Bastian Jantz

Mapping accountability changes in labour market administrations: from concentrated to shared accountability?:

The article explores how recent changes in the governance of employment services in three European countries (Denmark, Germany and Norway) have influenced accountability relationships. The overall assumption in the growing literature about accountability is that the number of actors involved in accountability arrangements is rising, that accountability relationships are becoming more numerous and complex, and that these changes may lead to contradictory accountability relationships, and finally to ‘multi accountability disorder’. The article tries to explore these assumptions by analysing the different actors involved and the information requested in the new governance arrangements in all three countries. It concludes that the considerable changes in organizational arrangements and more managerial information demanded and provided have led to more shared forms of accountability. Nevertheless, a clear development towards less political or administrative accountability could not be observed. Points for practitioners Public organizations in many areas are confronted with and are using ever more and more sophisticated accountability measures to monitor and improve their performance. But many citizens still perceive them as being not accountable enough. These accountability problems are normally treated by recommending and establishing new and more accountability structures with more actors and information requirements and the assumption that these systems will lead to better output and outcome. At the same time there is a widespread fear that these new shared and fragmented accountability structures weaken established political accountability and legitimacy. The article explores these developments by comparing changes in accountability in labour market administration in three countries and finds that there is more shared accountability but at the same time no weakening of political and administrative accountability.

Marketization and Varieties of Accountability Relationships in Employment Services Comparing Denmark, Germany, and Great Britain

In the past decade, European countries have contracted out public employment service functions to “activate” working-age benefit clients. There has been limited discussion of how contracting out shapes the accountability of employment services or is shaped by alternative democratic, administrative, or network forms of accountability. This article examines employment service accountability in Germany, Denmark, and Great Britain. We find that market accountability instruments are additional instruments, not replacements. The findings highlight the importance of administrative and political instruments in legitimizing marketized service provision and shed light on the processes that lead to the development of a hybrid accountability model.

Performance Management and Accountability: The Welfare Administration Reform in Norway and Germany

A key premise of recent administrative reforms was that performance management would make public organizations more accountable for results. The article discusses the relations and tensions between performance management and different forms of accountability by focusing on the reform of the welfare administration in Norway and Germany. We find that the introduction of performance management has created new accountability structures which influence service delivery, but not necessarily in the direction expected by the reform agents. Unintended consequences observed include target fixation, the displacement of political accountability, and the predominance of control aspects of accountability.

Control and Autonomy—The SAIs in Norway, Denmark, and Germany as Watchdogs in an NPM-Era?

New public management (NPM) reforms have weakened the direct steering capacity within state bureaucracy. This article looks into how supreme audit institutions in three countries (Norway, Denmark, and Germany) assess these types of reforms. The analysis shows that all three SAIs have taken on an evaluative role when judging NPM instruments. At the same time their emphasis on legality and compliance can be at odds with some of the operating principles in NPM. All in all the German SAI seems to be the most radical critic. This may be linked to the lack of openness of the German SAIs results that makes it more internally focused within a mindset of administrative accountability.

Sunset Legislation: Theoretical Reflections and International Experiences

The chapter gives an overview about the use of sunset legislation in three countries, namely, USA, Australia, and Germany. Based on theoretical reflections of policy termination and evaluation, the empirical experiences on how sunset legislation can foster different policy goals are analyzed, and in conclusion the possibilities to connect sunset legislation to risk-based decision-making are discussed.

The Flood Crisis in Germany 2013

In 2013, large floods affected Germany heavily. The natural disaster transcended jurisdictional and organisational boundaries, necessitating a coordinative effort by disaster relief forces and their administrative and political leadership. In the aftermath, politicians and experts praised the improvement of the German system of crisis management, also in direct comparison with the response to the last German “flood of the century” of 2002. This chapter takes a public policy and organisational perspective to analyse the German disaster relief governance throughout all four crisis management phases. By highlighting the central features of the German governance arrangements and the main organisational changes implemented in reaction to the previous flood in 2002, we find that Whole-of-Government approaches are increasingly used by the federal and Lander government.

Steuerung von Querschnittspolitik durch das Bundeskanzleramt

Das Bundeskanzleramt ubt in Deutschland bei der Erarbeitung von Regierungspolitiken traditionell vor allem eine koordinierende Funktion aus. Diese Rollenzuschreibung spiegelt sich in der internen Aufbauorganisation des Bundeskanzleramtes in einer streng hierarchischen Gliederung in Abteilungen, Gruppen und (auf die Geschaftsbereiche einzelner Fachressort spezialisierte) Spiegelreferate wider. Projekt- und Strategiegruppen sowie andere Formen flexibler und innovationsorientierter Organisation spielen hingegen nur eine untergeordnete Rolle. Aufgaben der Politikformulierung und -implementation werden in Deutschland also ublicherweise nicht proaktiv durch die Regierungszentrale wahrgenommen, sondern liegen im Zustandigkeitsbereich der Ressorts. Dies gilt nicht nur fur klassische sektorale Politiken wie die Gesundheitspolitik oder die Landwirtschaftspolitik, sondern auch fur die meisten Querschnittspolitiken. Zwar besitzen viele Policies einen mehr oder minder stark ausgepragten Querschnittscharakter, eindeutige Querschnittspolitiken wie zum Beispiel die Haushalts- und Gleichstellungspolitik, aber auch die im Mittelpunkt dieses Beitrags stehende Burokratieabbaupolitik, sind jedoch dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass deren Implementation (und damit deren Erfolg) in besonders hohem Mase davon abhangt, ob es gelingt, sie dauerhaft in alle anderen Politikfelder zu integrieren.

Verwaltungspolitik auf Bundesebene – eine Bilanz der Großen Koalition

Im Unterschied zu Fragen der Arbeitsmarkt-, Wirtschafts- und Gesundheitspolitik, die von Politikern und Verwaltungsfachleuten, Parteien, Verbanden, Stiftungen, Wissenschaftlern und Burgern intensiv diskutiert werden, findet ein Diskurs uber konkrete Inhalte der Verwaltungspolitik meist nur in Expertenzirkeln statt. Verwaltungspolitische Themen gelangen zwar gelegentlich auf die politische und mediale Agenda, wenn sie eng an Reformen in anderen Politikfeldern geknupft sind (z.B. Umbau der Bundesanstalt in eine Bundesagentur fur Arbeit), einen unmittelbaren Burger- oder Unternehmensbezug aufweisen (z.B. Innovationsregionen) oder aber wenn Verfehlungen der Verwaltung angeprangert werden (z.B. Debatte um die Kontrolltatigkeit der Bundesanstalt fur Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht im Zuge der Finanzmarktkrise). Die allermeisten verwaltungspolitischen Masnahmen werden jedoch unbeachtet von der Offentlichkeit, sogar vielfach unbeachtet von der politischen Elite, ‚von Burokraten fur Burokraten’ entwickelt und umgesetzt.