Lorne Falkenstein

Hume's project in ‘The natural history of religion’

There are good reasons to think that at least a part of Humes project in the ‘The natural history of religion’ was to buttress a philosophical critique of the reasonableness of religious belief undertaken in other works, and to attack a fundamentalist account of the history of religion and the foundations of morality. But there are also problems with supposing that Hume intended to achieve either of these goals. I argue that two problems in particular – accounting for Humes neglect of revelation, and accounting for his remarks on the ‘invincibility’ of the reasons for ‘genuine theism’ – can only be resolved by recognizing that Humes purposes in ‘The natural history’ were not fundamentally critical. If I am right, Humes purpose was mainly to explain why ‘false’ or ‘adulterate’ forms of religious belief are so widespread and so influential.

Reid's Account of Localization

This paper contrasts three different positions taken by 18th century British scholars on how sensations, particularly sensations of colour and touch, come to be localized in space: Berkeleys view (initiated, though not fully executed) that we learn to localize ideas of colour by associating certain purely qualitative features of those ideas with ideas of touch and motion, Humes view that visual and tangible impressions are originally disposed in space, and Reids view (inspired by Porterfield) that we are innately disposed to refer appearances of colour to the end of a line passing through the centre of the eye and originating from the spot on the back of the retina where the material impression causing that appearance was received. Reids reasons for rejecting the Berkeleian and Humean views are examined. It is argued that Reids position on visual localization is ultimately driven by his dualistic metaphysical commitments rather than by an empirically grounded investigation of the phenomena of vision. To this extent, his position sits uncomfortably with his own methodological commitments.

Condillac's Paradox

I argue that Condillac was committed to four mutually inconsistent propositions: that the mind is unextended, that sensations are modifications of the mind, that colours are sensations, and that colours are extended. I argue that this inconsistency was not just the blunder of a second-rate philosopher, but the consequence of a deep-seated tension in the views of early modern philosophers on the nature of the mind, sensation, and secondary qualities and that more widely studied figures, notably Condillacs contemporaries, Hume and Reid, were not ultimately any more successful at developing an account of vision that unproblematically avoids the paradox. In passing, I take issue with Nicholas Pastores account of how Condillacs Treatise on Sensations deals with the visual perception of form (in A Selective History of Theories of Visual Perception).

Hume and Reid on the Simplicity of the Soul

HUME STUDIES’ Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the HUME STUDIES archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Each copy of any part of a HUME STUDIES transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

Hume’s Reply to the Achilles Argument

Book 1, part 4, Section 5 of David Hume’s Treatise of human nature attacks the belief in an immaterial soul.1 (It also attacks the belief in a material soul, though that further project is not advertised in the title Hume chose to give to the section, and appears to have been largely incidental to his main purpose.) In the process, it considers and challenges what Hume described as a ‘remarkable’ argument for the immateriality of the soul. This ‘remarkable’ argument has some affinity with an argument that was given by predecessors, such as Ralph Cudworth, Pierre Bayle, and Samuel Clarke; contemporaries such as Etienne de Condillac; and later contemporaries, such as Moses Mendelssohn. It was subsequently described by Immanuel Kant as the ‘Achilles’ of all the purely a priori arguments concerning the soul, an epithet Kant applied because, like the legendary Greek warrior, the argument appears to withstand all opposition.2 (I borrow that name for the argument here.)