Leslie Holmes

Corruption and the crisis of the post-communist state

Corruption, or at least its reporting, appears to be increasing everywhere. But there is still too little comparative analysis of its nature and role in post-communist systems. This is understandable, given their newness. But it is now possible and desirable to compare corruption in such systems with corruption elsewhere. This article makes some initial comparative observations, and argues that the significance of post-communist corruption reaches far beyond the post-communist countries themselves. These states are compared briefly with other kinds of transitional states, and found to be different in a number of important ways. Finally, the author asks whether or not the apparent growth of corruption is leading to a seventh version of the crisis of the state.

Legitimation and Legitimacy in Russia Revisited

The 1982 volume edited by T.H. Rigby and Ferenc Feher, Political Legitimation in Communist States, was a seminal work.1 Not only did it open up a whole new dimension of Communist politics, but it also introduced the concept of goal-rational legitimation to theories of legitimacy.2 In doing so, it alerted us to the fact that the classic Weberian three-fold approach to legitimacy was in serious need of an update and expansion, particularly if it was to apply to Communist systems.3

Corruption in Post-Soviet Russia

Corruption has been a serious problem in post-Soviet Russia – though there was also much more of it in Soviet Russia than is generally realised. This article considers the scale of the problem, its causes and what both the authorities and civil society are doing about it. It argues that President Medvedev has been genuine in wanting to reduce corruption, and much more committed to this than either of his predecessors were. But corruption is so widespread and pervasive in Russia that it will take many years to bring it down to ‘reasonable’ levels; Medvedevs political will is a necessary but insufficient condition, and he requires greater political capacity and support. Moreover, since Putin has been elected to become president again (March 2012), the anti-corruption momentum built up by Medvedev will dissipate, unless Medvedev is made prime minister and given both full support and free rein by the president to pursue his anti-corruption drive.

Corruption and Organised Crime in Putin's Russia

IN HIS LONG FINAL PRESS CONFERENCE AS PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA (14 February 2008), Vladimir Putin somewhat smugly claimed that he had basically accomplished all he had set out to when he became president, and that there had been no ‘serious failures’. While he did achieve much, including a marked improvement in Russia’s selfimage and economy, there were also a number of real problem areas. Here, just one will be considered: the fight against corruption and organised crime. The former was one of the few relative failures Putin acknowledged in his February speech; indeed, he described corruption as ‘the most wearying and difficult to resolve’ of all Russia’s problems while he was president. 1 When the 2007 Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) was published in late September 2007, sections of the Russian media claimed that Russia was plummeting in terms of its level of corruption. 2 This was a gross exaggeration. Russia’s score in 2007 was 2.3, compared with scores of 2.5 in 2006 and 2.4 in 2005. 3 In short, the situation appeared to be relatively stable; at worst, there had been a modest deterioration. This is not to deny that Russia’s score in the CPI declined during Putin’s second term in office; but the decline was marginal, and Russia’s corruption levels are in fact no worse now than they have been for much of the postcommunist period. But having noted this, Russia does appear to have had consistently high levels of corruption throughout the post-communist period, and the problem is a relatively serious one—as Putin himself acknowledged. Overall crime rates have been rising in post-Soviet Russia, despite a small improvement in the early 2000s that has now been reversed. But in the particular case of organised crime, the (less than robust) available data suggest a decline in some types of activity. However, this was from a high base-level. Moreover, as will be demonstrated, some aspects of organised crime have become more of a problem in recent years, especially for legitimate businesses. Thus, like corruption, organised

Political Corruption in Central and Eastern Europe

In 1999, the World Bank published a comparative analysis of corruption in all the major regions of the world for the period 1996–99 (see Kaufmann et al., 1999a,b). According to that, and contrary to many people’s expectations, the worst region on earth for corruption was perceived to be neither Africa, nor South or East Asia, nor Latin America, but the Commonwealth of Independent States. Not quite as bad, but still among the more corrupt parts of the world, was what used to be known as Eastern Europe. This chapter will explore both regions — hereafter referred to as Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).

Introduction: The Issue of Human Trafficking

Human trafficking has justifiably been called the slavery of our times. While the overwhelming majority of internationally trafficked persons – an estimated 80 per cent – are women and children, many thousands of men are trafficked each year too. The majority of internationally trafficked persons are forced into what is nowadays an antiquated term, ‘white slavery’ – that is, sex work. One reason why this term is no longer appropriate is that contemporary trafficking involves people of all colours, ethnicities and religions. But not all trafficked persons are engaged in sex work. While some – especially children – operate in the shadow economy as beggars or pickpockets, many others work in more or less legitimate areas of national economies, including agriculture, construction, fishing, domestic service, and manufacturing. Many other children are trafficked for adoption purposes, which sometimes results in them virtually becoming slaves to their new families. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), some 43 per cent of trafficked persons are trafficked for sexual exploitation, 32 per cent for non-sexual labour exploitation and circa 25 per cent for a mixture of sexual and nonsexual labour exploitation (ILO 2008: 3). One feature common to all trafficked persons is that, irrespective of the type of work in which they are engaged, they are being severely exploited, enjoy few if any human rights and, in one way or another, are being severely coerced. Most have also been deceived by traffickers. Before exploring this issue further, it is necessary to define two of the key terms used in this study. The first is ‘human trafficking’. The most frequently cited definition in the 2000s is that provided in Article 3 of one of the so-called Palermo Protocols of the United Nations (UN), that on human trafficking (the ‘Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children’ – in UN 2000a).1 This is quoted in full in Chapter 2, and need not be repeated here. Unfortunately, while this UN definition is a thoughtful and comprehensive one, it is also somewhat cumbersome and even confusing. For instance, newcomers to the topic might find difficulty in understanding from it the differences between human trafficking and people smuggling; the

