William Epstein

Why States Go—And Don't Go—Nuclear:

The incentives and disincentives for countries to go nuclear comprise a combination of military, political, and economic concerns and motivations. These vary over time for different countries. For countries allied to one of the two nuclear superpowers, concern about their military security is not a predominant factor, while it is the decisive one for the non-nuclear countries who are not under the nuclear umbrella of a superpower and who perceive serious threats to their security. For countries without acute security problems, the political and economic motivations are the predominant ones and these include such incentives as strengthening their independence and increasing their status and prestige in the world. The disincentives are largely potential, ranging from effective security guarantees through adequate supplies of conventional armaments to assurances concerning future supplies of fissile materials. Incentives to go nuclear appear to outweigh the disincentives. Only drastic measures by the nuclear powers in the way of security assurances, nuclear disarmament, and the creation of a more just political and economic world order can serve to prevent the emergence of a proliferated world.

What is to be Done

It is now time to turn from theory to a brief consideration of practice—to ask the question, if something like the analysis given in the preceding chapters is correct, then what, if anything, does it demand that we do? At the end of chapter one, it was pointed out that, considered analytically, Holt’s works consist of three main components. First, they contain a positive or constructive account of what he considers the ‘best learning’, the sorts of conditions that promote such learning, and the sorts of conditions that are hostile to it. Secondly, they contain a critique of education, which is justified by appeal to the foregoing account of ‘best learning’. And thirdly, they contain a range of practical strategies, aimed at mitigating the problems of education (especially compulsory schooling) and maximising the opportunity of acquiring the ‘best learning’. This third component was of great significance to Holt. Although there is a sense in which Holt’s work is ‘utopian’, in that it criticises some foundational cultural assumptions and envisages a possible society that exists nowhere, he is, at the same time, a deeply practical, realistic thinker. He does not offer airy plans for grand social reconstruction, addressed to nobody in particular; rather, he tries to answer the question of what can be done by us, here and now. In the words of one of his book titles, he wants to answer the question: What do I do Monday?

Non-nuclear states move to end testing

The United Nations has called a conference to amend the Partial Test Ban Treaty and make it comprehensive. The three principals—the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom—have agreed to come.

The Point Count Plan for Nuclear Arms Reduction

Given the differences in negotiating styles and the technical problems of comparing and balancing diverse weapons systems, USA-USSR nuclear arms control negotiations are extraordinarily difficult in even the most agreeable political climate. Today’s climate is anything but agreeable. The air is polluted by polemics and chilled by distrust. The START and INF talks are suspended indefinitely, and the bewildering array of new weapons developed since SALT I confound any efforts to achieve agreement on the relative threats posed by different components of each side’s nuclear arsenals.

Calculating weapons reductions

Superpower agreement on the overall balance of strategic forces is extremely difficult to achieve. The authors suggest annual percentage reductions, with each side determining its own cuts.