Li-Lin Rao

Psychological Typhoon Eye in the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake

Background On May 12, 2008, an earthquake measuring 8.0 on the Richter scale jolted Wenchuan, China, leading to 69,227 deaths and 374,643 injured, with 17,923 listed as missing as of Sept. 25, 2008, and shook the whole nation. We assessed the devastating effects on peoples post-earthquake concern about safety and health. Methodology/Principal Findings From June 4 to July 15, 2008, we surveyed a convenience sample of 2,262 adults on their post-earthquake concern about safety and health. Residents in non-devastated areas (Fujian and Hunan Provinces, and Beijing) and devastated areas (Sichuan and Gansu Provinces) responded to a questionnaire of 5 questions regarding safety measures, epidemic disease, medical workers, psychological workers, and medication. The ANOVAs showed a significant effect of residential devastation level on the estimated number of safety measures needed, the estimated probability of the outbreak of an epidemic, and the estimated number of medical and psychological workers needed (Ps<0.001). The post-earthquake concern decreased significantly as the level of residential devastation increased. Because of the similarity with the meteorological phenomenon of the eye of a typhoon, we dubbed these findings a “Psychological Typhoon Eye”: the closer to the center of the devastated areas, the less the concern about safety and health a resident felt. Conclusions/Significance Contrary to common perception and ripple effect that the impact of an unfortunate event decays gradually as ripples spread outward from a center, a “Psychological Typhoon Eye” effect was observed where the post-earthquake concern was at its lowest level in the extremely devastated areas. The resultant findings may have implications for Chinese governmental strategies for putting “psychological comfort” into effect.

Anticipated Regret, Risk Perception, or Both: Which is Most Likely Responsible for Our Intention to Gamble?

The current study investigated whether risk aversion or regret aversion could be related to a lower intention to gamble, and whether the type of gambling was a moderator of this relationship. The study took place in Macau, often called “the Las Vegas of East Asia.” A total of 373 Macau residents completed a questionnaire survey dealing with thirteen types of gambling. The results showed that risk perception and anticipated regret had a significant negative effect on the intention to gamble. This negative effect was domain-specific, varying with the type of gambling. Our findings indicated that neither risk aversion nor regret aversion can uniquely explain an individual’s risk-taking tendency consistently. Instead, which factor plays a greater role in lowering the intention to gamble—regret aversion, risk aversion, or both—is itself dependent on the type of gambling involved. The finding that not all gambles are created equal could be useful in gambling prevention and advertising appeal by providing a basis for understanding the role that cognitive and emotional factors play in different types of gambling.

The neural correlates of risk propensity in males and females using resting-state fMRI

Men are more risk prone than women, but the underlying basis remains unclear. To investigate this question, we developed a trait-like measure of risk propensity which we correlated with resting-state functional connectivity to identify sex differences. Specifically, we used short- and long-range functional connectivity densities to identify associated brain regions and examined their functional connectivities in resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data collected from a large sample of healthy young volunteers. We found that men had a higher level of general risk propensity (GRP) than women. At the neural level, although they shared a common neural correlate of GRP in a network centered at the right inferior frontal gyrus, men and women differed in a network centered at the right secondary somatosensory cortex, which included the bilateral dorsal anterior/middle insular cortices and the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex. In addition, men and women differed in a local network centered at the left inferior orbitofrontal cortex. Most of the regions identified by this resting-state fMRI study have been previously implicated in risk processing when people make risky decisions. This study provides a new perspective on the brain-behavioral relationships in risky decision making and contributes to our understanding of sex differences in risk propensity.

Disrutpted resting-state functional architecture of the brain after 45-day simulated microgravity.

