Larry L. Jacoby

A process dissociation framework: Separating automatic from intentional uses of memory☆

Abstract This paper begins by considering problems that have plagued investigations of automatic or unconscious influences of perception and memory. A process dissociation procedure that provides an escape from those problems is introduced. The process dissociation procedure separates the contributions of different types of processes to performance of a task, rather than equating processes with tasks. Using that procedure, I provide new evidence in favor of a two-factor theory of recognition memory; one factor relies on automatic processes and the other relies on intentional processes. Recollection (an intentional use of memory) is hampered when attention is divided, rather than full, at the time of test. In contrast, the use of familiarity as a basis for recognition memory judgments (an automatic use of memory) is shown to be invariant across full versus divided attention, manipulated at test. Process dissociation procedures provide a general framework for separating automatic from intentional forms of processing in a variety of domains; including perception, memory, and thought.

Separating conscious and unconscious influences of memory: Measuring recollection

How can conscious and unconscious influences of memory be measured? In this article, a processdissociation procedure (L. L. Jacoby, 1991) was used to separate automatic (unconscious) and consciously controlled influences within a task. For recall cued with word stems, automatic influences of memory (a) remained invariant across manipulations of attention that substantially reduced conscious recollection and (b) were highly dependent on perceptual similarity from study to test. Comparisons with results obtained through an indirect test show the advantages of the process-dissociation procedure as a means of measuring unconscious influences. The measure of recollection derived from this procedure is superior to measures gained from classic test theory and signal-detection theory. The process-dissociation procedure combines assumptions from these 2 traditional approaches to measuring memory. Dissociations between performance on direct and indirect tests of memory supply examples of effects of the past in the absence of remembering (for reviews, see Hintzman, 1990; Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988). In an indirect test, subjects are not asked to report on memory for an event as they would be in a direct test, such as in a test of recognition or recall; rather, they engage in some task that can indirectly reflect memory for the occurrence of that event. Word stemand fragment-completion tasks are among the most popular indirect tests of memory (e.g., Graf & Mandler, 1984; Tulving, Schacter & Stark, 1982; Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1974). For a stem-completion task, subjects might read the word scalp and then be presented with the stem sea— with instructions to complete that stem with the first word that comes to mind. Evidence of automatic influences of memory that are dissociated from performance on a direct test is provided by the finding that prior presentation of a word increases the likelihood of that word being used to complete a stem, even though a direct test reveals no memory for the prior presentation of the word. Some of the most striking examples of dissociations come from the performance of patients suffering a neurological deficit. Korsakoff amnesics, for example, show near-normal effects of memory in their performance of a stem-completion task, even though

Perceptual Enhancement: Persistent Effects of an Experience

Presenting a word enhances its later perceptual identification. This article focuses on the relation between this effect on perception and recognition memory. Prior experiments have revealed that perceptual enhancement is independent of recognition memory and have led to the two types of task being identified with separate memory systems. In contrast, the present experiments reveal parallel effects on the two types of task. Perceptual enhancement persists over days but, like recognition memory, is influenced by manipulations of retrieval conditions. I conclude that both perceptual and memory tasks rely on the retrieval of memory for whole prior processing episodes but can differ in terms of the number and nature of retrieval cues that they provide. I describe perception and memory within a common framework.

On interpreting the effects of repetition: Solving a problem versus remembering a solution

When a problem is repeated, the later presentation of the problem sometimes results in the subject responding by remembering the solution rather than by going through the operations that would otherwise be necessary to solve the problem. The means of obtaining the solution is shown to influence subsequent retention performance; retention of the solution suffers if it has been obtained by remembering rather than by solving the problem. The distinction between solving a problem and remembering a solution is used in an account of the effect of spacing repetitions and other standard memory phenomena. The relevance of the distinction to tasks such as word perception is also discussed.

Becoming famous without being recognized: Unconscious influences of memory produced by dividing attention

