Louise Amoore

Data Derivatives: On the Emergence of a Security Risk Calculus for Our Times

In a quiet London office, a software designer muses on the algorithms that will make possible the risk flags to be visualized on the screens of border guards from Heathrow to St Pancras International. There is, he says, ‘real time decision making’ – to detain, to deport, to secondarily question or search – but there is also the ‘offline team who run the analytics and work out the best set of rules’. Writing the code that will decide the association rules between items of data, prosaic and mundane – flight route, payment type, passport – the analysts derive a novel preemptive security measure. This paper proposes the analytic of the data derivative – a visualized risk flag or score drawn from an amalgam of disaggregated fragments of data, inferred from across the gaps between data and projected onto an array of uncertain futures. In contrast to disciplinary and enclosed techniques of collecting data to govern population, the data derivative functions via ‘differential curves of normality’, imagining a range of potential futures through the association rule, thus ‘opening up to let things happen’ (Foucault 2007). In some senses akin to the risk orientation of the financial derivative, itself indifferent to actual underlying people, places or events by virtue of modulated norms, the contemporary security derivative is not centred on who we are, nor even on what our data say about us, but on what can be imagined and inferred about who we might be – on our very proclivities and potentialities.

Ambiguities of global civil society

The concept of an emergent global civil society (GCS), an identifiable public sphere of voluntary association distinct from the architecture of states and markets, has become voguish in some approaches to international relations and international political economy, and in the practices of global governance. This article seeks to reveal the limitations of the prevailing commonsense framing of GCS. Challenging the idea that we can isolate an unambiguous GCS sphere, we focus instead on the particular uses of GCS – on the practices that are shaped in its name. We make a number of interventions to emphasise the conceptual and political ambiguity of GCS. First, we shift the emphasis from GCS as a bounded ‘non-governmental’; space to GCS as precisely a means of making global politics governable in particular ways. Second, we question the assumption of GCS as ‘voluntary association’, asking what it means for GCS to embody or represent the interests of social groups. Finally, we raise questions of the image of empowerment through GCS, highlighting the power relations, tensions and contradictions at the heart of a transformative politics.

Taking People Apart: Digitised Dissection and the Body at the Border

The UK Home Office and the US Transportation Security Administration have made substantial recent investment in new Backscatter X-ray scanners to screen bodies at securitised border checkpoints. Promising to make the invisible visualisable, these devices project an image of a naked body onto a screen to identify concealed ‘risk’. Contemporary security practices which seek to fix identity at the border through biometrics, datamining, and profiling—of which the ‘whole body scanner’ is part—have their genealogy in efforts in aesthetics and medical science to mine the body for certainties and reveal something of the unknown future. The scan is revealed as a simultaneous partitioning and projection, the body ‘digitally dissected’ into its component parts, from which a specific, securitised visualisation is shaped. Drawing on the entangled histories of ‘body knowledge’ in art, science, and anatomy—their techniques of abstraction and technologies of visualisation—we explore what light may be shed on the Backscatter scan and, more importantly, what ramifications this may have for a critical response. Challenges to the biometric border have tended to centre on surveillance, making appeals to privacy and bodily integrity. However, if border disclosures which ‘take apart’ the body are more precisely understood as visualisations, then there are more fundamental issues than recourse to rights of privacy can counteract.

Lines of sight: on the visualization of unknown futures

This article considers the specific mode of visualization that is at work in contemporary border security practices. Taking inspiration from art historian Jonathan Crarys genealogies of attention, it situates homeland security visuality in a particular economy of attention or attentiveness to the world. How is it that we come to focus on some elements of our way of life, establish them as normal and designate deviations from the norm? How does this algorithmic attentiveness break up the visual field, ‘pixelating’ sensory data so that it can be reintegrated to project a picture of a person? The pre-emptive lines of sight emerging in contemporary security practice become precisely a means of visualizing unknown futures. The article concludes with reflections on the creative artistic forms of attention that flourish even where the lines of sight of the consumer, the citizen, the border guard, the traveller, the migrant appear ever more directed and delimited. It is in these more creative modes of attention that we find one of the most important resources to contemporary political life – the capacity to question the ‘better picture’, to disrupt what we see as ordinary or out of the ordinary and confront the routines of our lives anew.

Border theatre: on the arts of security and resistance

This essay addresses the conditions and limits of artistic interventions in the contemporary landscape of border security. It argues that the theatrical rituals of border security — scanning, screening, verifying identity — have become domesticated and all-but-invisible in our daily scopic regimes. At the same time, the essay suggests that surprising, enchanting encounters with the techniques and technologies of security can interrupt border sequences and create invigorated possibilities for public engagement. An ethics of unanticipated worlds is proposed as an alternative to political action as always proximate to observable and visible violence. In a world where rituals of border security increasingly operate precisely by pre-deciding and pre-empting in advance, art that works in the absence of certainty and decidability offers a crucial window through which to evaluate and respond.

