Kyle Nash

Neural Markers of Religious Conviction

Many people derive peace of mind and purpose in life from their belief in God. For others, however, religion provides unsatisfying answers. Are there brain differences between believers and nonbelievers? Here we show that religious conviction is marked by reduced reactivity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), a cortical system that is involved in the experience of anxiety and is important for self-regulation. In two studies, we recorded electroencephalographic neural reactivity in the ACC as participants completed a Stroop task. Results showed that stronger religious zeal and greater belief in God were associated with less firing of the ACC in response to error and with commission of fewer errors. These correlations remained strong even after we controlled for personality and cognitive ability. These results suggest that religious conviction provides a framework for understanding and acting within ones environment, thereby acting as a buffer against anxiety and minimizing the experience of error.

Religious Belief as Compensatory Control

The authors review experimental evidence that religious conviction can be a defensive source of compensatory control when personal or external sources of control are low. They show evidence that (a) belief in religious deities and secular institutions can serve as external forms of control that can compensate for manipulations that lower personal control and (b) religious conviction can also serve as compensatory personal control after experimental manipulations that lower other forms of personal or external control. The authors review dispositional factors that differentially orient individuals toward external or personal varieties of compensatory control and conclude that compensatory religious conviction can be a flexible source of personal and external control for relief from the anxiety associated with random and uncertain experiences.

Threat and Defense: From Anxiety to Approach

Abstract The social psychological literature on threat and defense is fragmented. Groups of researchers have focused on distinct threats, such as mortality, uncertainty, uncontrollability, or meaninglessness, and have developed separate theoretical frameworks for explaining the observed reactions. In the current chapter, we attempt to integrate old and new research, proposing both a taxonomy of variation and a common motivational process underlying people’s reactions to threats. Following various kinds of threats, people often turn to abstract conceptions of reality—they invest more extremely in belief systems and worldviews, social identities, goals, and ideals. We suggest that there are common motivational processes that underlie the similar reactions to all of these diverse kinds of threats. We propose that (1) all of the threats present people with discrepancies that immediately activate basic neural processes related to anxiety. (2) Some categories of defenses are more proximal and symptom-focused, and result directly from anxious arousal and heightened attentional vigilance associated with anxious states. (3) Other kinds of defenses operate more distally and mute anxiety by activating approach-oriented states. (4) Depending on the salient dispositional and situational affordances, these distal, approach-oriented reactions vary in the extent to which they (a) resolve the original discrepancy or are merely palliative; (b) are concrete or abstract; (c) are personal or social. We present results from social neuroscience and standard social psychological experiments that converge on a general process model of threat and defense.

Ideological and personal zeal reactions to threat among people with high self-esteem: motivated promotion focus.

After a mortality salience manipulation, participants completed measures of either ideological zeal (Study 1) or personal project zeal (Study 3). Mortality salience increased both kinds of zeal but only among participants with high self-esteem. High self-esteem was positively correlated with dispositional tendencies toward promotion focus, action orientation, and behavioral activation; it was negatively correlated with behavioral inhibition and rumination (Study 2). These findings clarify the role of dispositional self-esteem in mortality salience research and confirm that, as has been found with various other threats, zealous reactions to mortality salience are most pronounced among participants with high self-esteem. Results support a regulatory focus perspective on zealous reactions to threat. Ideological and personal zeal reflect motivated promotion focus reactions that are rewarding because they decrease the motivational relevance, regulatory fit, and subjective salience of threats.

Threat and defense as goal regulation: from implicit goal conflict to anxious uncertainty, reactive approach motivation, and ideological extremism.

Four studies investigated a goal regulation view of anxious uncertainty threat (Gray & McNaughton, 2000) and ideological defense. Participants (N = 444) were randomly assigned to have achievement or relationship goals implicitly primed. The implicit goal primes were followed by randomly assigned achievement or relationship threats that have reliably caused generalized, reactive approach motivation and ideological defense in past research. The threats caused anxious uncertainty (Study 1), reactive approach motivation (Studies 2 and 3), and reactive ideological conviction (Study 4) only when threat-relevant goals had first been primed, but not when threat-irrelevant goals had first been primed. Reactive ideological conviction (Study 4) was eliminated if participants were given an opportunity to attribute their anxiety to a mundane source. Results support a goal regulation view of anxious uncertainty, threat, and defense with potential for integrating theories of defensive compensation.