Vietnam in a Comparative Communist and Postcommunist Perspective

The period 1989–91 was a traumatic one for Russians. In the space of just over two years, they experienced a quintuple loss. One of these—of the Inner Empire (the disintegration of the USSR)—need not detain us, since it was not directly relevant to Vietnam’s situation in recent years. But four of the losses are of major significance. The first was the collapse of what is often called the Soviet Outer Empire. Vietnam had been a member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon) since 1978. This meant that it had access to preferential trade arrangements, and ready markets for its goods. Following a rather slow start, its high level of economic integration into the Soviet-dominated economic bloc by the mid-1980s can be readily seen in tables 1.1 and 1.2.

Comparative Conclusions: Legitimacy and Legitimation in Eurasian Post-Communist States

In every type of political system, power is exercised through a combination of coercion (repression) and legitimation. In democracies, legitimation is far more salient than coercion, whereas the balance is reversed in authoritarian systems. Nevertheless, even the latter seek legitimacy, which history suggests renders a system stronger in the long run than high levels of coercion. One way in which authoritarian regimes can attempt to build legitimacy is, as Adele Del Sordi argues in Chapter 4 with reference to Kazakhstan, through ‘subtle manipulation and persuasion’. This can be operationalized through significant state control of the media, the education system and other channels of purposive socialization and constitutes a key component of ‘soft authoritarianism’. Since almost all the states considered in this volume have been classified as either authoritarian or hybrid (i.e. between democratic and authoritarian), it is worth attempting to analyze the ways in which they seek to legitimize themselves, how successful they have been and the legitimation problems they currently face.

Combating Corruption in China: The Role of the State and Other Agencies in Comparative Perspective

Abstract This paper is the first to compare China’s current anti-corruption approach with those of both post-communist and other Sinic states/regions. Its principal purpose is to compare anti-corruption in China with the situation in countries that constitute appropriate comparators—either systemically (post-communist transition states) or culturally(predominantly Sinic states/regions)—and suggest ways in which China could usefully learn from these comparators.A comparative public policy evaluative approach forms the core of the analysis. The study uses publicly available surveydata, both perceptual and experiential, for drawing inferences about the corruption levels in China and the other statesanalyzed. A neo-Weberian approach to system legitimacy and delegitimation is employed in analyzing the potential dangersof a radical anti-corruption approach, while Giddensian structuration theory is used to emphasize the interplay between structure and agency in anti-corruption. The findings and value of this research are primarily practical, in that it highlights potential lessons China could learn from Singapore and the Hong Kong SAR while also identifying the principal obstacles to the adoption of such measures. In particular, the establishment of a single and independent anti-corruption agency would almost certainly have a positive impact on the reduction of corruption levels. But this is politically difficult, since such a body could be perceived as constituting a threat to the Communist Party. Moreover, all comparisons between states are limited, since some features are unique to a given country.

Perestroika: A Reassessment *

IT IS NOW MORE THAN TWO DECADES SINCE THE collapse of the USSR. Theories abound as to how and, even more so, why it collapsed. One of the most popular is that the Soviet Union’s last leader, Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, let the genie out of the bottle and then could not put it back. Many criticise him for this, and attribute the collapse of the Soviet Union to his failure to reassert control. But even if such criticism is valid—and that is a moot point—should this be the only or the principal criterion by which Gorbachev and his policies, notably perestroika, are to be judged? One of the aims of this Introduction, and of this collection more generally, is to assess the Gorbachev and perestroika era with the benefit of hindsight, better access to sources (archives, memoirs and opinion surveys), and in light of the heated debates that have occurred since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. When Gorbachev came to power in March 1985, the USSR had, from many perspectives, been stagnating for years. During the later Brezhnev era (1964–1982), this stagnation (zastoi)—to use Gorbachev’s term—led many in the Soviet Union to claim that ‘my zhdali, my spali’ (‘we waited, we slept’). Following Brezhnev’s death in 1982, a reasonably energetic former KGB head, Yurii Andropov, did set out to make radical changes; but he died just 15 months after assuming office, before much could be achieved. His successor, Konstantin Chernenko, was much less active, and has justifiably been described as a caretaker or transitional leader who made little perceptible difference; he died even sooner after taking office than his predecessor had done. It was in this context of drift that a relatively young—just 54—and certainly dynamic leader, Gorbachev, came to power.