Livia Colle

Impaired recognition of negative basic emotions in autism: A test of the amygdala theory

Abstract Autism and Asperger Syndrome are autism spectrum conditions (ASC) characterized by deficits in understanding others’ minds, an aspect of which involves recognizing emotional expressions. This is thought to be related to atypical function and structure of the amygdala, and performance by people with ASC on emotion recognition tasks resembles that seen in people with acquired amygdala damage. In general, emotion recognition findings in ASC have been inconsistent, which may reflect low numbers of participants, low numbers of stimuli and trials, heterogeneity of symptom severity within ASC groups, and ceiling effects on some tasks. The present study tested 39 male adults with ASC and 39 typical male controls on a task of basic emotion recognition from photographs, in two separate experiments. On a control face discrimination task the group with ASC were not impaired. People with ASC were less accurate on the emotion recognition task compared to controls, but only for the negative basic emotions. This is discussed in the light of similar findings from people with damage to the amygdala.

Communicative Impairment in Traumatic Brain Injury: A Complete Pragmatic Assessment.

The aim of the present study was to examine the communicative abilities of traumatic brain injury patients (TBI). We wish to provide a complete assessment of their communicative ability/disability using a new experimental protocol, the Assessment Battery of Communication, (ABaCo) comprising five scales--linguistic, extralinguistic, paralinguistic, context and conversational--which investigate all the main pragmatic elements involved in a communicative exchange. The ABaCo was administered to 21 TBI subjects and to a control group. The results showed that performance by TBI patients was worse than that of controls on all scales; moreover they showed a trend of increasing difficulty in understanding and producing different pragmatic phenomena, i.e., standard communication acts, deceits and ironies, whether such phenomena are expressed through the linguistic or extralinguistic modality.

How children comprehend speech acts and communicative gestures

We propose a framework for explaining difference in difficulty of various pragmatic phenomena. In particular, we investigate the ability to comprehend direct, indirect, deceitful, and ironic communicative acts. Our main prediction is that there is a gradation of difficulty in their comprehension. Such a prediction is grounded on the assumptions that the various phenomena involve both mental representations of different complexity and different inferential load. A further prediction is that a communicative act has in principle the same difficulty of comprehension, whether performed through speech acts or communicative gestures. The underlying assumption is that the construction of the meaning of a communicative act is independent of the input modalities. We validate our predictions through an experiment on 160 children, with 40 in each of the following age groups: 2.6 to 3 years, 3.6 to 4 years, 4.6 to 5.6 years, and 6 to 7 years. The results confirm the predicted gradation of difficulty both for the different sorts of speech acts and for the communicative gestures. Also, the results, when broken down by each phenomenon, show that participants performed equally well in speech acts and in communicative gestures. We conclude with a discussion of the possible implications of our results for linguistic and gestural communication research.

The neural basis for understanding non-intended actions

We can often understand when actions done by others do or do not reflect their intentions. To investigate the neural basis of this capacity we carried out an fMRI study in which volunteers were presented with video-clips showing actions that did reflect the intention of the agent (intended actions) and actions that did not (non-intended actions). Observation of both types of actions activated a common set of areas including the inferior parietal lobule, the lateral premotor cortex and mesial premotor areas. The contrast non-intended vs. intended actions showed activation in the right temporo-parietal junction, left supramarginal gyrus, and mesial prefrontal cortex. The converse contrast did not show any activation. We conclude that our capacity to understand non intended actions is based on the activation of areas signaling unexpected events in spatial and temporal domains, in addition to the activity of the mirror neuron system. The concomitant activation of mesial prefrontal areas, known to be involved in self-referential processing, might reflect how deeply participants are involved in the observed scenes.

Rethinking the ontogeny of mindreading.

We propose a mentalistic and nativist view of human early mental and social life and of the ontogeny of mindreading. We define the mental state of sharedness as the primitive, one-sided capability to take ones own mental states as mutually known to an interactant. We argue that this capability is an innate feature of the human mind, which the child uses to make a subjective sense of the world and of her actions. We argue that the child takes all of her mental states as shared with her caregivers. This allows her to interact with her caregivers in a mentalistic way from the very beginning and provides the grounds on which the later maturation of mindreading will build. As the latter process occurs, the child begins to understand the mental world in terms of differences between the mental states of different agents; subjectively, this also corresponds to the birth of privateness.