Line bisection as a neural marker of approach motivation

Approach motivation has been reliably associated with relative left prefrontal brain activity as measured with electroencephalography (EEG). Motivation researchers have increasingly used the line bisection task, a behavioral measure of relative cerebral asymmetry, as a neural index of approach motivation-related processes. Despite its wide adoption, however, the line bisection task has not been confirmed as a valid measure of the precise pattern of activity linked to approach motivation. In two studies, we demonstrate that line bisection bias is specifically related to baseline, approach-related, prefrontal EEG alpha asymmetry (Study 1) and is heightened by the same situational factors that heighten the same approach-related prefrontal EEG alpha asymmetry (Study 2). Results support the line bisection task as an efficient and unobtrusive behavioral neuroscience measure of approach motivation.

Reactive Approach Motivation (RAM) for Religion

In 3 experiments, participants reacted with religious zeal to anxious uncertainty threats that have caused reactive approach motivation (RAM) in past research (see McGregor, Nash, Mann, & Phills, 2010, for implicit, explicit, and neural evidence of RAM). In Study 1, results were specific to religious ideals and did not extend to merely superstitious beliefs. Effects were most pronounced among the most anxious and uncertainty-averse participants in Study 1 and among the most approach-motivated participants in Study 2 (i.e., with high Promotion Focus, Behavioral Activation, Action Orientation, and Self-Esteem Scale scores). In Studies 2 and 3, anxious uncertainty threats amplified even the most jingoistic and extreme aspects of religious zeal. In Study 3, reactive religious zeal occurred only among participants who reported feeling disempowered in their everyday goals in life. Results support a RAM view of empowered religious idealism for anxiety management (cf. Armstrong, 2000; Inzlicht, McGregor, Hirsch, & Nash, 2009).

Approach-related left prefrontal EEG asymmetry predicts muted error-related negativity

In two studies, we used electroencephalography (EEG) to test whether approach-motivation-related brain activity would predict reduced sensitivity to negative outcomes. In both studies, participants (Study 1, N=26; Study 2, N=56) were first recorded for baseline EEG to measure approach-related left frontal EEG activity. They then completed either the color-naming Stroop task (Study 1) or the Multi-Source Interference Task (Study 2) to measure error-related negativity (ERN), an event-related potential that has been associated with aversive motivation and distress. In both studies, higher leftward frontal EEG asymmetry predicted reduced ERN amplitude. Hierarchical regression analyses of the separate frontal nodes that comprised the asymmetry score further showed that left frontal activity predicted reduced ERN amplitude whereas right frontal activity predicted greater ERN amplitude. Results have implications for understanding emotion and motivation and for understanding the personal resilience associated with approach motivated states.

Personal Uncertainty Management by Reactive Approach Motivation

The uncertainty management model (UMM) addresses a basic predicament of the human condition. Personal Uncertainty (PU) has long been identified by classic philosophical, sociological, and psychological theories as a cause of rigid and aggressive phenomena from repression and suicide to prejudice and hate. In this commentary, we review a Reactive Approach Motivation (RAM) view of compensatory conviction and worldview defense that is consistent with the UMM and grounded in the neuropsychology of anxiety. We also report new findings from our lab, cited in the target article, which further illuminate precise triggers of UMM and RAM outcomes. A complementarity of the UMM and our research is that the UMM tends to focus on affective reactions to PU, and our research tends to focus on compensatory worldview reactions to PU. Together, UMM and RAM research support the classic, multidisciplinary observation that PU is aversive and causes consequential outcomes.

A neural trait approach to exploring individual differences in social preferences

Research demonstrates that social preferences are characterized by significant individual differences. An important question, often overlooked, is from where do these individual differences originate? And what are the processes that underlie such differences? In this paper, we outline the neural trait approach to uncovering sources of individual differences in social preferences, particularly as evidenced in economic games. We focus on two primary methods—resting-state electroencephalography and structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)—used by researchers to quantify task-independent, brain-based characteristics that are stable over time. We review research that has employed these methods to investigate social preferences with an emphasis on a key psychological process in social decision-making; namely, self-control. We then highlight future opportunities for the neural trait approach in cutting-edge decision-making research. Finally, we explore the debate about self-control in social decision-making and the potential role neural trait research could play in this issue.