Stephanie A. Shields

Gender and Emotion

In this chapter we consider the relation between gender and emotion, particularly as that connection is expressed in stereotyping, power relations, and sexuality. As we review pertinent research we strive to move beyond the conventional “gender differences” model that has tended to dominate the study of gender and emotion. We propose two useful theoretical frameworks for investigating the gender-emotion link. The first, expectation states theory (Berger et al. 1977; Ridgeway and Correll 2004), is useful in explaining the relation of gender-emotion beliefs to social roles and other social structural variables. The second, doing emotion as doing gender (Shields 1995,2002), can be used to explain connections among beliefs about emotion, emotional experience, and a gendered sense of self.

The politics of emotion in everyday life: Appropriate emotion and claims on identity

Emotions have a political dimension in that judgments regarding when and how emotion should be felt and shown are interpreted in the interests of regulating the organization and functioning of social groups. This article argues that claims to authenticity and legitimacy of ones self-identity or group identity are at stake in the everyday politics of emotion. A brief discussion of the study of sex differences in the 19th century illustrates how emotion politics can saturate even scientific inquiry. Three ways in which there is a political dimension to socially appropriate emotion in contemporary life are then discussed: (a) Is the emotion the “wrong” emotion for the situation? (b) How are competing standards for emotional experience and expression managed? and (c) What constitutes the boundary between “too much” and “too little” emotion? The author concludes by considering the relevance of emotion politics to research on emotion.

Reports of bodily change in anxiety, sadness, and anger

In a series of studies, retrospective reports were used to assess differences in physiological symptoms associated with three emotions: Anxious, Angry, Sad. Symptom awareness, as measured by scores on the Autonomic Perception Questionnaire and the Somatic Perception Questionnaire, was significantly greater for Anxious than for the other emotions; reports for Angry and Sad were quantitatively similar. Qualitative analysis showed a different pattern. Sad was characterized as involving a low arousal state, while Anxious and Angry shared several distinguishing symptoms, most notably cardiac symptoms and general restlessness. Predicted gender differences were also observed. Males and females did not differ in overall reported level of awareness, but did differ in their reports of the specific symptoms constituting that awareness.

The experience and symptoms of blushing as a function of age and reported frequency of blushing

Sixty-five self-identified frequent and infrequent blushers in four age groups (ages 13 to 55) were interviewed regarding their typical experience of blushing, physiological correlates of blushing, age-related changes in blushing, and the social context of blushing. Both groups experienced blushing as varying in intensity, duration, latency, and the extent to which it is accompanied by other physical symptoms. Reported frequency of blushing was negatively correlated with age (r=−.49,p<.0001). While 64% of the subjects age 25 and younger reported blushing more than once a week (and 36% blush daily), only 28% of those over 25 reported blushing more than once a week.

Distinguishing between emotion and nonemotion: judgments about experience

The conceptual distinction between emotion and nonemotion subjective states was investigated in a series of three studies. Three questions were addressed. First, is there high agreement among people in identifying labels for subjective states as either emotion or nonemotion? Second, in judgments of the similarity of subjective states is the emotion-nonemotion distinction more or less salient than other properties of experience? Third, what criteria are used to distinguish conceptually between emotion and nonemotion states? Results indicated that, for many feeling states, there is no substantial agreement as to whether the state should be considered emotion or nonemotion, that the affective dimension of experience is not as salient as are other specific properties of experience (physiological arousal, activity level, valence), and that, in general, people express their individual judgment of emotion-nonemotion on the basis of some nonspecific combination of physiological arousal and character of cognitive state.

Development of Autonomic Nervous System Responsitivity in Children: A Review of the Literature

This paper reviews the literature on Autonomic Nervous System (ANS) responsiveness in children. Normative developmental changes in cardiovascular activity (heart rate and blood pressure), electrodermal activity, and the dynamic balance between branches of the ANS are summarized. Several issues which appear to have potential for further developmental study are identified. Problems and limitations in the psychophysiological study of children are also discussed.

