Bruno G. Bara

Understanding Intentions in Social Interaction: The Role of the Anterior Paracingulate Cortex

Neuroimaging studies have identified the anterior paracingulate cortex (PCC) as the key prefrontal region subserving theory of mind. We adopt an evolutionary perspective hypothesizing that, in response to the pressures of social complexity, a mechanism for manipulating information concerning social interaction has emerged in the anterior PCC. To date, neuroimaging studies have not properly distinguished between intentions of persons involved in social interactions and intentions of an isolated person. In two separate fMRI experiments, we demonstrated that the anterior PCC is not necessarily involved in the understanding of other peoples intentions per se, but primarily in the understanding of the intentions of people involved in social interaction. Moreover, this brain region showed activation when a represented intention implies social interaction and therefore had not yet actually occurred. This result suggests that the anterior PCC is also involved in our ability to predict future intentional social interaction, based on an isolated agents behavior. We conclude that distinct areas of the neural system underlying theory of mind are specialized in processing distinct classes of social stimuli.

The intentional network: how the brain reads varieties of intentions.

Social neuroscience provides insights into the neural correlates of the human capacity to explain and predict other peoples intentions, a capacity that lies at the core of the Theory of Mind (ToM) mechanism. Results from neuroimaging research describe a widely distributed neural system underlying ToM, including the right and left temporo-parietal junctions (TPJ), the precuneus, and the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC). Nevertheless, there is disagreement in the literature concerning the key region for the ToM network. Some authors point to the MPFC, others to the right TPJ. In the effort to make a contribution to the debate, we propose a model of a dynamic ToM network consisting of four regions. We also introduce a novel theoretical distinction among varieties of intention, which differ by the nature of an individuals pursued goal (private or social) and by the social interactions temporal dimension (present or future). Our results confirm the crucial role of both the MPFC and the right TPJ, but show that these areas are differentially engaged depending on the nature of the intention involved. Whereas the right TPJ and the precuneus are necessary for processing all types of prior intentions, the left TPJ and the anterior paracingulate cortex are specifically involved in the understanding of social intention. More specifically, the left TPJ is activated only when a subset of social intentions are involved (communicative intentions). Taken together, these results demonstrate the progressive recruitment of the ToM network along the theoretical dimensions introduced in the present paper.

Conversation and Behavior Games in the Pragmatics of Dialogue

In this article we present the bases for a computational theory of the cognitive processes underlying human communication. The core of the article is devoted to the analysis of the phases in which the process of comprehension of a communicative act can be logically divided: (1) literal meaning, where the reconstruction of the mental states literally expressed by the actor takes place: (2) speakers meaning, where the partner reconstructs the communicative intentions of the actor; (3) communicative effect, where the partner possibly modifies his own beliefs and intentions; (4) reaction, where the intentions for the generation of the response are produced; and (5) response, where an overt response is constructed. The model appears to be compatible with relevant facts about human behavior. Our hypothesis is that, through communication, an actor tries to exploit the motivational structures of a partner so that the desired goal is generated. A second point is that social behavior requires that cooperation be maintained at some level. In the case of communication, cooperation is, in general, pursued even when the partner does not adhere to the actors goals, and therefore no cooperation occurs at the behavioral level. This important distinction is reflected in the two kinds of game we introduce to account for communication. The main concept implied in communication is that two agents overtly reach a situation of shared mental states. Our model deals with sharedness through two primitives: shared beliefs and communicative intentions.

Communicative Impairment in Traumatic Brain Injury: A Complete Pragmatic Assessment.

The aim of the present study was to examine the communicative abilities of traumatic brain injury patients (TBI). We wish to provide a complete assessment of their communicative ability/disability using a new experimental protocol, the Assessment Battery of Communication, (ABaCo) comprising five scales--linguistic, extralinguistic, paralinguistic, context and conversational--which investigate all the main pragmatic elements involved in a communicative exchange. The ABaCo was administered to 21 TBI subjects and to a control group. The results showed that performance by TBI patients was worse than that of controls on all scales; moreover they showed a trend of increasing difficulty in understanding and producing different pragmatic phenomena, i.e., standard communication acts, deceits and ironies, whether such phenomena are expressed through the linguistic or extralinguistic modality.

How children comprehend speech acts and communicative gestures

We propose a framework for explaining difference in difficulty of various pragmatic phenomena. In particular, we investigate the ability to comprehend direct, indirect, deceitful, and ironic communicative acts. Our main prediction is that there is a gradation of difficulty in their comprehension. Such a prediction is grounded on the assumptions that the various phenomena involve both mental representations of different complexity and different inferential load. A further prediction is that a communicative act has in principle the same difficulty of comprehension, whether performed through speech acts or communicative gestures. The underlying assumption is that the construction of the meaning of a communicative act is independent of the input modalities. We validate our predictions through an experiment on 160 children, with 40 in each of the following age groups: 2.6 to 3 years, 3.6 to 4 years, 4.6 to 5.6 years, and 6 to 7 years. The results confirm the predicted gradation of difficulty both for the different sorts of speech acts and for the communicative gestures. Also, the results, when broken down by each phenomenon, show that participants performed equally well in speech acts and in communicative gestures. We conclude with a discussion of the possible implications of our results for linguistic and gestural communication research.

