Louis Massicotte

Mixed electoral systems: a conceptual and empirical survey

Abstract Until recently, mixed electoral systems have attracted minimal academic attention. Recent developments warrant reconsideration. At present no less than 29 countries, totalling about one-fifth of the worlds population, use mixed systems for elections to their first or single chamber. However, there is no consensus in the literature as to whether mixed electoral systems are in a category of their own. Numerous scholars use the concept but do not agree on what it means exactly. We propose a rigorous definition of mixed systems, and argue that electoral systems should not be classified as mixed for the sole reason that they produce results in between those resulting from plurality or majority and PR. Rather, the crucial feature of a mixed system is that its mechanics involves both PR and plurality or majority. We distinguish between independent and dependent combinations, the latter corresponding to those cases where the application of one formula depends on the outcome produced by the other formula. We identify five basic types of hybrids: superposition (now exemplified by Japan), correction (Germany), coexistence (French Senate), fusion (French municipal elections) and conditional (the 1923 and 1953 Italian election laws). Existing and older systems are classified under those headings and their main features are described.

DECIDING WHO HAS THE RIGHT TO VOTE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ELECTION LAWS

The paper analyses seven potential restrictions to the right to vote in 63 democracies. Only two of these restrictions have given rise to a near consensus. An overwhelming majority of democracies have decided that the minimum voting age should be 18 and that the right to vote of mentally deficient people should be restricted. There is little consensus about whether the right to vote should be restrcited to citizens, about whether there should be country or electoral district residence requirements, about which electors residing abroad (if any) should retain their right to vote and about which prison inmates (if any) should have the right to vote. The paper also examines two factors that affect right to vote laws: British colonialism and level of political rights. The pattern found with respect to electoral systems, whereby former British colonies emulate their former ruler, is less systematic in the case of right to vote legislation. Finally, “strong” democracies are slightly more inclusive than “weak” ones when deciding who has the right to vote.

Electoral formulas: A macroscopic perspective

The paper offers a macroscopic view of the legislative electoral formulas in force in 166 sovereign countries, whether democratic or not. The purpose is to determine which formulas are the most widespread, and whether the prevalence of a formula is correlated with geographical, historical, economic, and political factors. While plurality and PR systems are equally frequent, the former tend to be found in more populated countries. PR prevails in Europe and South America, and among the most democratic countries, while the plurality rule is more typical of Asia, Africa, and North America, and is especially popular among former British colonies. Large countries are more likely to opt for single-member districts. No significant correlation emerges between the level of economic development or French colonial background and any electoral formula. The study suggests that the selection of an electoral system is not merely the outcome of party interest, but is also strongly influenced by ideas about what is good, just, or efficient.

Direct presidential elections: a world summary

Abstract This paper first examines the frequency of direct presidential elections among the 170 countries of the world with a working, directly elected parliament. We find that there is a directly elected president in more than half of the countries and in about two-thirds of the republics. Former British colonies are less likely to hold direct presidential elections, which are otherwise very popular in North and South America and Africa. We then examine the kind of electoral formula that is used for the election of presidents. Most elections are held under the majority rule, most of the time under the majority runoff procedure. The majority rule is clearly predominant in Europe and Africa, and is unpopular in North America. Finally, no relationship is observed between the level of economic development or of democracy and the use of direct presidential elections or the choice of an electoral formula.

Mixed electoral systems: An overview

Professors Andre Blais and Louis Massicotte of the University of Montreal assess the many forms of mixed electoral systems for ’Representation’.

TOWARDS A MIXED‐MEMBER PROPORTIONAL SYSTEM FOR QUÉBEC?

In December 2004, the Québec provincial government tabled a proposal aimed at introducing a mixed-member proportional system (MMP) for elections to the National Assembly, broadly patterned on the German, New Zealand and Scottish electoral systems (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). This article summarises the historical background of electoral system reform in Québec and the reasons for reform, analyses the proposal in detail, and explores the prospects for its ultimate adoption. The proposal can be found in a draft bill (Dupuis 2004), the contents of which were determined by the government on the basis of a working paper I prepared (Massicotte, 2004a).

Judging elections by their outcome

Abstract This paper considers judgments based on electoral outcomes, questioning whether a decision on what is ‘free and fair’ can be related to what results from an electoral competition. It is noted that no one has seriously argued that elections should be deemed free and fair based on the extent to which a specific party has won, although it is possible that the electoral process may be more likely to be found acceptable when the ‘ins’ are defeated. Such a judgement would be a mistake. The thorny issue of socio‐demographic and political party outcomes has produced no consensus, and it is important to remember that electorates remain free to produce outcomes with which we, in our wisdom, might disagree.

Can successors succeed? Assessing the odds for Prime Ministerial re‐election in old commonwealth countries since 1945

This article focuses on prime ministers who reached office by succeeding another prime minister from the same party rather than by winning an election in their own right. Successors are found to be as numerous as those who won office through a general election. The odds are currently against successors. Successors who have the highest rate of success are those who waited between one and 12 months before calling an election. Defeated successors are likely to quit as party leaders afterwards. The findings are similar among jurisdictions, except for the Australian states, where successors have rarely been successful in recent decades.