Antoine Yoshinaka

A cross-national analysis of economic voting: taking account of the political context across time and nations

Abstract Powell and Whitten (Am. J. Polit. Sci. 37 (1993) 391) showed that clarity of responsibility for public policy is a key determinant of the extent of economic voting, where their measure of clarity relies heavily on long-term institutional factors. Work since then suggests that clarity of responsibility is variable across time as well as space. We create a new index that combines long-term factors with medium- and short-term factors, permitting us to examine the strength of economic voting not only across a range of countries but over time within single countries. We test the new measure using individual-level data from eight European countries over a 16-year time span. The test also uses a refined measure of retrospective economic performance based on the aggregation of individual observations. We find a strong relationship between our expanded index of clarity of responsibility and the level of economic voting. As anticipated, levels of clarity vary substantially over time within countries as well as between individual countries and groups of countries. The fact that clarity tends to peak in majoritarian systems underlines an apparent contradiction between clarity and consensualism and raises interesting questions for democratic theories in general and voting behavior in particular.

DECIDING WHO HAS THE RIGHT TO VOTE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ELECTION LAWS

The paper analyses seven potential restrictions to the right to vote in 63 democracies. Only two of these restrictions have given rise to a near consensus. An overwhelming majority of democracies have decided that the minimum voting age should be 18 and that the right to vote of mentally deficient people should be restricted. There is little consensus about whether the right to vote should be restrcited to citizens, about whether there should be country or electoral district residence requirements, about which electors residing abroad (if any) should retain their right to vote and about which prison inmates (if any) should have the right to vote. The paper also examines two factors that affect right to vote laws: British colonialism and level of political rights. The pattern found with respect to electoral systems, whereby former British colonies emulate their former ruler, is less systematic in the case of right to vote legislation. Finally, “strong” democracies are slightly more inclusive than “weak” ones when deciding who has the right to vote.

The Electoral Consequences of Party Switching by Incumbent Members of Congress, 1947–2000

What are the electoral consequences of switching parties for incumbent members of Congress? Do incumbents who switch fare better or worse after their switch? Aldrich (1995) and Aldrich and Bianco (1992) present a model of party affiliation for all candidates. We empirically extend this model for incumbent legislators who have switched parties. Specifically, we look at the universe of incumbent representatives who have run for Congress under more than one party label since World War II. We find that the primary and general election vote shares for party switchers are not as high after the switch as before. Additionally, we learn that party switching causes the primaries in the switchers party and in the the opposing party (the switchers �old� party) to become more competitive in the short run. Over the long run, however, primaries in the switchers new party are less competitive than those in the old party before the switch.

Partisan Politics and Electoral Design: The Enfranchisement of Felons and Ex-Felons in the United States, 1960–99:

The authors thank Chris Uggen and Angie Behrens for sharing their data and Poonam Kumar for assistance with data collection. DISENFRANCHISEMENT due to a felony conviction remains one of the few legal voting prohibitions for adult citizens in the United States. In fact, felons and ex-felons are the largest group of disenfranchised citizens. According to one estimate, there are more than four million Americans disenfranchised due to felony convictions (Uggen and Manza 2002). Moreover, African Americans, Latinos, and the poor are disproportionately affected by the disenfranchisement laws (Demeo and Ochoa 2003; Harvey 1994; Hench 1998; Shapiro 1993). One study estimated that 14 percent of black adult males nationwide were disenfranchised in 1996 due to felony convictions (Fellner and Mauer 1998). In particular, in the South, felony disenfranchisement has had a signifi cant impact on minority voters; in Alabama in 1996, for instance, over 30 percent of black men were disenfranchised (Fellner and Mauer 1998). As of 2002, 48 states disenfranchised incarcerated felons. Thirty-four of those states also disenfranchised felons on parole, probation, or both. Of those 34 states, 14 also disenfranchised ex-felons who had completed their sentences (Behrens, Uggen, and Manza 2003). While the numerical impact of felon disenfranchisement is well documented, scholars have only recently begun to explore the political ramifi cations (e.g., Ewald 2002; Manza and Uggen 2004; McLeod, White, and Gavin 2003; Miles 2004; Uggen and Manza 2002).1 A study of the political ramifi cations of the repeal of felon disenfranchisement laws is well overdue since debates about felon disenfranchisement are often overtly partisan. Even if not, politicians are acutely aware of the possible electoral impact of any change in voting laws. Since the 2000 U.S. presidential election, legislators have been faced with multiple election-related grievances brought by voters and groups claiming to have been improperly disenfranchised. Such displays of activism suggest that the disenfranchisement laws can— and do—make a difference in the electoral arena. Although widespread popular pressure for changes in felon disenfranchisement laws has been generally minimal, many states have modifi ed their voting statutes and constitutions since the 1960s in order to become more inclusive. The likelihood of a statutory change in any given year has been rare, but the cumulative effect of states enfranchising Partisan Politics and Electoral Design: The Enfranchisement of Felons and Ex-Felons in the United States, 1960–99

Ideological Hedging in Uncertain Times: Inconsistent Legislative Representation and Voter Enfranchisement

Can ideological inconsistency in legislators’ voting records be explained by uncertainty about constituent preferences? Do legislators ‘hedge their bets’ ideologically when faced with constituency uncertainty? This article presents an uncertainty-based theory of ideological hedging. Legislators faced with uncertainty about their constituent preferences have an incentive to present ideologically inconsistent roll-call records. Legislators experiment with a variety of roll-call positions in order to learn the preferences of their constituents. An examination of US senators during 1961–2004 shows that uncertainty due to black enfranchisement and mobilization led to higher ideological inconsistency in legislative voting records. Ideologically inconsistent behaviour by elected officials can be characterized as best responses to a changing and uncertain environment. These results have implications for representation and the stability of democracy.