Developmental pragmatics in normal and abnormal children.

We propose a critical review of current theories of developmental pragmatics. The underlying assumption is that such a theory ought to account for both normal and abnormal development. From a clinical point of view, we are concerned with the effects of brain damage on the emergence of pragmatic competence. In particular, the paper deals with direct speech acts, indirect speech acts, irony, and deceit in children with head injury, closed head injury, hydrocephalus, focal brain damage, and autism. Since no single theory covers systematically the emergence of pragmatic capacity in normal children, it is not surprising that we have not found a systematic account of deficits in the communicative performance of brain injured children. In our view, the challenge for a pragmatic theory is the determination of the normal developmental pattern within which different pragmatic phenomena may find a precise role. Such a framework of normal behavior would then permit the systematic study of abnormal pragmatic development.

Development of syllogistic reasoning

We investigated the syllogistic reasoning of children 9-10 years of age, adolescents, and adults. Their performance on five tasks that theoretically might measure components of such reasoning was examined: the interpretation of quantifiers such as some and all; the referential integration of assertions; the search for counterexamples to generalizations; the perception of identical shapes within figures; and the processing capacity of working memory. Syllogistic ability improved reliably with age, though even the youngest subjects were able to draw valid conclusions well above chance to one-model syllogisms. Performance on two of the component tasks also improved reliably with age: the detection of identities, and the capacity of working memory. Multiple regressions showed that performance on these two tasks also accounted for some of the variance in syllogistic reasoning. Performance on the other three tasks was at about adult level by the age of 9. We accordingly examined performance with a group of 7-year-old children and discovered that they also performed at better than chance with one-model syllogisms. Our results support three main conclusions: young children are capable of syllogistic reasoning (contrary to the claims of Inhelder & Piaget, 1964); there is a significant development of ability from childhood to adulthood; and it is possible to identify some of the major components of this improvement.

Intention processing in communication: A common brain network for language and gestures

Human communicative competence is based on the ability to process a specific class of mental states, namely, communicative intention. The present fMRI study aims to analyze whether intention processing in communication is affected by the expressive means through which a communicative intention is conveyed, that is, the linguistic or extralinguistic gestural means. Combined factorial and conjunction analyses were used to test two sets of predictions: first, that a common brain network is recruited for the comprehension of communicative intentions independently of the modality through which they are conveyed; second, that additional brain areas are specifically recruited depending on the communicative modality used, reflecting distinct sensorimotor gateways. Our results clearly showed that a common neural network is engaged in communicative intention processing independently of the modality used. This network includes the precuneus, the left and right posterior STS and TPJ, and the medial pFC. Additional brain areas outside those involved in intention processing are specifically engaged by the particular communicative modality, that is, a peri-sylvian language network for the linguistic modality and a sensorimotor network for the extralinguistic modality. Thus, common representation of communicative intention may be accessed by modality-specific gateways, which are distinct for linguistic versus extralinguistic expressive means. Taken together, our results indicate that the information acquired by different communicative modalities is equivalent from a mental processing standpoint, in particular, at the point at which the actors communicative intention has to be reconstructed.

Communicative Interactions Improve Visual Detection of Biological Motion

Background In the context of interacting activities requiring close-body contact such as fighting or dancing, the actions of one agent can be used to predict the actions of the second agent [1]. In the present study, we investigated whether interpersonal predictive coding extends to interactive activities – such as communicative interactions - in which no physical contingency is implied between the movements of the interacting individuals. Methodology/Principal Findings Participants observed point-light displays of two agents (A and B) performing separate actions. In the communicative condition, the action performed by agent B responded to a communicative gesture performed by agent A. In the individual condition, agent As communicative action was substituted with a non-communicative action. Using a simultaneous masking detection task, we demonstrate that observing the communicative gesture performed by agent A enhanced visual discrimination of agent B. Conclusions/Significance Our finding complements and extends previous evidence for interpersonal predictive coding, suggesting that the communicative gestures of one agent can serve as a predictor for the expected actions of the respondent, even if no physical contact between agents is implied.

Intentional minds: a philosophical analysis of intention tested through fMRI experiments involving people with schizophrenia, people with autism, and healthy individuals.

In this paper we show how we empirically tested one of the most relevant topics in philosophy of mind through a series of fMRI experiments: the classification of different types of intention. To this aim, firstly we trace a theoretical distinction among private, prospective, and communicative intentions. Second, we propose a set of predictions concerning the recognition of these three types of intention in healthy individuals, and we report the experimental results corroborating our theoretical model of intention. Third, we derive from our model predictions relevant for the domain of psychopathological functioning. In particular, we treat the cases of both hyper-intentionality (as in paranoid schizophrenia) and hypo-intentionality (as in autistic spectrum disorders). Our conclusion is that the theoretical model of intention we propose contributes to enlarge our knowledge on the neurobiological bases of intention processing, in both healthy people and in people with impairments to the neurocognitive system that underlies intention recognition.