The familiarity of names produced by their prior presentation can be misinterprete d as fame. We used this false fame effect to separately study the effects of divided attention on familiarity versus conscious recollection. In a first experiment, famous and nonfamous names were presented to be read under conditions of full vs. divided attention. Divided attention greatly reduced later recognition memory performance but had no effect on gains in familiarity as measured by fame judgments. In later experiments, we placed recognition memory and familiarity in opposition by presenting only nonfamous names to be read in the first phase. Recognizing a name as earlier read on the later fame test allowed Ss to be certain that it was nonfamous. Divided attention at study or during the fame test reduced list recognition performance but had no effect on familiarity. We conclude that conscious recollection is an attention-demanding act that is separate from assessing familiarity. Folk wisdom suggests that we benefit from experience by consciously remembering those experiences and applying the knowledge gained from them to the current situation. In contrast, research shows that many effects of prior experience on later performance can occur independently of the ability to consciously recollect the experience (see Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988, for a review). In this article, we provide further evidence that the past can be used to influence present performance without the intervention of conscious recollection. We show that divided attention, in comparison with full attention, can radically reduce a persons ability to recognize an item as previously presented while leaving intact the effects of that prior presentation on judgment. Furthermore, this potential for unconscious influence of the past leads to a role for conscious recollection that is directly counter to that advanced by folk wisdom. Rather than being a prerequisite for producing effects of the past, conscious recollection can be a means of escaping misleading effects of the past. The task that we used required subjects to judge whether a name was famous. In the first phase of each experiment, people read a list of names. Then those old names were mixed with new famous and new nonfamous names in a test of fame

Becoming famous overnight: limits on the ability to avoid unconscious influences of the past

Nonfamous names presented once in an experiment are mistakenly judged as famous 24 hr later. On an immediate test, no such false fame occurs. This phenomenon parallels the sleeper effect found in studies of persuasion. People may escape the unconscious effects of misleading information by recollecting its source, raising the criterion level of familiarity required for judgments of fame, or by changing from familiarity to a more analytic basis for judgment. These strategies place constraints on the likelihood of sleeper effects. We discuss these results as the unconscious use of the past as a tool vs its conscious use as an object of reflection. Conscious recollection of the source of information does not always occur spontaneously when information is used as a tool in judgment. Rather, conscious recollection is a separate act.

Automatic versus intentional uses of memory : aging, attention and control

In 2 experiments, the authors used a process dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 1991) to separately examine the effects of aging on automatic and consciously controlled memory processes. In Experiment 1, a group of young adults in either a full-attention or divided-attention condition were compared with a group of elderly adults on a fame judgment task. Both age and divided attention had a detrimental effect on consciously controlled memory processing but left automatic processing intact. In Experiment 2, the same age-related pattern was found using a more demanding forced-choice recognition paradigm.

Illusions of immediate memory: Evidence of an attributional basis for feelings of familiarity and perceptual quality ☆

Abstract Experiments were designed to produce illusions of immediate memory and of perception, in order to demonstrate that subjective experience of familiarity and perceptual quality may rely on an unconscious attribution process. Subjects saw a short and rapidly presented list of words, then pronounced and judged a target word. We influenced the fluency of pronouncing the target through independent manipulation of repetition and visual clarity. Judgments of repetition were influenced by clarity (Experiments 1 and 2), but not when subjects knew that clarity was manipulated (Experiment 3). Conversely, judgments of clarity were influenced by repetition (Experiment 4). We interpret these symmetric illusions to mean that fluent performance is unconsciously attributed to whatever source is apparent and that feelings of familiarity and perceptual quality result when fluency is attributed respectively to past experience or current circumstances.

Nonanalytic Cognition: Memory, Perception, and Concept Learning

Publisher Summary This chapter presents evidence that challenges major points in the usual, divergent treatment of perception, categorization, and episodic memory. Perceptual and categorical processing cannot be assumed to depend on high-level units that change only over many trials and that are relatively independent of context. The effect of attentive processing need not be the systematically discarded information about surface characteristics; many perceptual and conceptual judgments depend upon nominally irrelevant information about a source and format. Both generalizing and explicitly episodic memory tasks can be accomplished in several ways. The analytic extreme, emphasized in a usual cognitive framework, depends solely on relevant information. A nonanalytic procedure depends on tightly integrated combinations of relevant and irrelevant information. Perceptual identification and conceptual judgments are no less variable or context dependent than explicit memory for episodes. The chapter discusses the effects on perception and categorization of manipulations that have traditionally been employed in investigations of explicit episodic memory tasks.

Invariance in automatic influences of memory: Toward a user's guide for the process-dissociation procedure.

Three experiments investigated assumptions of the process-dissociation procedure for separating consciously controlled and automatic influences of memory. Conditions that encouraged direct retrieval revealed process dissociations. Manipulating attention during study or manipulating study time affected recollection but left automatic influences of memory relatively invariant. However, paradoxical dissociations were found when conditions encouraged use of a generate-recognize strategy, violating assumptions underlying the estimation procedure. Use of subjective reports to gain estimates produced parallel results. Easily observed correlations are shown to be not useful for testing assumptions underlying the process-dissociation procedure. A multinomial model produced results that agree with those from the process-dissociation approach.