments. At the same time their emphasis on legality and compliance can be at odds with some of the operating principles in NPM. All in all the German SAI seems to be the most radical critic. This may be linked to the lack of openness of the German SAIs results that makes it more internally focused within a mindset of administrative accountability.

A New Organisation of Public Administration: From Internal to External Control

Abstract Since the 1970s the Supreme Audit Institutions (SAI) have gradually expanded their role as external controllers of the public administration. Instead of merely controlling whether accounts are according to standards they have taken on a role as evaluators with a mandate to assess whether the public administration works economically, efficiently and effectively. With this new regime of external control, the question arises whether the SAIs’ control, in practice, contributes to a more efficient and effective public sector. Whether this external control will be effective depends, in the end, on the extent to which the organisations learn from the control they are subjected to and make actual changes. The chapter uses theories of cultural differences and theories on control within public administration to understand civil servant perceptions of SAI results. Data on civil servants’ reactions to the SAIs’ performance audit in four countries are analysed to see whether performance audits have any impact on the audited entities. The research is based on 696 responses to questionnaires sent out to civil servants in three different Nordic countries plus one new democracy in northern Europe, Estonia.

Extensive Decentralisation - but in the Shadow of Hierarchy

The Nordic countries are classified as Social Democratic welfare states. They are unitary states with strong local government capacities. In the Nordic model the two spheres of government are integrated and responsibilities are divided between different levels of government in flexible ways. The system is decentralised with local government providing most of the welfare services, but with significant regulation from the national governmental level. Norway has 428 municipalities. Each municipality has an average of 11,000 inhabitants, but the majority is small with more than half of them having fewer than 5000 inhabitants. There have been several initiatives to merge municipalities into larger entities, but few of them have succeeded. Smaller municipalities prefer instead to base services provision by the use of inter-municipal cooperation.