Lauren E. Kahn

Training-Induced Changes in Inhibitory Control Network Activity

Despite extensive research on inhibitory control (IC) and its neural systems, the questions of whether IC can be improved with training and how the associated neural systems change are understudied. Behavioral evidence suggests that performance on IC tasks improves with training but that these gains do not transfer to other tasks, and almost nothing is known about how activation in IC-related brain regions changes with training. Human participants were randomly assigned to receive IC training (N = 30) on an adaptive version of the stop-signal task (SST) or an active sham-training (N = 30) during 10 sessions across 3 weeks. Neural activation during the SST before and after training was assessed in both groups using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Performance on the SST improved significantly more in the training group than in the control group. The pattern of neuroimaging results was consistent with a proactive control model such that activity in key parts of the IC network shifted earlier in time within the trial, becoming associated with cues that anticipated the upcoming need for IC. Specifically, activity in the inferior frontal gyrus decreased during the implementation of control (i.e., stopping) and increased during cues that preceded the implementation of IC from pretraining to post-training. Also, steeper behavioral improvement in the training group correlated with activation increases during the cue phase and decreases during implementation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. These results are the first to uncover the neural pathways for training-related improvements in IC and can explain previous null findings of IC training transfer.

But do you think I'm cool? Developmental differences in striatal recruitment during direct and reflected social self-evaluations

Highlights • fMRI study examined neural correlates of evaluating self and close others.• Adolescent ventral striatum (VS) response is sensitive to evaluation type and domain.• Adolescents recruit VS during social self-evaluations from best friends perspective.• This VS response correlates with pubertal status and age throughout adolescence.

Self-Control as Value-Based Choice

Self-control is often conceived as a battle between “hot” impulsive processes and “cold” deliberative ones. Heeding the angel on one shoulder leads to success; following the demon on the other leads to failure. Self-control feels like a duality. What if that sensation is misleading, and, despite how they feel, self-control decisions are just like any other choice? We argue that self-control is a form of value-based choice wherein options are assigned a subjective value and a decision is made through a dynamic integration process. We articulate how a value-based choice model of self-control can capture its phenomenology and account for relevant behavioral and neuroscientific data. This conceptualization of self-control links divergent scientific approaches, allows for more robust and precise hypothesis testing, and suggests novel pathways to improve self-control.Value-based choice is the process of accumulating varied sources of subjective value for each choice option, then comparing the values to select an action. Self-control, we propose, is implemented by this simple valuation process. Self-control involves a choice among competing actions (e.g., between a goal-promoting behavior and a counter-goal impulse); self-control “success” is choosing an action consistent with the goal. In this model, self-control dilemmas are resolved by dynamically comparing the cumulative subjective value of each option. Thus, factors that increase the relative value of a goal-consistent option are hypothesized to improve self-control. We review anomalies in valuation relevant to self-control (endowment, delay discounting, and diminishing marginal utility) and explain how the properties of the valuation system explain self-control phenomena. We also describe how the valuation model integrates with existing models of self-control. Finally, we discuss how self-control can be improved through interventions that target sources of value, notably identity.

‘Like me?’: ventromedial prefrontal cortex is sensitive to both personal relevance and self-similarity during social comparisons

Social comparisons are an important means by which we gain information about the self, but little is known about the neural mechanisms underlying comparative social judgment, as most prior functional magnetic resonance imaging research on this topic has investigated judgments of self or others in isolation. Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) has routinely been implicated in social cognitive tasks that rely on such absolute judgments about the self or others, but it is unclear whether activity in this region is modulated by personal relevance of social stimuli or self-similarity of judgment targets. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we demonstrate that these forces interact to determine vmPFC response during social comparisons, as well as neural activity in the bilateral anterior insulae. Comparisons between the self and similar others exhibit a unique response in this region when compared with other judgment contexts, suggesting that the special psychological status afforded to these social comparisons is indexed by activity in the vmPFC and insula.

Finding the 'Self' in Self-Regulation: The Identity-Value Model

Many psychological theories suggest a link between self-regulation and identity, but until now a mechanistic account that suggests ways to improve self-regulation has not been put forth. The identity-value model (IVM) connects the idea from social psychology, that aspects of identity such as core values and group affiliations hold positive subjective value, to the process-focused account from decision-making and behavioral economics, that self-regulation is driven by a dynamic value integration across a range of choice attributes. Together, these ideas imply that goal-directed behaviors that are identity-relevant are more likely to be enacted because they have greater subjective value than identity-irrelevant behaviors. A central hypothesis, therefore, is that interventions that increase the degree to which a target behavior is perceived as self-relevant will improve self-regulation. Additionally, identity-based changes in self-regulation are expected to be mediated by changes in subjective value and its underlying neural systems. In this paper, we define the key constructs relevant to the IVM, explicate the model and delineate its boundary conditions, and describe how it fits with related theories. We also review disparate results in the research literature that might share identity-related value as a common underlying mechanism of action. We close by discussing questions about the model whose answers could advance the study of self-regulation.

