Laurent Viguier

Marginal abatement costs of CO2 emission reductions, geographical flexibility and concrete ceilings: an assessment using the POLES model

Abstract The Kyoto Protocol envisage the setting-up of flexibility mechanisms allowing Annex B countries to fulfil their commitments to reducing greenhouse gases with respect for the principle of economic efficiency. The current negotiations relate in particular to the possibility of setting up a system of tradable emissions permits for Annex B countries and also of introducing “ceilings” to trade. This paper analyses the stakes and economic potential of adopting this instrument, both for those countries that made commitments in Kyoto and for developing countries. It is based on a formal approach that allows for a consistent framework of analysis. The emission permit market, is, in fact, simulated on the basis of a reference scenario and of marginal abatement cost curves and estimated by the POLES model; after analysing these marginal abatement cost curves and comparing them with those produced by other models, we explore two different configurations for a competitive market: a market limited to the Annex B countries and a world market. The results produced by the model show that widening the market to include developing countries is more effective than the Annex B market solution; it reduces the cost of implementing Kyoto for OECD countries and at the same time allows the countries of the South to benefit from selling the permits. This research also shows that introducing restrictions on exchanges for Annex B countries could have a counter-productive redistribution effect, with the ethical argument that underlies that particular measure.

The costs of the Kyoto protocol in the European Union

We estimate reference CO2 emission projections in the European Union, and quantify the economic impacts of the Kyoto commitment on Member States. We consider the case where each EUmember individually meets a CO 2 emissions target, applying a country-wide cap and trade system to meet the target but without trade among countries. We use a version of the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model, here disaggregated to separately include 9 European Community countries and commercial and household transportation sectors. We compare our results with that of four energy-economic models that have provided detailed analyses of European climate change policy. In the absence of specific additional climate policy measures, the EPPA reference projections of carbon emissions increase by 14% from 1990 levels. The EU-wide target under the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change is a reduction in emissions to 8% below 1990 levels. EPPA emissions projections are similar to other recent modeling results, but there are underlying differences in energy and carbon intensities among the projections. If EUcountries were to individually meet the EUallocation of the Community-wide carbon cap specified in the Kyoto Protocol, we find using EPPA that carbon prices vary from

Assessing the impact of carbon tax differentiation in the European Union

91 in the United Kingdom to

A two-level computable equilibrium model to assess the strategic allocation of emission allowances within the European union

385 in Denmark; welfare costs range from 0.6% to 5%. r 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

An oracle based method to compute a coupled equilibrium in a model of international climate policy

To what extent do the welfare costs associated with the implementation of the Burden Sharing Agreement in the European Union depend on sectoral allocation of emissions rights? What are the prospects for strategic climate policy to favor domestic production? This paper attempts to answer those questions using a CGE model featuring a detailed representation of the European economies. First, numerical simulations show that equalizing marginal abatement costs across domestic sectors greatly reduces the burden of the emissions constraint but also that other allocations may be preferable for some countries because of pre-existing tax distortions. Second, we show that the effect of a single countrys attempt to undertake a strategic policy to limit impacts on its domestic energy-intensive industries has mixed effects. Exempting energy-intensive industries from the reduction program is a costly solution to maintain the international competitiveness of these industries; a tax-cum-subsidy approach is shown to be better than exemption policy to sustain exports. The welfare impact either policy – exemption or subsidy – on other European countries is likely to be small because of general equilibrium effects.

A Coupled Bottom-Up/Top-Down Model for GHG Abatement Scenarios in the Swiss Housing Sector

This paper deals with the modeling of the strategic allocation of greenhouse gases emission allowances in the EU-wide trading market that results from Kyoto agreement implementation. An M-matrix game is formulated where the players are countries or groups of countries that may have a strategic influence through their allocation of emission allowances and the payoffs are the welfare gains of these countries, evaluated from a multi-country computable general equilibrium model. To solve the matrix game one uses the concept of correlated equilibrium which makes sense in the context of EU negotiations. One studies several formulations of that two-level game structure and, in all these instances, we obtain a unique equilibrium solution that can be given an interesting interpretation for establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the community.

A stochastic dynamic game of carbon emissions trading

This paper proposes a computational game-theoretic model for the international negotiations that should take place at the end of the period covered by the Kyoto protocol. These negotiations could lead to a self-enforcing agreement on a burden sharing scheme given the necessary global emissions limit that will be imposed when the real extent of climate change is known. The model assumes a non-cooperative behavior of the parties except for the fact that they will be collectively committed to reach a target on total cumulative emissions by the year 2050. The concept of normalized equilibrium, introduced by J.B. Rosen for concave games with coupled constraints, is used to characterize a family of dynamic equilibrium solutions in an m-player game where the agents are (groups of) countries and the payoffs are the welfare gains obtained from a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. The model deals with the uncertainty about climate sensitivity by computing an S-adapted equilibrium. These equilibria are computed using an oracle-based method permitting an implicit definition of the payoffs to the different players, obtained through simulations performed with the global CGE model GEMINI-E3.

Carbon Tax and International Emissions Trading: A Swiss Perspective

In this paper we report on the coordinated development of a regional module within a world computable general equilibrium model (CGEM) and of a bottom up energy-technology-environment model (ETEM) describing long term economic and technology choices for Switzerland to mitigate GHG emissions in accordance with Kyoto and post-Kyoto possible targets. We discuss different possible approaches for coupling the two types of models and we detail a scenario built from a combined model where the residential sector is described by the bottom-up model and the rest of the economy by the CGEM.

The coupling of climate and economic dynamics : essays on integrated assessment

This paper proposes a computable stochastic equilibrium model to represent the possible competition between Russia and China on the international market of carbon emissions permits. The model includes a representation of the uncertainty concerning the date of entry of developing countries (e.g., China) on this market in the form of an event tree. Assuming that this date of entry is an uncontrolled event, we model the competition as a dynamic game played on an event tree and we look for a solution called S-adapted equilibrium. We compare the solution obtained from realistic data describing the demand curves for permits and the marginal abatement cost curves in different countries, under different market and information structures: (i) Russias monopoly, (ii) Russia–China competition in a deterministic framework, (iii) Russia–China competition in a stochastic framework. The results show the possible impact of this competition on the pricing of emissions permits and on the effectiveness of Kyoto and post-Kyoto agreements, without a US participation.

Fair trade and harmonization of climate change policies in Europe

This paper assesses the economic impacts of the Swiss climate policy formulated under the Kyoto Protocol; the impacts on the carbon price, the welfare cost, and trade effects are examined. Our analysis is based on a multi-sectoral and multi-regional, computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the world economy (GEMINI-E3) which includes a representation of the Swiss economy. The model is used to evaluate the economic costs incurred in reaching the Swiss emission target through a CO2 tax, and/or by joining a EU-wide emission trading regime.