Lawrence B. Pulley

Cash, Paper, and Electronic Payments: A Cross-Country Analysis

The social cost of a payment system comprises between 1% to 1.5% of GDP. This cost can be reduced if non-cash payments shift from paper to electronics since the cost of an electronic payment is estimated to be from one-third to one-half that of a paper-based transaction. We examine the use of cash and five non-cash payment instruments in 14 developed countries over 1987-1993. Our purpose is (1) to outline the current use of check, paper giro, electronic giro, credit card, and debit card payments and (2) to determine why some payment instruments are used more intensively than others, especially electronic versus paper-based payments. Standard demand theory influences (own price and incomes, institutional factors, and simple availability measures across countries are examined, as is the effect of habit formation. Payment substitution relationships are also estimated and indicate that checks will decline with further growth of electronic payments while the instruments that make up electronic payments will tend to expand together rather than replace one another. Copyright 1996 by Ohio State University Press.

Do consumers pay for one-stop banking? Evidence from an alternative revenue function

Abstract In providing financial services jointly, banks may reduce costs due to complementarities in production (cost economies of scope) or raise revenues from complementarities in consumption (revenue economies of scope). Cost economies of scope between bank deposits and loans have been found to be small. Revenue economies of scope are investigated here for the first time and found to be insignificant over 1978–1990 for both small and large banks and for those on or off the revenue-efficient frontier. The lack of complementarities between deposits and loans — where benefits are most likely to occur — suggests that claims of important synergies from an expansion of banking powers be taken with caution.

The Check's in the Mail: Why the United States Lags in the Adoption of Cost-Saving Electronic Payments

The United States payment system costs around

Scope economies: fixed costs, complementarity, and functional form

225 billion annually and checks account for 75% of all noncash payments. Other electronic payment methods (debit cards, automated clearing house direct deposits, and debits) cost only around one third to one half as much as a check. This paper outlines the main reasons why the shift from checks to cheaper electronic payments has been slow, much slower here than in other countries. We also forecast the future use of checks and electronic payments and end by discussing policy initiatives that may speed up this substitution process.

Assessing the FDIC's premium and examination policies using 'Soviet' put options

Bank scope economies have been derived from either the standard or generalized (Box-Cox) multiproduct translog (or other logarithmic) functional form. Reported results have ranged from strong economies to diseconomies and are far from conclusive. The problem is functional form. An alternative composite form is shown to yield stable SCOPE results both at the usual point of evaluation and for points associated with quasi-specialized production (QSCOPE). Unstable results are obtained for the other forms. Scope economies are shown to exist for large U.S. banks in 1988 and to depend on the number of banking outputs specified. The scope estimates are also separated into their two sources - fixed-cost and cost-complementarity effects.

Banks' Responses to Deregulation: Profits, Technology, and Efficiency

Abstract The FDICs total liability for insuring a banks deposits during a fixed period diminishes as the frequency of examinations increases, since a marginally solvent bank can be closed while losses are small. The paper develops a technique for pricing the insurance liability over a fixed period during which there are multiple examinations. Under current policy most banks are examined annually and reviewed every six months, at which time the fees for insurance may be adjusted. Since the current schedule of fees allows only a narrow range and a few discrete levels, the FDIC typically retains some positive or negative residual liability in each six-month period and for the entire year. We show how to estimate this net liability. The calculations of total and net liability are illustrated for a sample of large banks.