Laura Meriluoto

Existence Advertising, Price Competition, and Asymmetric Market Structure

We examine a two-stage duopoly game in which firms advertise their existence to consumers in stage 1 and compete in prices in stage 2. Whenever the advertising technology generates positive overlap in customer bases, the equilibrium for the stage-1 game is asymmetric in that one firm chooses to remain small in comparison to its competitor. For a specific random advertising technology, we show that one firm will always be half as large as the other. No pure-strategy price equilibrium exists in the stage-2 game, and as long as there is some overlap in customer bases, the mixed-strategy price equilibrium does not converge to the Bertrand equilibrium.

On the probability of winning a lottery with a random number of competitors

This article is concerned with models in which an agent faces a lottery with j other agents for a prize, so that the probability of winning the prize is 1/(j + 1), and where j is stochastic. After describing four different situations where such a lottery is present, we construct the expected value of the probability of winning such a lottery and prove a theorem that presents the expected value in a simpler form. We then give an example of the theorem being applied to gain new insights into auction theory.

Filtering and Email Pricing as Solutions to Spam

We analyze the success of filtering as a solution to the spam problem when used alone or concurrently with sender pricing, receiver pricing, or both. We find that filtering alone may exacerbate the spam problem in terms of both the total number of spam message sent and the expected number of spam messages received, because it may cause the spammer to send multiple variants of his message to each customer in an attempt to evade the filter. Sender and receiver prices work as expected. The effectiveness of each instrument improves as the levels of other instruments are increased.

The fixed price offer mechanism in Trade Me online auctions

The fixed-price-offer (FPO) mechanism in Trade Me auctions allows sellers to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer at the conclusion of an unsuccessful auction. Weinvestigate the effects of the FPO option on strategies and outcomes in independent-value auctions. The FPO option induces some bidders with a value above the sellers reserve to wait for an FPO instead of bidding. Overall, the FPO option increases the probability of sale but reduces expected seller revenue compared with a standard auction. The impact of the FPO option is reduced when the number of bidders increases.