Long-term spaceflight induces both physiological and psychological changes in astronauts. To understand the neural mechanisms underlying these physiological and psychological changes, it is critical to investigate the effects of microgravity on the functional architecture of the brain. In this study, we used resting-state functional MRI (rs-fMRI) to study whether the functional architecture of the brain is altered after 45 days of −6° head-down tilt (HDT) bed rest, which is a reliable model for the simulation of microgravity. Sixteen healthy male volunteers underwent rs-fMRI scans before and after 45 days of −6° HDT bed rest. Specifically, we used a commonly employed graph-based measure of network organization, i.e., degree centrality (DC), to perform a full-brain exploration of the regions that were influenced by simulated microgravity. We subsequently examined the functional connectivities of these regions using a seed-based resting-state functional connectivity (RSFC) analysis. We found decreased DC in two regions, the left anterior insula (aINS) and the anterior part of the middle cingulate cortex (MCC; also called the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex in many studies), in the male volunteers after 45 days of −6° HDT bed rest. Furthermore, seed-based RSFC analyses revealed that a functional network anchored in the aINS and MCC was particularly influenced by simulated microgravity. These results provide evidence that simulated microgravity alters the resting-state functional architecture of the brains of males and suggest that the processing of salience information, which is primarily subserved by the aINS–MCC functional network, is particularly influenced by spaceflight. The current findings provide a new perspective for understanding the relationships between microgravity, cognitive function, autonomic neural function, and central neural activity.

Belief in Luck or in Skill: Which Locks People into Gambling?

According to the social axioms framework, people’s beliefs about how the world functions (i.e., internal or external locus of control) are related to their social behaviors. Previous researchers have attempted to relate locus of control to gambling behavior, but the results have not been clear-cut. The present study speculated that the effects of perceived control (i.e., belief in luck and belief in skill) on gambling behavior are domain-specific and vary with the type of gambling. A total of 306 adult Macau residents ranging in age from 18 to 65 with casino gambling experience were recruited by going door to door. Empirical data on gambling frequency and perceived control relating to 13 types of gambling were collected. Our results demonstrated that the effects of belief in luck or skill on gambling behavior varied across different gambling categories. Specifically, for football lottery, Chinese lottery, and baccarat, it was not belief in skill but rather belief in luck that was a positive significant predictor of gambling frequency. Only for slot machines and stud poker did belief in skill significantly predict gambling frequency. For the remaining eight gambling categories, neither belief in luck nor belief in skill could predict gambling frequency. Our findings indicate that neither internal nor external locus of control can consistently explain people’s gambling behaviors. Instead, which factor plays a greater role in a person’s gambling behavior is dependent on the gambling type. Therefore, the finding that not all gambles are created equal might be a promising avenue for further research and treatment approaches.

Money talks: neural substrate of modulation of fairness by monetary incentives

A unique feature of the human species is compliance with social norms, e.g., fairness, even though this normative decision means curbing self-interest. However, sometimes people prefer to pursue wealth at the expense of moral goodness. Specifically, deviations from a fairness-related normative choice have been observed in the presence of a high monetary incentive. The neural mechanism underlying this deviation from the fairness-related normative choice has yet to be determined. In order to address this issue, using functional magnetic resonance imaging we employed an ultimatum game (UG) paradigm in which fairness and a proposed monetary amount were orthogonally varied. We found evidence for a significant modulation by the proposed amount on fairness in the right lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) and the bilateral insular cortices. Additionally, the insular subregions showed dissociable modulation patterns. Inter-individual differences in the modulation effects in the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) accounted for inter-individual differences in the behavioral modulation effect as measured by the rejection rate, supporting the concept that the PFC plays a critical role in making fairness-related normative decisions in a social interaction condition. Our findings provide neural evidence for the modulation of fairness by monetary incentives as well as accounting for inter-individual differences.

Are Risky Choices Actually Guided by a Compensatory Process? New Insights from fMRI

The dominant theories about risky decision-making assume that decision conflicts are solved by a compensatory process involving a trade-off of probability against payoff, but it is unclear whether these theories actually represent the events that occur when people make a risky decision. By contrasting a preferential choice with a judgment-based choice that required a compensatory process, we explored the mechanisms underlying risky decision-making. First, using parametric analyses, we identified the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) as the specific region in charge of task-related conflict in risky decision-making tasks. We also showed that the dMPFC was activated less when judgment-based choices were being made, implying that the conflict experienced during a judgment-based choice was not as strong as the conflict that was experienced during the preferential choice. Our results provide neural evidence that preferential choice cannot be characterized solely as a compensatory process. Thus, questions were raised about whether existing compensatory theories could adequately describe individual risky decisions.

