Linnda R. Caporael

Selfishness examined: Cooperation in the absence of egoistic incentives

Social dilemmas occur when the pursuit of self-interest by individuals in a group leads to less than optimal collective outcomes for everyone in the group. A critical assumption in the human sciences is that peoples choices in such dilemmas are individualistic, selfish, and rational. Hence, cooperation in the support of group welfare will only occur if there are selfish incentives that convert the social dilemma into a nondilemma. In recent years, inclusive fitness theories have lent weight to such traditional views of rational selfishness on Darwinian grounds. To show that cooperation is based on selfish incentives, however, one must provide evidence that people do not cooperate without such incentives. In a series of experimental social dilemmas, subjects were instructed to make single, anonymous choices about whether or not to contribute money for a shared “bonus” that would be provided only if enough other people in the group also contributed their money. Noncontributors cited selfish reasons for their choices; contributors did not. If people are allowed to engage in discussion, they will contribute resources at high rates, frequently on irrational grounds, to promote group welfare. These findings are consistent with previous research on ingroup biasing effects that cannot be explained by “economic man” or “selfish gene” theories. An alternative explanation is that sociality was a primary factor shaping the evolution of Homo sapiens . The cognitive and affective mechanisms underlying such choices evolved under selection pressures on small groups for developing and maintaining group membership and for predicting and controlling the behavior of other group members. This sociality hypothesis organizes previously inexplicable and disparate phenomena in a Darwinian framework and makes novel predictions about human choice.

Verbal response modes of baby talk and other speech at institutions for the aged

Recent research on the well-being of elderly adults has expanded beyond physiological and medical issues to include social issues (Riley et al., 1983), but communication processes are still predominantly studied in terms of neurologic functioning (Obler and Albert, 1980). Geschwind (1980) writes, ‘we must realize that when we talk about changes in communication and language in the elderly, we are speaking primarily about changes in nervous tissue . . .’ (p. 205). But communication is a social process wherein roles can be formed and relationships negotiated. The neurologic perspective presupposes that the aged are spoken to in some ‘common coinage’ of adult speech and that all variation in elderly communication can be accounted for by reference to the aged individual. The research we present here questions that presupposition. We examined how elderly people were spoken to at two institutions for the aged. Of special concern was the use of baby talk to the institutionalized elderly.

Selfish genes vs. selfish people: Sociobiology as origin myth

The sociobiological version of human evolution is criticized as excessively reductionistic and focused on reproductive competition. An alternative version of evolutionary psychology is proposed based on the premise that the most important feature of human evolutionary history is selection for small group living. The structural requirements of group survival can account for fundamentally social motives characteristic of the human species such as cooperation, conformity, and group loyalty.

A subjective judgment study of polygon based curved surface imagery

In the past computer graphics efforts, several researchers have demonstrated that polygon models can be used to produce images of curved surfaces that appear to be smooth and accurate. However, the authors know of no attempt to appraise such imagery by using multiple human observation ratings. The effectiveness of curved surface imagery generated from polygon models was investigated in a judgment study. Research subjects evaluated sphere model imagery derived from several polygon densities and shading procedures including flat shading, shade interpolation (Gouraud) and normal interpolation (Phong). Results of the evaluations indicated that little was gained by reducing the average polygon areas below approximately 110 pixels per polygon for spheres of 95 pixel radii displayed on a 512 x 512 resolution monitor. Evaluations for both shade and normal interpolution placed polygon image quality reasonably close to an “ideal” image. Although the evaluations indicated that normal interpolation was slightly superior to the shade interpolation, shade interpolation required significantly less computation. Most significantly, results from this study provide strong support for the notion that polygons can be used effectively to produce smooth shaded imagery of curved surface models.

Homo Sapiens, Homo Faber, Homo Socians: Technology and the Social Animal

Modern technology is a pinnacle of human progress, the perfection of reason mirrored in design. It maintains that bit of Enlightenment hubris captured in the term Homo sapiens. Why, then, does it seem easier to design technology than to make decisions about how to use it? That technologies can puzzle or disappoint or seem out of control, is explained — by their opponents — as temporary yet resoluble oversights of rational solutions, or — by their supporters — as the failure to demonstrate to all concerned the reasons that the benefits outweigh the costs. (In spite of the acronym MAD, nuclear armaments debates are conducted in this vein). Alternatively, some of our technologies may puzzle, disappoint, or seem out of control because the model of human nature is inappropriate. Despite economic, hedonic, and normative justifications, the technology or its implementation somehow doesn’t ‘make sense’ or ‘feel right’.

Predictive State Representations for grounding human-robot communication

Allowing robots to communicate naturally with humans is an important goal for social robotics. Most approaches have focused on building high-level probabilistic cognitive models. However, research in cognitive science shows that people often build common ground for communication with each other by seeking and providing evidence of understanding through behaviors like mimicry. Predictive State Representations (PSRs) allow one to build explicit, low-level models of the expected outcomes of actions, and are therefore well-suited for tasks that require providing such evidence of understanding. Using human-robot shadow puppetry as a prototype interaction study, we show that PSRs can be used successfully to both model human interactions, and to allow a robot to learn on-line how to engage a human in an interesting interaction.

Coordinating bodies, minds and groups: Evolution and human social cognition

Abstract Human evolution occurred in the context of face-to-face groups. I argue that there are structural features of groups that recur across generations in evolutionary history; these should constitute “the minds natural environment.” This article begins by developing a vocabulary of “repeated assembly” as a replacement for nature-nurture and biol- ogy-culture dualisms. It then proposes a face-to-face group structure based on four “core configurations.” These are hypothesized to repeatedly assemble, generation-to-generation, and to function in the coordination of human behav- ior. We should expect human mental systems to correlate with core configurations; also, that capabilities specialized for specific configurations should be extended for use in other configurations and recombined for novel behavior and situations, including the development of, and life in, complex modem societies.

We ARE Darwinians, and this is what the fuss is all about

Evolutionary accounts of human behavior often involve constructing the past from the present. For this reason, such accounts are highly susceptible to ideological biases and cultural blinders. Sociobiology is a variant of competitive individualism that also underlies many economic and psychological models. These assumptions must be tested against competing models of human sociality if evolutionary psychology is to be science rather than dogma.Nonbelief, when rigorous, systematic, and searching was considered a threat to all orthodoxy; no institution is safe if people simply stop believing in the assumptions that justify its existence.Margaret C. Jacob,The Cultural Meaning of the Scientific Revolution

Psychology and groups at the junction of genes and culture

Replacements for the self-interest axiom may posit weak to strong theories of sociality. Strong sociality may be useful for positing social cognitive mechanisms and their evolution, but weak sociality may work better for identifying interesting group-level outcomes by focusing on deviations from self-interested psychological assumptions. Such theoretical differences are likely to be based on disciplinary expertise, and the challenge for Darwinian integration is to keep the conversation flowing.

BONES AND STONES: SELECTION FOR SOCIALITY*

This paper reviews evidence from paleoanthropology about the mode and tempo of human evolutionary history. Rather than a gradualistic, “uphill” directional change as one species is transformed into another by selection, the fossil record indicates many species related to ours, some quite successful with respect to their longevity as a lineage. The implications of the fossil record include a revival of group selection, a recognition of groups as selective (and selected) environment, and a concern about the “grain” or complexity of adaptations.