Alain Haurie

Reinforcing the EU Dialogue with Developing Countries on Climate Change Mitigation

The FP6 TOCSIN project has evaluated climate change mitigation options in China and India and the conditions for strategic cooperation on research, development and demonstration (RDD (II) a strong increase in Annex I support regarding RD (III) a well-designed mix of instruments and targets in an effective climate deal that addresses manifold national interests and concerns.

A Coupled Bottom-Up/Top-Down Model for GHG Abatement Scenarios in the Swiss Housing Sector

In this paper we report on the coordinated development of a regional module within a world computable general equilibrium model (CGEM) and of a bottom up energy-technology-environment model (ETEM) describing long term economic and technology choices for Switzerland to mitigate GHG emissions in accordance with Kyoto and post-Kyoto possible targets. We discuss different possible approaches for coupling the two types of models and we detail a scenario built from a combined model where the residential sector is described by the bottom-up model and the rest of the economy by the CGEM.

The coupling of climate and economic dynamics : essays on integrated assessment

Keywords: NCCR-Climate Note: (Advances in global change research ; vol. 22) Reference REME-BOOK-2005-001doi:10.1007/1-4020-3425-3 Record created on 2006-08-25, modified on 2017-11-27

Assessment of the Effectiveness of Global Climate Policies Using Coupled Bottom-Up and Top-Down Models

In order to assess climate mitigation agreements, we propose an iterative procedure linking TIAM-WORLD, a global technology-rich optimization model, and GEMINI-E3, a global general equilibrium model. The coupling methodology combines the precise representation of energy and technology choices with a coherent representation of the macro-economic impacts, especially in terms of trade effects of climate policies on energy-intensive products. In climate mitigation scenarios, drastic technology breakthroughs are required as soon as possible, especially in large emitting countries, and in all sectors of the economy. Energy-intensive industries tend to be delocalized in regions where low-carbon production is feasible and cheap, or in regions without emission cap. However, emission leakage remains small, mainly due to global lower oil demand, and energy exporting countries are extremely penalized given lower energy exports. Emission reduction at least in the power sector and in energy-intensive industries of developing countries must be considered to reach the 2°C target.

A Robust Noncooperative Meta-Game for Climate Negotiation in Europe

In this paper we define and solve a ‘robust game design’ problem that could be used to assess the fair sharing of the abatement burden among the 28 EU countries in their coming climate negotiations. The problem consists in finding a distribution of a global ‘safety emission budget’ for the panning period 2010–2050, among the 28 countries in such a way to obtain a balanced relative loss of welfare (computed in percent of the discounted consumption in the reference case) when the countries supply strategically their permit endowment on a permit trading system with full banking and borrowing. We assume that the countries play a noncooperative game, where the payoffs are constituted of the gains from the terms of trade plus the gains in the permit trading and minus the abatement cost, expressed as the compensative variation of income. These payoff functions are estimated from an ensemble of numerical simulations of a detailed CGE model, GEMINI-E3 representing the economic interactions among the 28 EU countries. To deal with the uncertainty introduced by the statistical emulation technique we propose to use the concept of robust equilibrium, where the results of robust optimization are exploited in the definition of an equilibrium solution, when the payoff is subject to uncertainties. A numerical illustration is performed and an interpretation of the impact of the robustification approach on the solution of the game design problem is provided.