Is Payoff Necessarily Weighted by Probability When Making a Risky Choice? Evidence from Functional Connectivity Analysis

How people make decisions under risk remains an as-yet-unresolved but fundamental question. Mainstream theories about risky decision making assume that the core processes involved in reaching a risky decision include weighting each payoff or reward magnitude by its probability and then summing the outcomes. However, recently developed theories question whether payoffs are necessarily weighted by probability when making a risky choice. Using functional connectivity analysis, we aimed to provide neural evidence to answer whether this key assumption of computing expectations holds when making a risky choice. We contrasted a trade-off instruction choice that required participants to integrate probability and payoff information with a preferential choice that did not. Based on the functional connectivity patterns between regions in which activity was detected during both of the decision-making tasks, we classified the regions into two networks. One network includes primarily the left and right lateral prefrontal cortices and posterior parietal cortices, which were found to be related to probability in previous reports, and the other network is composed of the bilateral basal ganglia, which have been implicated in payoff. We also found that connectivity between the payoff network and some regions in the probability network (including the left lateral prefrontal cortices and bilateral inferior parietal lobes) were stronger during the trade-off instruction choice task than during the preferential choice task. This indicates that the functional integration between the probability and payoff networks during preferential choice was not as strong as the integration during trade-off instruction choice. Our results provide neural evidence that the weighting process uniformly predicted by the mainstream theory is unnecessary during preferential choice. Thus, our functional integration findings can provide a new direction for the investigation of the principles of risky decision making.

Can Overconfidence be Debiased by Low-Probability/High-Consequence Events?

During the first half of 2008, China suffered three natural disasters: a heavy snow storm, an outbreak of hand-foot-mouth disease, and a severe earthquake. The aim of the present study is to explore how low-probability/high-consequence events influence overconfidence. In Study 1, opportunity samples were obtained by recruiting residents in three different types of disaster-hit areas to answer a peer-comparison probability judgment questionnaire about 1 month after the corresponding disaster occurred. The performance of 539 participants in disaster-hit areas was compared with that of 142 residents in a nondisaster area. The findings indicate that residents in disaster-hit areas were less overconfident than those in the nondisaster area on both positive and negative events. In Study 2, we surveyed a total of 336 quake-victims 4 and 11 months after the earthquake to examine whether the impact of disasters on overconfidence would decay with time. The resulting data indicate that the disaster victims became more overconfident as time elapsed. The overall findings suggest that low-probability/high-consequence events could make people less overconfident and more rational and seem to serve as a function of debiasing.

Can Sophie's Choice Be Adequately Captured by Cold Computation of Minimizing Losses? An fMRI Study of Vital Loss Decisions

The vast majority of decision-making research is performed under the assumption of the value maximizing principle. This principle implies that when making decisions, individuals try to optimize outcomes on the basis of cold mathematical equations. However, decisions are emotion-laden rather than cool and analytic when they tap into life-threatening considerations. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), this study investigated the neural mechanisms underlying vital loss decisions. Participants were asked to make a forced choice between two losses across three conditions: both losses are trivial (trivial-trivial), both losses are vital (vital-vital), or one loss is trivial and the other is vital (vital-trivial). Our results revealed that the amygdala was more active and correlated positively with self-reported negative emotion associated with choice during vital-vital loss decisions, when compared to trivial-trivial loss decisions. The rostral anterior cingulate cortex was also more active and correlated positively with self-reported difficulty of choice during vital-vital loss decisions. Compared to the activity observed during trivial-trivial loss decisions, the orbitofrontal cortex and ventral striatum were more active and correlated positively with self-reported positive emotion of choice during vital-trivial loss decisions. Our findings suggest that vital loss decisions involve emotions and cannot be adequately captured by cold computation of minimizing losses. This research will shed light on how people make vital loss decisions.