Gender and Emotion What We Think We Know, What We Need to Know, and Why It Matters

I draw on research on emotion and gender to illustrate how an essentialized view of gender as difference persists through the circulation of beliefs about gender from popular culture to scientific writing and back again. I begin by describing the paradoxical nature of beliefs about emotion and then show that emotion’s representations in beliefs and stereotypes have a powerful effect on how we interpret our own and others’ emotional behavior. I consider how the differences paradigm, the study of gender in terms of identification of difference(s) between girls/women and boys/men, aids the circulation of essentialized beliefs about gender from popular culture to psychological science. Specifically, essentializing discourses from popular culture are absorbed into scientific discourse and gain scientific authorization via research undertaken within a differences paradigm. These results circulate back again to popular culture and the cycle continues. I conclude with a discussion of how the differences paradigm can be disrupted by a research approach informed by contextual factors that moderate gender effects, the intersectionality of social identities, and attentiveness to gender fault lines, giving examples from our work on the “negotiability” of emotion’s meaning and emotion’s representation in language. My article has implications for counselors and therapists whose clients struggle with the expression of emotions, instructors who want to encourage their students to explore how they think about gender as essentialized, and researchers concerned with interpersonal interactions, especially workplace interactions where understanding of others’ emotions often has a gendered cast.

The Social Psychology of Sex and Gender: From Gender Differences to Doing Gender

>> The social psychology of gender is a major, if qualified, success story of contemporary feminist psychology. The breadth and intellectual vigor of the field is reflected in the following six commentaries in the broadly defined area of the Social Psychology of Gender which were commissioned for this third of four 35th anniversary sections to feature brief retrospectives by authors of highly cited PWQ articles. Our goal in this section’s introduction is to provide a brief history of the development of this area, placing the articles described in the commentaries into this historical context. The six articles in this special section, individually and taken together, identify significant turning points in the social psychology of gender. We focus on how, within a few brief years, the study of gender in psychology underwent massive transformation. 1 The social psychology of gender has grown to become a thriving, scientifically sound research theme that encompasses a wide variety of topics and questions. The story of how this came to be has been told from a number of perspectives (e.g., Crawford & Marecek, 1989; Deaux, 1999; Rutherford, Vaughn-Blount, & Ball, 2010; Unger, 1998). Here, we focus on how, from psychology of gender’s murky beginnings in early 20th century Freudian personality theory and even deeper roots in androcentric paternalism of 19th century science (Shields, 1975, 1982; Shields & Bhatia, 2009), feminist psychologists have shaped how sex and gender are scientifically defined, theorized, and studied. Over the course of the second half of the 20th century, feminist psychologists challenged psychology’s long-standing equation of female with defect and the psychology of gender with cataloging sex differences (Marecek, Kimmel, Crawford, & Hare-Mustin, 2003; Rutherford & Granek, 2010). We identify three intertwined streams of investigation from which the contemporary psychology of gender grew: (a) research focusing on gender identity as a feature of personality, (b) research on behavioral sex differences, and (c) research on gender roles and the study of gender in social context. We interweave into this story how each of the six key articles highlighted in this special section illustrate turning points in that history. We then describe the critical importance of networks and mentors toward making the research reported in those articles possible. We conclude with our thoughts on future directions in the social psychology of gender.

Emotion: The Perception of Bodily Change

Imagine yourself, for a moment, in any situation which you find stressful, for example, waiting in the dentist’s office or anticipating an important interview. With little thought you will probably be able to name the bodily changes that you usually notice in yourself in these types of situations: tense stomach, sweaty palms, general restlessness, pounding heart, and so on. We have found that adults are not only able to tell us their general responses, but also name their primary physiological response to real-life stress (Stern & Higgins, 1969).

Darwin on Race, Gender, and Culture

Darwins theories of natural selection and sexual selection are significant scientific achievements, although his understanding of race and gender was defined and limited by his own life circumstances and the sociohistorical context within which he worked. This article considers the ways in which race, gender, and culture were represented and explained by Darwin and the ways in which his observations and opinions on gender and race were taken up by others and, more often than not, misapplied. Whereas the challenge of race (for Darwin) was to demonstrate the fundamental similarity and, hence, the common origin, of human races, the challenge of gender (for Darwin) was to identify a mechanism that could account for differences between women and men that, to him, were obvious, fundamental, and significant. The article concludes by considering the implications of Darwins views for contemporary scientific psychology.