Leah R. Warner

Invited Reflection: Intersectionality as an Epistemological Challenge to Psychology

Else-Quest and Hyde (2016) describe three epistemological perspectives that are commonly differentiated by feminist theorists and that are relevant to research in psychology. They explore how each of these perspectives might inform quantitative research approaches to intersectionality theory. As we explain in detail elsewhere (Warner, Settles, & Shields, in press), one debate among scholars who study intersectionality is whether intersectionality is best conceptualized as a theory, as a framework, or as an approach to social activism. ElseQuest and Hyde distinguish intersectionality as a critical theory in contrast to a falsifiable ‘‘grand theory.’’ We refer to intersectionality as a theory here to be consistent with ElseQuest and Hyde’s framing of intersectionality as a critical theory in the context of discussing epistemology. We appreciate their focus on epistemology, because in psychology researchers do not typically articulate the theory of knowledge that underlies their scholarship. One exception is feminist scholars who reject positivist traditions, as their perspective and assumptions about knowledge and reality are at odds with the predominant viewpoint within the field. Dominant research in psychology, that is, ‘‘mainstream’’ research published in outlets that are granted high status and legitimacy in the field, operates under one of the two epistemic perspectives: (1) positivist epistemology, which assumes that there is an objective reality and truth that is discoverable, and that science is value neutral and without an opinion on the reality and the truth it seeks to find and (2) post-positivist (which includes feminist empiricism) epistemology, which asserts that bias can enter into research at any number of points in the process, but if bias is reduced or eliminated, science can discover reality. This latter perspective allows for scientists to attach values to the topics they study, for example, to note that sexism and racism are aversive social problems that should be eliminated (Campbell & Wasco, 2000; Eagly & Riger, 2014), as long as the scientific practice itself is not subverted by the intrusion of the scientist’s values. ElseQuest and Hyde go beyond epistemologies rooted in positivism to discuss ways of knowing that are more attuned to the questions raised by an intersectionality perspective, including social constructionism and standpoint epistemology. We argue below that Else-Quest and Hyde’s discussion of these three epistemological positions must be expanded to effectively show how intersectionality relates to each in psychological research. At a general level, it is important for researchers to be clear about their epistemic position. When position is left unstated, communication is made more difficult because researchers may have fundamentally different assumptions about knowledge, for example, whether research reveals ‘‘one truth’’ or how different people experience different realities. Further, there is a tendency to devalue scholarship that is different from a discipline’s dominant epistemological perspective. In psychology, intersectionality, which often employs social constructionist epistemologies, would fall into this group. A danger is that research undertaken outside the dominant epistemological perspective, such as intersectionality and other feminist scholarship, is dismissed as ‘‘bad science’’ because dominant assumptions about knowledge— how to know, who is the knower, and so on—place nondominant epistemological perspectives in the margin. In other words, dominant epistemological perspectives influence whether researchers view intersectionality and feminist scholarship as valuable; when these perspectives are not made explicit, however, what gets communicated is that this scholarship is weak or poorly constructed. Intersectionality, which challenges knowledge production that marginalizes people and their lived experiences (Cho, Crenshaw, & McCall, 2013), is susceptible to marginalization. In addition, by not articulating their own epistemic position, even if they occupy a favored position within the dominant framework, researchers may be unable or unwilling to see the ways in which their values and biases enter the research process; they may come

Judgements of others' emotional appropriateness are multidimensional

This study investigated the multidimensional structure of judgements of emotional appropriateness, the degree to which an observer judges a targets emotion to conform to observer-valued expectations for emotion in that context. Participants (N=169) were shown one of two brief video clips of an actor either showing anger or neutral expressions in an anger-evoking situation of either low, medium, or high severity. Participants rated the targets emotion on the Perception of Emotion Appropriateness Rating Scale (PEARS), which taps observers’ perceptions of a targets emotional appropriateness for a specific situation. We found that appropriateness ratings are comprised of three factors, assessment of Type Present (type of emotion in expression); Type Absent (missing key emotions); and Intensity (intensity with which the emotion is felt or expressed). Results are discussed in terms of the usefulness of a multidimensional conceptualisation of emotional appropriateness.

