Louise Whiteley

Effects of category-specific costs on neural systems for perceptual decision-making.

Perceptual judgments are often biased by prospective losses, leading to changes in decision criteria. Little is known about how and where sensory evidence and cost information interact in the brain to influence perceptual categorization. Here we show that prospective losses systematically bias the perception of noisy face-house images. Asymmetries in category-specific cost were associated with enhanced blood-oxygen-level-dependent signal in a frontoparietal network. We observed selective activation of parahippocampal gyrus for changes in category-specific cost in keeping with the hypothesis that loss functions enact a particular task set that is communicated to visual regions. Across subjects, greater shifts in decision criteria were associated with greater activation of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Our results support a hypothesis that costs bias an intermediate representation between perception and action, expressed via general effects on frontal cortex, and selective effects on extrastriate cortex. These findings indicate that asymmetric costs may affect a neural implementation of perceptual decision making in a similar manner to changes in category expectation, constituting a step toward accounting for how prospective losses are flexibly integrated with sensory evidence in the brain.

Facilitated Processing of Visual Stimuli Associated with the Body

Recent work on tactile perception has revealed enhanced tactile acuity and speeded spatial-choice reaction times (RTs) when viewing the stimulated body site as opposed to viewing a neutral object. Here we examine whether this body-view enhancement effect extends to visual targets. Participants performed a speeded spatial discrimination between two lights attached either to their own left index finger or to a wooden finger-shaped object, making a simple distal–proximal decision. We filmed either the finger-mounted or the object-mounted lights in separate experimental blocks and the live scene was projected onto a screen in front of the participants. Thus, participants responded to identical visual targets varying only in their context: on the body or not. Results revealed a large performance advantage for the finger-mounted stimuli: reaction times were substantially reduced, while discrimination accuracy was unaffected. With this finding we address concerns associated with previous work on the processing of stimuli attributed to the self and extend the finding of a performance advantage for such stimuli to vision.

Spatially Distributed Encoding of Covert Attentional Shifts in Human Thalamus

Spatial attention modulates signal processing within visual nuclei of the thalamus—but do other nuclei govern the locus of attention in top-down mode? We examined functional MRI (fMRI) data from three subjects performing a task requiring covert attention to 1 of 16 positions in a circular array. Target position was cued after stimulus offset, requiring subjects to perform target detection from iconic visual memory. We found positionally specific responses at multiple thalamic sites, with individual voxels activating at more than one direction of attentional shift. Voxel clusters at anatomically equivalent sites across subjects revealed a broad range of directional tuning at each site, with little sign of contralateral bias. By reference to a thalamic atlas, we identified the nuclear correspondence of the four most reliably activated sites across subjects: mediodorsal/central-intralaminar (oculomotor thalamus), caudal intralaminar/parafascicular, suprageniculate/limitans, and medial pulvinar/lateral posterior. Hence, the cortical network generating a top-down control signal for relocating attention acts in concert with a spatially selective thalamic apparatus—the set of active nuclei mirroring the thalamic territory of cortical “eye-field” areas, thus supporting theories which propose the visuomotor origins of covert attentional selection.

Attention in a Bayesian framework

The behavioral phenomena of sensory attention are thought to reflect the allocation of a limited processing resource, but there is little consensus on the nature of the resource or why it should be limited. Here we argue that a fundamental bottleneck emerges naturally within Bayesian models of perception, and use this observation to frame a new computational account of the need for, and action of, attention – unifying diverse attentional phenomena in a way that goes beyond previous inferential, probabilistic and Bayesian models. Attentional effects are most evident in cluttered environments, and include both selective phenomena, where attention is invoked by cues that point to particular stimuli, and integrative phenomena, where attention is invoked dynamically by endogenous processing. However, most previous Bayesian accounts of attention have focused on describing relatively simple experimental settings, where cues shape expectations about a small number of upcoming stimuli and thus convey “prior” information about clearly defined objects. While operationally consistent with the experiments it seeks to describe, this view of attention as prior seems to miss many essential elements of both its selective and integrative roles, and thus cannot be easily extended to complex environments. We suggest that the resource bottleneck stems from the computational intractability of exact perceptual inference in complex settings, and that attention reflects an evolved mechanism for approximate inference which can be shaped to refine the local accuracy of perception. We show that this approach extends the simple picture of attention as prior, so as to provide a unified and computationally driven account of both selective and integrative attentional phenomena.

Endogenous GABA controls oligodendrocyte lineage cell number, myelination, and CNS internode length

Adjusting the thickness and internodal length of the myelin sheath is a mechanism for tuning the conduction velocity of axons to match computational needs. Interactions between oligodendrocyte precursor cells (OPCs) and developing axons regulate the formation of myelin around axons. We now show, using organotypic cerebral cortex slices from mice expressing eGFP in Sox10‐positive oligodendrocytes, that endogenously released GABA, acting on GABAA receptors, greatly reduces the number of oligodendrocyte lineage cells. The decrease in oligodendrocyte number correlates with a reduction in the amount of myelination but also an increase in internode length, a parameter previously thought to be set by the axon diameter or to be a property intrinsic to oligodendrocytes. Importantly, while TTX block of neuronal activity had no effect on oligodendrocyte lineage cell number when applied alone, it was able to completely abolish the effect of blocking GABAA receptors, suggesting that control of myelination by endogenous GABA may require a permissive factor to be released from axons. In contrast, block of AMPA/KA receptors had no effect on oligodendrocyte lineage cell number or myelination. These results imply that, during development, GABA can act as a local environmental cue to control myelination and thus influence the conduction velocity of action potentials within the CNS. GLIA 2017;65:309–321

Spatial consequences of bridging the saccadic gap

We report six experiments suggesting that conscious perception is actively redrafted to take account of events both before and after the event that is reported. When observers saccade to a stationary object they overestimate its duration, as if the brain were filling in the saccadic gap with the post-saccadic image. We first demonstrate that this illusion holds for moving objects, implying that the perception of time, velocity, and distance traveled become discrepant. We then show that this discrepancy is partially resolved up to 500 ms after a saccade: the perceived offset position of a post-saccadic moving stimulus shows a greater forward mislocalization when pursued after a saccade than during pursuit alone. These data are consistent with the idea that the temporal bias is resolved by the subsequent spatial adjustment to provide a percept that is coherent in its gist but inconsistent in its detail.

Biases in the perceived timing of perisaccadic perceptual and motor events

Subjects typically experience the temporal interval immediately following a saccade as longer than a comparable control interval. One explanation of this effect is that the brain antedates the perceptual onset of a saccade target to around the time of saccade initiation. This could explain the apparent continuity of visual perception across eye movements. Thisantedating account was tested in three experiments in which subjects made saccades of differing extents and then judged either the duration or the temporal order of key events. Postsaccadic stimuli underwent subjective temporal lengthening and had early perceived onsets. A temporally advanced awareness of saccade completion was also found, independently of antedating effects. These results provide convergent evidence supporting antedating and differentiating it from other temporal biases.

The “mesh” as evidence–model comparison and alternative interpretations of feedback

We agree that the relationship between phenomenology and accessibility can be fruitfully investigated via meshing, but we want to emphasise the importance of proper comparison between meshes, as well as considerations that make comparison especially difficult in this domain. We also argue that Blocks interpretation of the neural data in his exemplar mesh is incorrect, and propose an alternative.