Karl Ameriks

The Cambridge companion to German idealism

List of contributors Introduction: interpreting German Idealism Karl Ameriks 1. The Enlightenment and Idealism Frederick Beiser 2. Absolute Idealism and the rejection of Kantian dualism Paul Guyer 3. Kants practical philosophy Allen Wood 4. The aesthetic holism of Hamann, Herder and Schiller Daniel Dahlstrom 5. All or nothing: systematicity and nihilism in Jacobi, Reinhold and Maimon Paul Franks 6. The early philosophy of Fichte and Schelling Rolf Peter Horstmann 7. Holderlin and Novalis Charles Larmore 8. Hegels Phenomenology and Logic: an overview Terry Pinkard 9. Hegels practical philosophy: the realization of freedom Robert Pippin 10. German realism: the self-limitation of Idealism in Fichte, Schelling, and Schopenhauer Gunter Zoller 11. Politics and the new mythology: the turn to late Romanticism Dieter Sturma 12. German Idealism and the arts Andrew Bowie 13. The legacy of Idealism in the philosophy of Feuerbach, Marx and Kierkegaard Karl Ameriks Bibliography Index.

Kant’s Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument

Considerable study has been given in recent years to the question of transcendental arguments in general and to Kants transcendental deduction in particular. Recent analytical studies of Kant have approached his work with a pronounced interest in the former general issue and with broad theories about the way the f irst Critique äs a whole should be interpreted. As a consequence there has been a tendency to pass over the complex details of Kants own discussion of the structure of transcendental argumentation. Indicative of this Situation is the absence of any detailed treatment of the second edition version of the transcendental deduction. In this paper I shall argue that once Kants revisions in the second edition are given their due, his transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding can be seen to have a surprisingly clear structure and one which is at variance with contemporary interpretations. My main objective is to give a fair representation of that structure, but in so doing I will argue that it has been misrepresented in an fundamental and common way by Kants most distinguished recent commentators Peter Strawson, Jonathan Bennett, and Robert Paul Wolff. Whereas their interpretations see Kants deduction äs aiming to provide aproof of objectivity which will answer scepticism, I will argue that on the contrary it is necessary and profitable to understand the deduction äs moving f rom the assumption that there is empirical knowledge to a proof of the preconditions of that knowledge.

Kant's theory of mind : an analysis of the paralogisms of pure reason

(* NEW TO THIS EDITION) *PREFACE I. INTRODUCTION II. IMMATERIALITY III. INTERACTION IV. IDENTITY V. IMMORTALITY VI. INDEPENDENCE VII. IDEALITY *POSTSCRIPT *BIBLIOGRAPHY *INDEX.

Kant’s Idealism on a Moderate Interpretation

For many interpreters, the holy grail of Kant scholarship is to find a meaning for the doctrine of transcendental idealism that is not only consistent, understandable in its origins, and not immediately absurd, but also does full justice to the complex fact that Kant insists on claiming both that there are ‘real appearances’ (Erscheinungen in contrast to blosser Schein), that is, appearances disclosing to us features of physical objects that are empirically real, and also that these features are nonetheless ‘mere appearances’ in contrast to ‘things in themselves’.

Kant and Hegel on freedom: Two new interpretations

Can Kants theory of freedom be defended in contemporary ‘incompatibilist’ terms, as Henry Allison believes, or is it vulnerable to Hegelian criticisms of the ‘compatibilist’ sort that Allen Wood presents? I argue that the answer to both of these questions is negative, and that there is a third option, namely that Kants real theory of freedom is not as well off as Allison contends, nor as weak as Wood claims. Allison tries to save Kants theory of freedom from both what he takes to be traditional and improper interpretations ‐ notably including Hegels and Woods ‐ of what that theory means, as well as from traditional and improper objections to its defensibility. I argue in part with Wood (and Hegel) against Allison on the issue of the meaning of Kants theory, and in part with Allison against Wood (and Hegel) on the issue of the defensibility of Kants theory.

The Hegelian Critique of Kantian Morality

Important work on the Hegelian critique of Kantian morality can now be found in at least three different domains. The first is the field of current English-language ethical theory, where after an influential neo-Hegelian attack on Kant by Bernard Williams and others, Kantians have now begun to mount a sharp counterattack. The second is the domain of Englishlanguage Kant scholarship proper, from Paton and Knox to Gregor and Hill, where exegetes have tried diligently but without true popular success to put down the cruder misconceptions about Kant. The third sphere is the German scene, where after the great historical researches of scholars such as Henrich and Schmucker, a number of younger philosophers have attempted to combine traditional exegesis with an extensive systematic and analytic treatment of the Hegelian challenge. I believe it is only by considering all these perspectives together – and by realizing how closely related they are – that we can properly estimate the force and value of Hegels challenge. As a first step toward such a consideration, I will briefly outline what appear to be the three main points at issue, and then by focusing on one of them, I will show how to a great extent Kant can be vindicated. Obviously, a complete evaluation of this matter must await a thorough examination of Kants entire practical philosophy as well as an explanation of how Hegels critique fits in with the general objective of his own massive system.

