Loran F. Nordgren

A theory of unconscious thought

We present a theory about human thought named the unconscious-thought theory (UTT). The theory is applicable to decision making, impression formation, attitude formation and change, problem solving, and creativity. It distinguishes between two modes of thought: unconscious and conscious. Unconscious thought and conscious thought have different characteristics, and these different characteristics make each mode preferable under different circumstances. For instance, contrary to popular belief, decisions about simple issues can be better tackled by conscious thought, whereas decisions about complex matters can be better approached with unconscious thought. The relations between the theory and decision strategies, and between the theory and intuition, are discussed. We end by discussing caveats and future directions.

The Devil Is in the Deliberation: Thinking Too Much Reduces Preference Consistency

In five experiments we found that deliberation reduces preference consistency. In experiments 1 and 2, participants who deliberated on their preferences were less consistent in their evaluations compared to those who did not deliberate. Experiment 3 demonstrated that this effect is due to the impediment of deliberation and not to the benefit of nondeliberation. We hypothesized that deliberation leads to the inconsistent weighting of information, especially when the information is complex. As such, we predicted and found in experiments 4 and 5 that the extent to which deliberation decreases preference consistency depends upon the complexity of the information.

Empathy gaps for social pain: why people underestimate the pain of social suffering.

In 5 studies, the authors examined the hypothesis that people have systematically distorted beliefs about the pain of social suffering. By integrating research on empathy gaps for physical pain (Loewenstein, 1996) with social pain theory (MacDonald & Leary, 2005), the authors generated the hypothesis that people generally underestimate the severity of social pain (ostracism, shame, etc.)--a biased judgment that is only corrected when people actively experience social pain for themselves. Using a social exclusion manipulation, Studies 1-4 found that nonexcluded participants consistently underestimated the severity of social pain compared with excluded participants, who had a heightened appreciation for social pain. This empathy gap for social pain occurred when participants evaluated both the pain of others (interpersonal empathy gap) as well as the pain participants themselves experienced in the past (intrapersonal empathy gap). The authors argue that beliefs about social pain are important because they govern how people react to socially distressing events. In Study 5, middle school teachers were asked to evaluate policies regarding emotional bullying at school. This revealed that actively experiencing social pain heightened the estimated pain of emotional bullying, which in turn led teachers to recommend both more comprehensive treatment for bullied students and greater punishment for students who bully.

The Restraint Bias: How the Illusion of Self-Restraint Promotes Impulsive Behavior

Four studies examined how impulse-control beliefs—beliefs regarding ones ability to regulate visceral impulses, such as hunger, drug craving, and sexual arousal—influence the self-control process. The findings provide evidence for a restraint bias: a tendency for people to overestimate their capacity for impulse control. This biased perception of restraint had important consequences for peoples self-control strategies. Inflated impulse-control beliefs led people to overexpose themselves to temptation, thereby promoting impulsive behavior. In Study 4, for example, the impulse-control beliefs of recovering smokers predicted their exposure to situations in which they would be tempted to smoke. Recovering smokers with more inflated impulse-control beliefs exposed themselves to more temptation, which led to higher rates of relapse 4 months later. The restraint bias offers unique insight into how erroneous beliefs about self-restraint promote impulsive behavior.

Visceral Drives in Retrospect Explanations About the Inaccessible Past

The present research demonstrates that the extent to which people appreciate the influence past visceral states have had on behavior (e.g., the influence hunger has had on food choice) depends largely on their current visceral state. Specifically, we found that when people were in a hot state (e.g., fatigued), they attributed behavior primarily to visceral influences, whereas when people were in a cold state (e.g., nonfatigued), they underestimated the influence of visceral drives and instead attributed behavior primarily to other, nonvisceral factors. This hot-cold empathy gap was observed when people made attributions about the past behavior of another person or themselves, and proved difficult to overcome, as participants could not correct for the biasing influence of their current visceral state when instructed to do so. These different attribution patterns also had consequences for peoples satisfaction with their performance. Those who attributed their poor performance to visceral factors were more satisfied than those who made dispositional attributions.

