Linda Silberman

Same-Sex Marriage: Refining the Conflict of Laws Analysis

To be objective about the role of conflict of laws in the treatment of same-sex marriage, it is helpful to start with tolerance for the views of both sides in the substantive debate over whether to permit samesex marriage. I begin with this observation because much of the writing about conflict of laws issues and the recognition of same-sex marriage is far from neutral on that issue. Unless and until the Supreme Court determines that a prohibition on same-sex marriage is unconstitutional as a matter of federal law, it is within the prerogative of each individual state to determine what status to accord to same-sex couples who want to formalize their relationship and/or what rights should attach to such relationships. The view about same-sex marriage that is taken by a particular state (in the United States) or by a particular country reflects the set of values accepted in that community as determined through its own political processes, whether expressed in state constitutional amendments, statutes enacted by the legislature, or by judicial decisions declared in the courts.

Judicial Adjuncts Revisited: The Proliferation of Ad Hoc Procedure

This birthday celebration of the Federal Rules is a time to marvel at the enduring character of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Given the dramatic changes that have taken place in litigation over these decades, it is no surprise that the proponents of the philosophy of uniform and trans-substantive rules believe that time has proved their case. I want to suggest, however, as indeed others already have,1 that trans-substantive rulemaking in fact has been eroded and replaced by ad hoc versions of specialized rules. One clear example of such ad hoc proceduralism comes via the increased number of judicial adjuncts, who customize procedure for particular and individual cases. This example supports those who call for a different approach to federal rulemaking. The judicial adjuncts to whom I refer are primarily masters and

Some Judgements on Judgments: A View from America

I am honoured to have delivered and now to publish the 2006 Graveson Memorial Lecture. I never had the pleasure of knowing Professor Graveson, but his perspective in encouraging an international appreciation of private international law is one that I share.1 In my lecture, and now in this article, I hope to show how an international perspective contributes to reform and brings insight to an area of law in which I have great interest and which is the subject of my lecture—the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The affiliations of Professor Graveson with both King’s College London and Gray’s Inn have special meaning to me as well. In 1968–69, I was a Fulbright Scholar in London, undertaking a study of the English masters, under the auspices and guidance of Sir Jack Jacob, who was a great mentor to me from that time until his death in 2000. I took a course with Sir Jack at the University of London (Sir Jack was Professor at UCL) during my time in London and have fond memories of that experience. Like Professor Graveson, Sir Jack was a member of Gray’s Inn, and now Sir Robin Jacob (Sir Jack’s son) is (in 2007), as Professor Graveson once was, Master Treasurer of Gray’s. So, I feel a particular kinship with Professor Graveson, with King’s College London, and with Gray’s Inn, and I am pleased to be a part of this lecture series.