Lisa K. Son

Metacognitive and control strategies in study-time allocation

This article investigates how peoples metacognitive judgments influence subsequent study-time-allocation strategies. The authors present a comprehensive literature review indicating that people allocate more study time to judged-difficult than to judged-easy items--consistent with extant models of study-time allocation. However, typically, the materials were short, and participants had ample time for study. In contrast, in Experiment 1, when participants had insufficient time to study, they allocated more time to the judged-easy items than to the judged-difficult items, especially when expecting a test. In Experiment 2, when the materials were shorter, people allocated more study time to the judged-difficult materials. In Experiment 3, under high time pressure, people preferred studying judged-easy sonnets; under moderate time pressure, they showed no preference. These results provide new evidence against extant theories of study-time allocation.

Transfer of Metacognitive Skills and Hint Seeking in Monkeys

Metacognition is knowledge that can be expressed as confidence judgments about what one knows (monitoring) and by strategies for learning what one does not know (control). Although there is a substantial literature on cognitive processes in animals, little is known about their metacognitive abilities. Here we show that rhesus macaques, trained previously to make retrospective confidence judgments about their performance on perceptual tasks, transferred that ability immediately to a new perceptual task and to a working memory task. We also show that monkeys can learn to request “hints” when they are given problems that they would otherwise have to solve by trial and error. This study demonstrates, for the first time, that nonhuman primates share with humans the ability to monitor and transfer their metacognitive ability both within and between different cognitive tasks, and to seek new knowledge on a need-to-know basis.

Spacing One's Study: Evidence for a Metacognitive Control Strategy.

This article investigated individual control of spacing strategies during study. Three predictions were outlined: The spacing hypothesis suggests that people choose to space their study to improve long-term learning via the spacing effect. The massing hypothesis suggests that people choose to mass their study because of illusions of confidence during study. The metacognitive hypothesis suggests that people control their spacing schedules as a function of their metacognitive judgments of specific to-be-learned items. To test these hypotheses, the authors asked participants to study and make judgments of learning for cue-target pairs. Then, participants were given three choices; they could study the pair again immediately (massed), study the pair again after the entire list had been presented (spaced), or choose not to restudy (done). Results supported a metacognitively controlled spacing strategy-people spaced items that were judged to be relatively easy but massed items that were judged as relatively difficult.

Learners’ choices and beliefs about self-testing

Students have to make scores of practical decisions when they study. We investigated the effectiveness of, and beliefs underlying, one such practical decision: the decision to test oneself while studying. Using a flashcards-like procedure, participants studied lists of word pairs. On the second of two study trials, participants either saw the entire pair again (pair mode) or saw the cue and attempted to generate the target (test mode). Participants were asked either to rate the effectiveness of each study mode (Experiment 1) or to choose between the two modes (Experiment 2). The results demonstrated a mismatch between metacognitive beliefs and study choices: Participants (incorrectly) judged that the pair mode resulted in the most learning, but chose the test mode most frequently. A post-experimental questionnaire suggested that self-testing was motivated by a desire to diagnose learning rather than a desire to improve learning.

A cognitive-science based programme to enhance study efficacy in a high and low risk setting

In three experiments, learning performance in a 6- or 7-week cognitive-science based computer-study programme was compared to equal time spent self-studying on paper. The first two experiments were conducted with grade 6 and 7 children in a high risk educational setting, the third with Columbia University undergraduates. The principles the programme implemented included (1) deep, meaningful, elaborative, multimodal processing, (2) transfer-appropriate processing, (3) self-generation and multiple testing of responses, and (4) spaced practice. The programme was also designed to thwart metacognitive illusions that would otherwise lead to inappropriate study patterns. All three experiments showed a distinct advantage in final test performance for the cognitive-science based programme, but this advantage was particularly prominent in the children.

