Lawrence A. Shapiro

Dynamics and Cognition

Many who advocate dynamical systems approaches to cognitive science believe themselves committed to the thesis of extended cognition and to the rejection of representation. I argue that this belief is false. In part, this misapprehension rests on a warrantless re-conception of cognition as intelligent behavior. In part also, it rests on thinking that conceptual issues can be resolved empirically. Once these issues are sorted out, the way is cleared for a dynamical systems approach to cognition that is free to retain the standard conception of cognition as taking place in the head, and over representations.

How to Test for Multiple Realization

When conceived as an empirical claim, it is natural to wonder how one might test the hypothesis of multiple realization. I consider general issues of testability, show how they apply specifically to the hypothesis of multiple realization, and propose an auxiliary assumption that, I argue, must be conjoined to the hypothesis of multiple realization to ensure its testability. I argue further that Bechtel and Mundale (1999) go astray because they fail to appreciate the need for this auxiliary assumption.

Evolutionary Theory Meets Cognitive Psychology: A More Selective Perspective

L. Cosmides and J. Tooby, leaders in the field of evolutionary psychology, have claimed that an evolutionary perspective toward psychology requires both that psychologists conceive of psychological processes as domain specific and that psy- chologists view all adaptive behavior as the product of cognition. In fact, we argue, an evolutionary perspective commits psychology to neither of these positions. The real value of evolutionary theory for psychology, we contend, lies in the heuristic role it plays in determining the function of psychological mechanisms and in the depth it contributes to explanations of why psychological processes have the proper- ties they do. Quite unexpectedly, cognitive psychologists find their field inti- mately connected to a whole new intellectual landscape that had previously seemed remote, unfamiliar, and all but irrelevant. Yet the proliferating connections tying together the cognitive and evol- utionary communities promise to transform both fields, with each supplying necessary principles, methods, and a species of rigor that the other lacks. (Cosmides and Tooby, 1994, p. 85) Recent years have seen a growing movement to wed evolutionary theory to cognitive psychology, and among the matchmakers pushing for this mar- riage Cosmides and Tooby have been especially outspoken. We too think the match will be a fruitful one, but we disagree with C&T that the resulting union is likely to transform cognitive psychology in any drastic way. C&T, as well as other workers in what is sometimes called evolutionary psychology, are inclined to describe a Darwinized cognitive psychology as a radical departure from traditional cognitive psychology. In particular, C&T believe that an introduction of evolutionary thinking into cognitive psychology will

A Clearer Vision

Frances Egan argues that the states of computational theories of vision are individuated individualistically and, as far as the theory is concerned, are not intentional. Her argument depends on equating the goals and explanatory strategies of computational psychology with those of its algorithmic level. However, closer inspection of computational psychology reveals that the computational level plays an essential role in explaining visual processes and that explanations at this level are nonindividualistic and intentional. In conclusion, I sketch an account of content in which content does the sort of explanatory work that Egan denies is possible.

Mental Manipulations and the Problem of Causal Exclusion

Christian List and Peter Menzies 2009 have looked to interventionist theories of causation for an answer to Jaegwon Kims causal exclusion problem. Important to their response is the idea of realization-insensitivity. However, this idea becomes mired in issues concerning multiple realization, leaving it unable to fulfil its promise to block exclusion. After explaining why realization-insensitivity fails as a solution to Kims problem, I look to interventionism to describe a different kind of solution.

Identity, variability, and multiple realization in the special sciences

Compositional variation and variability in nature is abundant. This fact is often thought to entail that multiple realization is also ubiquitous. In particular, compositional variability among cognitive creatures is thought to provide conclusive evidence against the mind-brain type identity theory. In this chapter we argue that the type identity theory, properly understood, is compatible with a wide range of compositional and constitutional variation and variability. Similarly, contrary to received wisdom, variation poses no threat to reductionist ventures. Multiple realization as we understand it, requires a specific pattern of variation. Multiple realization is not self-contradictory; the kinds of variation that qualify as multiple realization are not impossible, but they are less common in general than is widely supposed.

James Bond and the Barking Dog: Evolution and Extended Cognition*

Prominent defenders of the extended cognition thesis have looked to evolutionary theory for support. Roughly, the idea is that natural selection leads one to expect that cognitive strategies should exploit the environment, and exploitation of the right sort results in a cognitive system that extends beyond the head of the organism. I argue that proper appreciation of evolutionary theory should create no such expectation. This leaves open whether cognitive systems might in fact bear a relationship to the environment that leads to their extension.

Making sense of mirror neurons

The discovery of mirror neurons has been hailed as one of the most exciting developments in neuroscience in the past few decades. These neurons discharge in response to the observation of others’ actions. But how are we to understand the function of these neurons? In this paper I defend the idea that mirror neurons are best conceived as components of a sensory system that has the function to perceive action. In short, mirror neurons are part of a hitherto unrecognized “sixth sense”. In this spirit, research should move toward developing a psychophysics of mirror neurons.

The nature of nature: Rethinking naturalistic theories of intentionality

Abstract While there is controversy over which of several naturalistic theories of the mental is most plausible, there is consensus regarding the desideratum of a naturalistically respectable theory. A naturalistic theory of the mental, it is agreed, must explicate representation in nonintentional terms. I argue that this constraint does not get at the heart of what it is to be natural. On the one hand, it fails to provide us with a meaningful distinction between the natural and the unnatural. On the other hand, it unfairly suggests that we withhold judgment on those successes our sciences of the mind have already achieved until a convincing decomposition of the mental is available. I urge a new conception of naturalism that focuses less upon ontological considerations and more upon methodological ones.

Mechanism or Bust? Explanation in Psychology

Proponents of mechanistic explanation have recently suggested that all explanation in the cognitive sciences is mechanistic, even functional explanation. This last claim is surprising, for functional explanation has traditionally been conceived as autonomous from the structural details that mechanistic explanations emphasize. I argue that functional explanation remains autonomous from mechanistic explanation, but not for reasons commonly associated with the phenomenon of multiple realizability. 1. Introduction2. Mechanistic Explanation: A Quick Primer3. Functional Explanation: An Example4. Autonomy as Lack of Constraint5. The Price of Autonomy6. Another Argument against Autonomy7. Conclusion: Autonomy and Multiple Realization Introduction Mechanistic Explanation: A Quick Primer Functional Explanation: An Example Autonomy as Lack of Constraint The Price of Autonomy Another Argument against Autonomy Conclusion: Autonomy and Multiple Realization