On Beiser's German idealism

Frederick Beiser’s magisterial new volume on German Idealism provides the latest and most ambitious installment of his account of the main periods of classical German philosophy. 1 This book contains nearly 600 pages of text, 97 pages of notes, and a well-organized 25 page bibliography that covers merely a portion of the extensive scholarship that was consulted. Its four parts can each be regarded as significant works of their own, concerning, in turn (1) Kant, (2) Fichte, (3) absolute idealism, and (4) Schelling. The volume exhibits the well-known features of Beiser’s earlier work, notably his engaging style and unique gift for reconstructing relatively obscure philosophical debates in a way that provides a gripping intellectual drama for readers of all kinds. This account of German Idealism is by no means a mechanical survey of the period that merely summarizes previous work. It delves deeply into an enormous range of primary and secondary sources, covers numerous important controversies effectively for the first time in English, and offers a challenging new perspective on the era as a whole. The book’s subtitle, ‘The Struggle Against Subjectivism, 1781–1801’, indicates an orientation that is highly appropriate in several ways. First, it properly expresses the fundamental fact that, despite their emphasis on the distinctive powers of mind, or subjectivity in general, the major philosophers of the German Idealist period are all very much oriented against , rather than toward, ‘subjectivism’ as it is ordinarily understood in English – for example, in the sense of any reduction of ontology to a set of mental states. Second, the subtitle is an indirect reminder of the fact that there is a struggle here that concerns not only these primary figures but also the intense dispute about their interpretation, which has been going on ever since 1781. The tendency to invoke the spectre of subjectivism as a heavy-handed club against earlier thinkers is a mistake that still must be struggled against, and it is a problem that often can be found in the Idealists’ attitudes toward their own immediate predecessors, as well as in uncharitable and still influential contemporary

Understanding Apperception Today

Kant’s theory of the mind has received considerable attention in the last decade, but most of the approaches of recent years can be seen as a resuscitation of strategies initiated by earlier generations of Kant scholars.’ For example, my own work in excavating the rationalist commitments that may remain intact behind Kant’s critical arguments in the Paralogism has some obvious parallels with the “metaphysical” approach to Kant favored in the 1920s by German philosophers such as Heinz Heimsoeth, Max Wundt, and Martin Heidegger.2 Yet another tradition, going back to Fichte, has been resurrected in our time by the influential work of Dieter Henrich3 and carried forward in an important new study by Frederick Neuhouser, whose focus on Fichte’s concept of the self as “self-positing” resembles notions recently said to be found in Kant by Henry Allison and Robert Pippin.4 These interpretations contrast with the standard analytic and anti-idealist approach represented most recently by C. T. Powell’s new work,’ which can be seen as a development of suggestions by earlier English-speaking philosophers such as Peter Strawson, Wilfrid Sellars, and Jay Rosenberg. Similar but looser and more distant relations of indebtedness can be found between Patricia Kitcher’s work6 and the Humean tradition, which has bequeathed a set of “naturalistic” problems and approaches, if not answers, to a line of interpreters that extends from Herbart to Robert Paul Wolff.’

Reinhold, History, and the Foundation of Philosophy

Reinhold has long been well known for his interest in foundational philosophy. More recently, he has been becoming much better known for his interest in history and the history of philosophy as well. These two interests can appear to be antithetical to one another, but it is also possible to see them as complementary. In particular, I argue that one can read even one of Reinhold’s most foundational texts, his essay “On the Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge,” in such a way that it too is best understood in relation to Reinhold’s lifelong concern with practical and historical issues. In the second half of this essay I supplement this analysis with a reaction to four fundamental questions about Reinhold’s relation to history that are raised by Daniel Breazeale in an essay in this volume.

The Key Role of Selbstgefühl in Philosophy's Aesthetic and Historical Turns

Abstract In Selbstgefühl, Manfred Frank provides a detailed study of the eighteenth century origins and contemporary philosophical implications of a unique kind of direct self-awareness. The growing significance of this phenomenon is closely related to three interconnected developments in modern philosophy, which I describe as the ‘subjective turn’, the ‘aesthetic turn’, and the ‘historical turn’. While following Frank in emphasising key concepts in the first of these two turns, I add a stress on the historical turn in post-Kantian philosophical writing.