Risk, reward and discipline at work

This paper argues that the manufacture of specific kinds of uncertainty and risk has become central to programmes of work flexibilization. The construction of a riskuncertainty relation has underpinned a raft of managerial doctrines on the worker as entrepreneur. I outline the dominant representation of risk as an unavoidable symptom of globalization. I then explore the relationship between human capital risk management, as defined by management consultants, and the working practices restructured in their name. In contrast to the rhetoric of worker-entrepreneurs, the making of contingency and uncertainty at work is revealed to be riven by tensions. I conclude by considering how we might begin to expose the myths of individual entrepreneurship, revealing the ordinary and everyday practices that make the displacement and reallocation of risk possible.

Life beyond big data: governing with little analytics

Abstract The twenty-first-century rise of big data marks a significant break with statistical notions of what is of interest or concern. The vast expansion of digital data has been closely intertwined with the development of advanced analytical algorithms with which to make sense of the data. The advent of techniques of knowledge discovery affords some capacity for the analytics to derive the object or subject of interest from clusters and patterns in large volumes of data, otherwise imperceptible to human reading. Thus, the scale of the big in big data is of less significance to contemporary forms of knowing and governing than what we will call the little analytics. Following Henri Bergsons analysis of forms of perception which ‘cut out’ a series of figures detached from the whole, we propose that analytical algorithms are instruments of perception without which the extensity of big data would not be comprehensible. The technologies of analytics focus human attention and decision on particular persons and things of interest, whilst annulling or discarding much of the material context from which they are extracted. Following the algorithmic processes of ingestion, partitioning and memory, we illuminate how the use of analytics engines has transformed the nature of analysis and knowledge and, thus, the nature of the governing of economic, social and political life.

Cloud geographies Computing, data, sovereignty

The architecture of cloud computing is becoming ever more closely intertwined with geopolitics – from the sharing of intelligence data, to border controls, immigration decisions, and drone strikes. Developing an analogy with the cloud chamber of early twentieth century particle physics, this paper explores the geography of the cloud in cloud computing. It addresses the geographical character of cloud computing across two distinct paradigms. The first, ‘Cloud I’ or a geography of cloud forms, is concerned with the identification and spatial location of data centres where the cloud is thought to materialize. Here the cloud is understood within a particular history of observation, one where the apparently abstract and obscure world can be brought into vision and rendered intelligible. In the second variant, ‘Cloud II’ or the geography of a cloud analytic, the cloud is a bundle of experimental algorithmic techniques acting upon the threshold of perception itself. Like the cloud chamber of the twentieth century, contemporary cloud computing is concerned with rendering perceptible and actionable that which would otherwise be beyond the threshold of human observation. The paper proposes three elements of correlative cloud reasoning, suggesting their significance for our geopolitical present: condensing traces; discovering patterns; and archiving the future.

Security and the incalculable

In this article, I explore a specific relation between mathematics and security calculations. Recalling the confrontations between the mathematician Alan Turing and the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930s, I am interested in the relationship between intuition and ingenuity. During Wittgenstein’s 1930 lectures on the foundations of mathematics, Turing interjects in order to insist upon the capacity of number: ‘one can make predictions’. Wittgenstein replies that mathematics ‘makes no predictions’, but instead is a form of grammar: ‘taken by itself we shouldn’t know what to do with it; it’s useless. But there is all kind of use for it as part of a calculus’. It is just such a formulation of a calculus or grammar – ‘decision trees’, ‘event trees’, ‘attribute-based algorithms’ – that characterizes contemporary security. As for Turing, the logic comprises ‘two faculties, which we may call intuition and ingenuity’. The intuitive realm of imagination and speculation reaches toward a possible solution, while the ingenuity seeks arrangements of propositions. The advent of ‘rules-based’ and ‘risk-based’ security decisions, then, are always already political because they precisely involve combinatorial possibilities whose arrangement has effects in the world.

The clown at the gates of the camp: Sovereignty, resistance and the figure of the fool:

This article considers the figure of the clown-fool as a way of approaching anew contemporary practices of sovereignty and resistance. The spectre of the camp as the nomos of modern sovereign power is widely critiqued for its neglect of the thriving and teeming life that actually accompanies the declaration of exception. The clown is an errant and troublesome figure whose life haunts the sovereign decision on exception. His presence in border-camp activism invokes a rich, provocative history in which the clown’s foolish wisdom has critiqued the conceits of power. Yet, the clown’s significance exceeds his traditional associations with carnivalesque misrule and mockery. Like homo sacer, the clown occupies an ambiguous position between political inclusion and exclusion, between inside and outside. In short, the sovereign needs the clown. His relation to resistance is thus also complex. The clown does not turn to face a locus of power as though it could be countered or overturned. Rather, he is the example par excellence of the resistance always already present within the exercise of power: standing not inside or outside the gates, but looking through, he dwells within the court but is not of its making. As a singularity akin to Deleuze’s figurative children and Agamben’s tricksters, the clown troubles the division between interior and exterior on which sovereign political life rests, a division that is also frequently replicated in understandings of resistance.