Laura E. Kodres

The Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial Crisis: Some Uncomfortable Questions

We identify current challenges for creating stable, yet efficient financial systems using lessons from recent and past crises. Reforms need to start from three tenets: adopting a system-wide perspective explicitly aimed at addressing market failures; understanding and incorporating into regulations agents’ incentives so as to align them better with societies’ goals; and acknowledging that risks of crises will always remain, in part due to (unknown) unknowns – be they tipping points, fault lines, or spillovers. Corresponding to these three tenets, specific areas for further reforms are identified. Policy makers need to resist, however, fine-tuning regulations: a “do not harm” approach is often preferable. And as risks will remain, crisis management needs to be made an integral part of system design, not relegated to improvisation after the fact.

Does the Introduction of Futures on Emerging Market Currencies Destabilize the Underlying Currencies

Recent interest in futures contracts on emerging market currencies has raised concerns among some central bank authorities about their ability to maintain stable currencies. This paper presents empirical results examining the influence of the Mexican peso, the Brazilian real, and the Hungarian forint futures contracts on the respective spot markets. While measures of linear dependence and feedback indicate strong connections between the respective markets, futures volatility does not significantly explain spot market volatility, nor does it increase after futures introductions. To account for the characteristics of the spot and futures returns, a SWARCH model is employed to estimate volatility.

'Near-Coincident' Indicators of Systemic Stress

The G-20 Data Gaps Initiative has called for the IMF to develop standard measures of tail risk, which we identify in this paper with systemic risk. To understand the conditions under which tail risk is present, it is first necessary to develop a measure of what constitutes a systemic stress, or tail, event. We develop such a measure and uses it to assess the performance of eleven near-term systemic risk indicators as ‘early’ warning of distress among top financial institutions in the United States and the euro area. Two indicators perform particularly well in both regions, and a couple of other simple indicators do well across a number of criteria. We also find that the sizes of institutions do not necessarily correspond with their contribution to spillover risk. Some practical guidance for policies is provided.

Macroprudential regulatory policies : the new road to financial stability?

This book is a collection of papers presented in the conference held at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago in September 2010, that examines the role of macroprudential regulation in the financial industry. Shocked by the experience of the last few years, many argue that the more traditional microprudential regulatory tools are inadequate to create a safe and stable financial system. The microprudential paradigm relies on the presumption that the financial system as a whole can be made safe by ensuring individual financial institutions are made safe. This ignores interconnections and externalities, whereby the actions of one financial institution or events in financial markets can lead to spillover effects that adversely affect general market conditions, other financial institutions, and ultimately the economy as a whole. Instead, it is argued, there is a need for both microprudential approaches to regulate individual institutions and macroprudential approaches to manage the overall financial system risks. Conference participants discussed macroprudential regulation and related issues, including: What are the theoretical motivations for macroprudential regulation? How would it interact with other regulatory and macroeconomic policies, especially monetary policy? What would be the specific macroprudential tools? Who should have control over the macroprudential tools? How should a macroprudential regulator be structured? Where should it be housed? How can macroprudential policies be structured across national borders? What role, if any, can market discipline play in supporting macroprudential objectives? Concentrating on public policy issues, the conference featured keynote addresses by influential past and present public policy figures including: Paul Volcker, Chairman of the US Presidents Economic Recovery Advisory Board and former Chairman of the Federal Reserve System; Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, Chairman, Promontory Financial Group Europe and Former Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision; Jaime Caruana, General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements and Former Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision; and Charles Taylor, Director of the Pew Charitable Trust Financial Reform Project and Former Executive Director of the Group of Thirty.