Learning to play it safe or not: Stable and evolving neural responses during adolescent risky decision-making

Adolescent decision-making is a topic of great public and scientific interest. However, much of the neuroimaging research in this area contrasts only one facet of decision-making (e.g., neural responses to anticipation or receipt of monetary rewards). Few studies have directly examined the processes that occur immediately before making a decision between two options that have varied and unpredictable potential rewards and penalties. Understanding adolescent decision-making from this vantage point may prove critical to ameliorating risky behavior and improving developmental outcomes. In this study, participants aged 14–16 years engaged in a driving simulation game while undergoing fMRI. Results indicated activity in ventral striatum preceded risky decisions and activity in right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG) preceded safe decisions. Furthermore, participants who reported higher sensation-seeking and sensitivity to reward and punishment demonstrated lower rIFG activity during safe decisions. Finally, over successive games, rIFG activity preceding risky decisions decreased, whereas thalamus and caudate activity increased during positive feedback (taking a risk without crashing). These results indicate that regions traditionally associated with reward processing and inhibition not only drive risky decision-making in the moment but also contribute to learning about risk tradeoffs during adolescence.

Does inhibitory control training transfer?: behavioral and neural effects on an untrained emotion regulation task

Inhibitory control (IC) is a critical neurocognitive skill for successfully navigating challenges across domains. Several studies have attempted to use training to improve neurocognitive skills such as IC, but few have found that training generalizes to performance on non-trained tasks. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate the effect of IC training on a related but untrained emotion regulation (ER) task with the goal of clarifying how training alters brain function and why its effects typically do not transfer across tasks. We suggest hypotheses for training-related changes in activation relevant to transfer effects: the strength model and several plausible alternatives (shifting priorities, stimulus-response automaticity, scaffolding). Sixty participants completed three weeks of IC training and underwent fMRI scanning before and after. The training produced pre- to post-training changes in neural activation during the ER task in the absence of behavioral changes. Specifically, individuals in the training group demonstrated reduced activation during ER in the left inferior frontal gyrus and supramarginal gyrus, key regions in the IC neural network. This result is less consistent with the strength model and more consistent with a motivational account. Implications for future work aiming to further pinpoint mechanisms of training transfer are discussed.

Valuation as a Mechanism of Self-Control and Ego Depletion

This chapter presents a model of self-control that explains many phenomena related to self-control including ego depletion. We propose that valuation—the process of integrating multiple sources of subjective value for a given choice option—is a mechanism of self-control. The conflict between a goal and an impulse or another goal is resolved by comparing the cumulative subjective value of the choice options. A given choice option can have an arbitrary number of value sources, and these sources can shift over time depending on situational or intrapersonal constraints. We review the behavioral economics literature on three anomalies in valuation that are directly relevant to self-control (endowment, delay discounting, and diminishing marginal utility) and explain how the properties of the valuation system explain the ego-depletion effect. We close by discussing ways to improve self-control through interventions that target its sources of value, notably including identity.

Motus Moderari: A Neuroscience-Informed Model for Self-Regulation of Emotion and Motivation

This chapter takes a fresh look at emotion regulation and its associated neural systems by adopting a functionalist perspective on emotion and motivation. The common Latin root for both words is motus: to move. Considering emotion and motivation together because of their shared role in impelling behavior allows us to expand our theoretical perspective on “emotion regulation” to include attempts to control or modify motivational states (e.g., craving) as well as emotional ones. Researchers working in affective and clinical science have begun to establish the neural systems associated with the regulation of emotional and motivational states, respectively, but these literatures have remained largely unconnected. Here, we review human studies on emotion/motivation regulation that use neuroimaging, particularly functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and highlight distinct and overlapping patterns during the regulation of emotion versus motivation. These two literatures reveal a broad pattern of prefrontal cortical regulation of subcortical systems but with some critical variations depending on the specific target of the regulation (e.g., positive vs. negative emotions), task type (e.g., implicit vs. explicit), and the degree of agency implied (e.g., whether or not escape is an option). We conclude by introducing an integrated framework for understanding the similarities and differences between different forms of emotion or motivation regulation. The goals of this framework are to accommodate existing results and meaningful differences between them and to provide a clear roadmap for future work to address gaps in the literature on emotion/motivation regulation.

