Lorenzo Gai

Operational drivers affecting credit risk of mutual guarantee institutions

Purpose - – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the drivers influencing the risk of default on mutual guaranteed loans. The authors aim to verify whether default is influenced by the specific business policies of mutual guarantee institutions (MGIs) and to recommend guidelines for directing their operating management. Design/methodology/approach - – The authors analyse the guaranteed portfolios of 19 Italian MGIs and investigate the determinants of the defaulted positions at the end of June 2011. The sample consists of 167,777 guaranteed loans, of which 11,349 are in default. Using regression models, we identify the variables related to the business model of MGIs that are significantly associated with default on their positions. Findings - – The defaulted positions of MGIs are significantly correlated with the type of issued guarantees. This condition should be considered in defining product and price policies. Practical implications - – The authors identify some critical issues in the risk-taking processes of MGIs. The tested hypothesis highlights the opportunities for the optimisation of guaranteed loan portfolios, which is necessary for reducing the profitability/liquidity pressures of these financial institutions and enhancing their efficiency as instruments for mitigating the effects of credit rationing and promoting the revitalisation of small-and medium-sized enterprises. Originality/value - – The results are based on an original and reserved dataset, which is not available in public financial statements or public statistics, but is collected directly from the MGIs that are part of the study.

SMEs, public credit guarantees and mutual guarantee institutions

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to focus on public guarantees granted to micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by the Italian national credit guarantee programme (Fondo Centrale di Garanzia – Central Guarantee Fund – (CGF)). The CGF provides a direct guarantee to banks granting loans or a counter-guarantee to mutual guarantee institutions (MGIs) acting as first-level guarantors. Because the behaviour of MGIs could affect the default risk of counter-guaranteed loans, it is vital to investigate their operating and structural characteristics in order to identify an optimal design for public credit guarantee schemes (PCGSs). Design/methodology/approach Using regression models, the paper analyses the determinants of default for 33,229 SME loans guaranteed by an MGI and counter-guaranteed by the Italian CGF. The dependent variable is the ex-post default risk of SMEs’ counter-guaranteed loans in the 2010-2011 period. The explanatory variables are certain characteristics of the MGI. Findings The authors demonstrate that increases in an MGI’s leverage and the size of the counter-guaranteed portfolios increase the default risk. When the counter-guaranteed portfolio increases, MGIs are more risk taking but take less risk than when local and specialized MGIs are at play. Finally, direct public aid is relevant. Practical implications An appropriate design of the PCGS becomes crucial to controlling moral hazard in financial institutions and ensuring the financial sustainability of public intervention in favour of SMEs. Originality/value The paper evaluates an original and confidential firm-level data set that is not available in public documents or supervisory board statistics but is collected directly from the MGIs that participated in this study.