Invited Reflection Contested Interpretations and Methodological Choices in Quantitative Research

A growing body of literature suggests that intersectionality theory does not reflect a unified perspective, but rather that there are fundamental differences in interpretation of the purpose, scope, and function of intersectionality (Cho, Crenshaw, & McCall, 2013; Collins, 2015; Davis, 2008; May, 2015). These differences in interpretation have implications for psychological research (Warner, Settles, & Shields, in press). Intersectionality is a perspective that has been examined within and across disciplines (Bilge, 2013), and as it is filtered through various disciplinary lenses, intersectionality takes on different forms. Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall (2013) argue that it is time to think of intersectionality as a ‘‘field of intersectionality studies,’’ rather than as a stand-alone concept; Hancock (2016) observes that intersectionality is treated as a ‘‘meme’’ that is ‘‘copied and spread rapidly with slight variation’’ (p. 19). Acknowledging intersectionality’s multiple forms has direct implications for answering the question of how to integrate intersectionality theory into quantitative psychological research. In this commentary, I argue that researchers need to be explicitly aware of which interpretations of the theory their methodological choices support and which interpretations are sidelined, challenged, or delegitimized by their methodological choices. I begin by explaining why the framing of intersectionality theory as ‘‘contested’’ is a more productive way to discuss methodological approaches than to solely focus on the agreed-upon features of intersectionality (Cho et al., 2013). Then, focusing on intersectionality’s contested areas, I critique two methodological approaches to quantitative research on intersectionality. Finally, I suggest how to reconcile the limitations in methodological approaches in a manner that stays true to a deep engagement with intersectionality theory.

Teaching About the “War on Science” in Psychology of Women Courses

A political polarization of trust in science is growing. Conservatives’ trust in science has been decreasing over the last 25 years (Gauchat, 2012). The Trump administration is discrediting years of climate science (Brulle, 2017) and has defunded scientific and other academic research (Goldman et al., 2017). As a result of this climate, some have proclaimed that the United States is currently experiencing a “War on Science” (e.g., Otto, 2016). Psychologists have assumed a central role in initiatives to challenge threats to scientific study. For example, the American Psychological Association (2017) increased its scientific advocacy efforts and served as an official partner in the “March for Science,” an effort to defend the integrity of scientific inquiry (Brulle, 2017). In this teaching brief, I address the implications of this current sociopolitical context for students in psychology of women courses as they learn about feminist approaches to psychological science. In the popular press (e.g., Lynch, 2017), in signs and speeches at marches, and in some academic contexts (e.g., Goldman et al., 2017), there is a resurging tendency to challenge the “War on Science” by reaffirming that science is politically autonomous. This view concerns the nature of objectivity, defined here as a methodological approach that is fair to evidence and leads to conclusions that can withstand the severest criticisms (Harding, 2015). By saying that science is politically autonomous, objectivity is portrayed as only achieved when science is devoid of political interests, cultural perspectives, and social values, often described in philosophy of science as Objectivity (Longino, 1990). In this article, I use objectivity (lower-case “o”) when referring to the general definition and as an umbrella term encompassing multiple interpretations of the concept. I use Objectivity (upper-case “O”) when specifically referring to the form of objectivity in which science is viewed as politically autonomous. One consequence of this portrayal of science as Objective is that it directs attention away from science’s history of racism, sexism, and imperialism (Harding, 2015), as exposing bias within science would threaten the self-image of science as Objective (Rusert, 2017). The science-as-Objective narrative creates a challenge for feminist, anti-racist, and postcolonial scholars who critique science (henceforth referred to as FAP critiques of science), who have exposed the systematic oppressive practices of science for women, people of color, and the colonized peoples of the nonWestern world, respectively. FAP critiques of science have recently been blamed for facilitating distrust in science and creating the perception that science is politicized (e.g., Lynch, 2017; Otto, 2016). The 2010’s sociopolitical climate, in which people are divided in their trust in science and in which teaching about bias is devalued, is antithetical to common learning goals of psychology of women courses. Those goals typically include: (1) to understand the value of psychological science as an approach to understanding women’s and gendered experiences and (2) to understand FAP critiques of science, especially psychological science’s history of systematically pathologizing and marginalizing women. For courses with these learning goals, instructors need to teach students about objectivity in science, while at the same time teach them about the value of FAP critiques of dominant scientific practices. In this teaching brief, I explain how instructors can encourage students to analyze the relation between objectivity and FAP critiques of science. Specifically, I focus on two features of this association. First, students need to learn that the relation between objectivity and science is contextual; and they can do so by examining historical examples of how political circumstances have influenced psychological science and definitions of objectivity. Second, students need to learn that objectivity and FAP critiques of science can be mutually supportive; they can do so by examining examples