Vividness of the Future Self Predicts Delinquency

The tendency to live in the here and now, and the failure to think through the delayed consequences of behavior, is one of the strongest individual-level correlates of delinquency. We tested the hypothesis that this correlation results from a limited ability to imagine one’s self in the future, which leads to opting for immediate gratification. Strengthening the vividness of the future self should therefore reduce involvement in delinquency. We tested and found support for this hypothesis in two studies. In Study 1, compared with participants in a control condition, those who wrote a letter to their future self were less inclined to make delinquent choices. In Study 2, participants who interacted with a realistic digital version of their future, age-progressed self in a virtual environment were less likely than control participants to cheat on a subsequent task.

The Scope-Severity Paradox: Why Doing More Harm is Judged to Be Less Harmful

Punishment should be sensitive to the severity of the crime. Yet in three studies the authors found that increasing the number of people victimized by a crime actually decreases the perceived severity of that crime and leads people to recommend less punishment for crimes that victimize more people. The authors further demonstrate the process behind the scope-severity paradox—the victim identifiability effect—and test a strategy for overcoming this bias. Although Studies 1 and 2 document this phenomenon in the lab, in Study 3 the authors used archival data to demonstrate that the scope-severity paradox is a robust, real-world effect. They collected archival data of actual jury verdicts spanning a 10-year period and found that juries required defendants to pay higher punitive damages when their negligent behavior harmed fewer people.

Changing Places. A Dual Judgment Model of Empathy Gaps in Emotional Perspective Taking.

Abstract Emotional perspective taking involves peoples attempts to estimate the attitudes, preferences, and behaviors of other people who are in different emotional situations. We propose a dual judgment model in which perspective takers first predict what their own reactions would be to different emotional situations, and, second, adjust these self-predictions to accommodate perceived differences between themselves and others. Prior literature has focused on egocentric biases in the second judgment, perceived differences and similarities between the self and others. We propose that significant errors in emotional perspective taking often arise from the first judgment, people’s predictions of what their own attitudes, preferences, and behaviors would be in different emotional situations. Specifically, people exhibit “empathy gaps,” underestimating how much emotional situations influence their own attitudes, preferences, and behaviors. We review evidence that provides support for (a) the dual judgment model of emotional perspective taking, (b) the occurrence of empathy gaps in self-predictions, and (c) the occurrence of empathy gaps in social predictions that are mediated by empathy gaps in self-judgments. We discuss implications of empathy gaps in emotional perspective taking for social behavior, social judgment, and for other forms of perspective taking and affective forecasting.

What Constitutes Torture? Psychological Impediments to an Objective Evaluation of Enhanced Interrogation Tactics

Torture is prohibited by statutes worldwide, yet the legal definition of torture is almost invariably based on an inherently subjective judgment involving pain severity. In four experiments, we demonstrate that judgments of whether specific interrogation tactics constitute torture are subject to an empathy gap: People who are experiencing even a mild version of the specific pain produced by an interrogation tactic are more likely to classify that tactic as torture or as unethical than are those who are not experiencing pain. This discrepancy could result from an overestimation of the pain of torture by people in pain, an underestimation of the pain of torture by those not in pain, or both. The fourth experiment shows that the discrepancy results from an underestimation of pain by people who are not experiencing it. Given that legal standards guiding torture are typically established by people who are not in pain, this research suggests that practices that do constitute torture are likely to not be classified as such.

The Push and Pull of Temptation The Bidirectional Influence of Temptation on Self-Control

This article examines how people respond to the emergence of temptation in their environment. Three studies demonstrated that how people respond to temptation depends critically on their visceral state—whether or not they are actively experiencing visceral drives such as hunger, drug craving, or sexual arousal. We found that when people were in a “cold,” nonvisceral state, the presence of temptation prompted cognition to support self-control. However, when people were in a “hot,” visceral state, temptation prompted the same cognitive processes to support impulsive behavior. Study 1 examined how heterosexual men’s level of sexual arousal influences their attention to attractive women. Study 2 examined whether satiated and craving smokers would engage in motivated reasoning in order to dampen (or enhance) the appeal of smoking when confronted with the temptation to smoke. Study 3 tested the boundaries of the interaction between visceral state and temptation.