The Identity-Value Model of Self-Regulation: Integration, Extension, and Open Questions

or future-oriented thinking; in those cases, we would predict that the identity-relevant low-level manipulation would lead to greater changes in self-regulation than the identityirrelevant, high-level one. The Role of Social Context Another important aspect of identity that commentators considered to be highly relevant to the IVM is the social self. We fully agree: Identities are, to a large extent, socially and/or culturally constructed (Maranges & Baumeister, this issue), so in considering the role that identity plays in shaping self-regulation, it becomes very important to consider the role that social contexts and roles, as antecedents to and possibly authors of identity, play in doing the same. Moreover, as the research literatures on empathy and close relationships have made clear, the values of the self are often represented to some degree in others, just as the values of others are represented in the self (Fitzsimons, Finkel, & vanDellen, 2015; Nicolle et al., 2012), so the IVM must address how not only social norms but also close others can influence identity and self-concept. However, as some commentators note, the strong influences of social context on identity complicate our argument that identity is a promising candidate process to consistently influence self-regulation across time and context precisely because of its stability. As Hackel and Zaki (this issue) highlight, the assumption that identity has a consistent impact on choice across situations may not hold for aspects of identity related to social identification, such as self-construal (e.g., independent vs. interdependent) and self-categorization (e.g., political or regional identities), both of which are largely subject to contextual social influences. A similar notion was raised by Oyserman et al. (this issue), stating that situational cues (and perhaps social cues) about the contents of identity can shape behavior, an idea that builds off the working self-concept as presented in the IVM. We agree with the commentators that substantial changes in goal-relevant identity could potentially undermine the role of identity as a consistent contributor to self-regulation. However, this concern is mitigated for several reasons. First, as suggested by other commentators, it may be the case that the hierarchical nature of identity allows abstract, stable aspects of self to influence which lower level (e.g., contextually determined) aspects of the self become salient and how strongly they influence behavior. Second, even as social identities and contextual influences change over time and situations, we hold that core values and goals are stable across time because of their inherent abstract and diachronic nature (Northoff, this issue; Sklar & Fujita, this issue). Contextual cues are important, but they do not trigger the same behavior in all people; the meaning of situations and social identities are different across individuals, in part because they interact with stable, within-person attributes such as personality, core values, and long-term goals. Third, as Oyserman et al. (this issue) note, situations themselves can be a source of stability: People are not randomly assigned to situation but instead end up in similar ones repeatedly and often by their own choosing. To the extent that any aspects of identity, such as core values, are stable, they might also promote temporal stability in situations. In this way, we agree that stable contextual cues can facilitate successful self-regulation. We also add that the flexibility of social identities may provide a particular advantage when designing identity-based selfcontrol interventions. Although the stability of the self seems to provide the greatest source of value for motivating goal-oriented behavior change, it’s less clear how susceptible the stable nature of the self is to manipulation. As Molden et al. (this issue) note, if identity is stable and well-rooted in established values, then it might be difficult to change (although goal-promoting aspects of a stable identity could be primed or otherwise activated). Alternatively, flexible elements of identity, such as social identification, that tap into core underlying values may be more effective for targeted interventions. In addition, just because some or many aspects of identity are stable across time and place doesn’t imply that a person’s identity always influences behavior in the same way in a given situation. Another explanation for apparent changes in identity over time—and potential avenue for intervention—is variability in the accessibility or salience of different aspects of identity. Ultimately, the IVM predicts that the contents of the “working self-concept” (Markus & Wurf, 1987; see also McConnell, 2011) at the time of choice will influence the subjective value of the options, regardless of whether those contents are chronically accessible (stable) or were made temporarily salient by situational influences such as the social context or an intervention. The Neural Computations Involved in Identity and Valuation Northoff grapples with the tricky question of how the brain might represent a stable, diachronic identity. His points that identity is essentially (and necessarily) abstract and likely represented in cortical midline structures such as the medial prefrontal cortex fit well with the IVM and its assumptions about the content and neural underpinnings of identity. His commentary substantially advanced our broad starting points on these topics by adding mechanistic specificity of the neural processes, such as infraslow frequency oscillations in the medial prefrontal cortex, that give rise to identity diachronicity. We are encouraged that the very notion of stable identity seems plausible at the level of the brain and eager for further research to uncover exactly how these oscillations interact with the more rapid value accumulation process that occurs at the time of self-control choice. As described earlier, Shenhav notes that there is now strong evidence that value accumulation occurs not only in the vmPFC but also in regions such as the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC). Critically, evidence to date suggests that different accumulators might operate simultaneously at separate locations for various choice attributes, and possibly in interaction (Polania, Krajbich, Grueschow, & Ruff, 2014). For example, the value of mental effort appears to be accumulated in dACC (Shenhav et al., 2016), whereas the value of choice options is accumulated in vmPFC (Rangel & Hare, 2010). The idea that multiple value accumulation processes correspond to different points in the action control hierarchy and operate in parallel is fundamental to the process model of self-regulation (Duckworth, Gendler, & Gross, 2016; Gross, 2015; O’Leary et REPLY 161