Judgments of learning: Evidence for a two-stage process

Three experiments tested the hypothesis that people make judgments of learning (JOLs) by attempting to retrieve the target first. If this were the whole story, then the reaction time (RT) functions for making JOLs with no special instructions would parallel those found when people are told to first attempt retrieval and then make a JOL. In the present data, monotonic functions, showing an increase in RT with decreasing JOL, were found when people were instructed to retrieve covertly or overtly and then make a JOL, as would be expected if retrieval fluency entirely determined JOLs. However, the functions for making uninstructed JOLs were different: Low JOLs were made quickly, not slowly, and the curves were inverted U shapes, rather than linear. Furthermore, people’s memory performance was somewhat better, especially on low-JOL items, when they were instructed to first retrieve as opposed to when they were told only to make JOLs. To account for these data, we propose a two-stage model of JOLs, with the first stage occurring prior to attempted retrieval.

Metacognitive Control: Children's Short-Term Versus Long-Term Study Strategies

First graders were tested on 2 tasks investigating metacognitive control abilities. In Experiment 1, after studying and making judgments of learning (JOLs) on word-synonym pairs, they could either mass or space each pairs restudy trials. If they chose to mass study, then the pair was presented again immediately. If they chose to space study, then the pair was presented again after a delay, testing a long-term control strategy. Results showed that childrens JOLs did not influence study strategy. Furthermore, in general, children chose to mass more often than to space. In Experiment 2, after studying and making JOLs on word-synonym pairs, they could either read the entire pair again or they could generate the target by attempting to retrieve the target synonym when shown only the word. Unlike Experiment 1, both read and generate decisions were carried out in the short term. Also unlike Experiment 1, Experiment 2s results showed that the higher the childs JOL, the more likely they chose generation strategies—showing evidence for short-term metacognitively controlled strategies.

Metacognitive Control and Optimal Learning.

The notion of optimality is often invoked informally in the literature on metacognitive control. We provide a precise formulation of the optimization problem and show that optimal time allocation strategies depend critically on certain characteristics of the learning environment, such as the extent of time pressure, and the nature of the uptake function. When the learning curve is concave, optimality requires that items at lower levels of initial competence be allocated greater time. On the other hand, with logistic learning curves, optimal allocations vary with time availability in complex and surprising ways. Hence there are conditions under which optimal strategies will be relatively easy to uncover, and others in which suboptimal time allocation might be expected. The model can therefore be used to address the question of whether and when learners should be able to exercise good metacognitive control in practice.

Metacognitive Control and the Spacing Effect

This study investigates whether the use of a spacing strategy absolutely improves final performance, even when the learner had chosen, metacognitively, to mass. After making judgments of learning, adult and child participants chose to mass or space their study of word pairs. However, 1/3 of their choices were dishonored. That is, they were forced to mass after having chosen to space and forced to space after having chosen to mass. Results showed that the spacing effect obtained for both adults and children when choices were honored. However, using a spacing strategy when it was in disagreement with the participants own choice, or forced, did not enhance performance for the adults (Experiment 1). And although performance was enhanced for the children (beyond massing strategies), it was not as good as when the spacing decisions were self-chosen (Experiment 2). The data suggest that although spacing is an effective strategy for learning, it is not universal, particularly when the strategy is not chosen by the learner. In short, metacognitive control is often crucial and should be honored. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).

Children's Naive Theories of Intelligence Influence Their Metacognitive Judgments

Recent studies have shown that the metacognitive judgments adults infer from their experiences of encoding effort vary in accordance with their naive theories of intelligence. To determine whether this finding extends to elementary schoolchildren, a study was conducted in which 27 third graders (M(age) = 8.27) and 24 fifth graders (M(age) = 10.39) read texts presented in easy- or difficult-to-encode fonts. The more children in both grades viewed intelligence as fixed, the less likely they were to interpret effortful or difficult encoding as a sign of increasing mastery and the more likely they were to report lower levels of comprehension as their perceived effort increased. This suggests that children may use naive theories of intelligence to make motivationally relevant inferences earlier than previously thought.