Th.O.m.A.S.: An exploratory assessment of theory of mind in schizophrenic subjects

A large body of literature agrees that persons with schizophrenia suffer from a Theory of Mind (ToM) deficit. However, most empirical studies have focused on third-person, egocentric ToM, underestimating other facets of this complex cognitive skill. Aim of this research is to examine the ToM of schizophrenic persons considering its various aspects (first- vs. second-order, first- vs. third-person, egocentric vs. allocentric, beliefs vs. desires vs. positive emotions vs. negative emotions and how each of these mental state types may be dealt with), to determine whether some components are more impaired than others. We developed a Theory of Mind Assessment Scale (Th.o.m.a.s.) and administered it to 22 persons with a DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia and a matching control group. Th.o.m.a.s. is a semi-structured interview which allows a multi-component measurement of ToM. Both groups were also administered a few existing ToM tasks and the schizophrenic subjects were administered the Positive and Negative Symptoms Scale and the WAIS-R. The schizophrenic persons performed worse than control at all the ToM measurements; however, these deficits appeared to be differently distributed among different components of ToM. Our conclusion is that ToM deficits are not unitary in schizophrenia, which also testifies to the importance of a complete and articulated investigation of ToM.

Metacognitive dysfunctions in personality disorders: correlations with disorder severity and personality styles.

Metacognitive impairment is crucial to explaining difficulties in life tasks of patients with personality disorders (PDs). However, several issues remain open. There is a lack of evidence that metacognitive impairments are more severe in patients with PDs. The relationship between severity of PD pathology and the extent of metacognitive impairment has not been explored, and there has not been any finding to support the linking of different PDs with specific metacognitive profiles. The authors administered the Metacognitive Assessment Interview to 198 outpatients with PDs and 108 outpatients with no PDs, differentiating overall severity from stylistic elements of personality pathology. Results showed that metacognitive impairments were more severe in the group with PDs than in the control group, and that metacognitive dysfunctions and the severity of the PD were highly associated. Positive correlations were found between specific metacognitive dysfunctions and specific personality styles. Results suggest that metacognitive impairments could be considered a common pathogenic factor for PDs.

Understanding the communicative impairments in schizophrenia: A preliminary study

UNLABELLED The aim of the present study was to evaluate the pragmatic abilities of patients with schizophrenia in a variety of pragmatic phenomena expressed through different communicative means (language, gestures, and paralinguistic modality). For this purpose we used the Assessment Battery of Communication (ABaCo; Sacco et al., 2008). The ABaCo is a validated clinical tool for assessing pragmatic skills, which comprises five evaluation scales-linguistic, extralinguistic, paralinguistic, context, and conversational-investigating both comprehension and production of the main pragmatic phenomena involved in a communicative exchange, such as direct and indirect speech acts, irony, deceit, the violation of Grices maxims, topic management, and turn-taking. The battery was administered to a group of seventeen patients with schizophrenia, and matched healthy controls. We expected the clinical group to perform widely worse than the control group in the different pragmatic dimensions investigated. Results showed that patients with schizophrenia performed significantly worse than controls on all the five scales of the battery, both in comprehension and production tasks. Moreover, the results within each scale showed a differentiated performance in the clinical group among the pragmatic phenomena, with irony assessed as the most difficult task. The implications of these results for research and treatment in schizophrenia are discussed. LEARNING OUTCOMES After reading this article, the reader will be able to: (1) summarize thepreliminary assessment of pragmatic impairments in patients with schizophrenia; (2) describea variegated communicative profile regarding different pragmatic phenomena; and (3) discuss the planning and evaluating specific rehabilitation programs.

Sharedness and privateness in human early social life

This research is concerned with the innate predispositions underlying human intentional communication. Human communication is currently defined as a circular and overt attempt to modify a partners mental states. This requires each party involved to possess the ability to represent and understand the others mental states, a capability which is commonly referred to as mindreading, or theory of mind (ToM). The relevant experimental literature agrees that no such capability is to be found in the human species at least during the first year of life, and possibly later. This paper aims at advancing a solution to this theoretical problem. We propose to consider sharedness as the basis for intentional communication in the infant and to view it as a primitive, innate component of her cognitive architecture. Communication can then build upon the mental grounds that the infant takes as shared with her caregivers. We view this capability as a theory of mind in a weak sense.

Psychometric Properties of the Manchester Child Attachment Story Task: An Italian Multicentre Study.

The paper describes a multicentre study of the psychometric properties of the Manchester Child Attachment Story Task in a sample of 230 Italian children aged 4 to 8 years. The tasks internal consistency and inter-rater reliability were investigated; in addition, multiple discriminant analysis was used to explore the contribution of individual coding system scale scores to overall categorical attachment classification. The instrument showed acceptable psychometric properties, especially with respect to Disorganization and Coherence scales. However, our results also suggest that some subscales of the coding system could be modified in order to improve reliability. The implications of our results for future research and further test validation are discussed.