Luca Casolaro

The pricing effect of certification on syndicated loans

To verify if a delegated monitor can certify its ability to perform its assigned tasks, we test whether syndicated loans in which a larger share of the facility is retained by the arranger have lower interest rates. For a large sample of syndicated loans in over 80 countries we find that this certification effect exists and is greater for facilities characterized by greater due diligence and monitoring efforts. Further, for listed companies the announcement effect of the new loan on the stock price is an increasing function of the portions of the loan retained by the arranger.

Loan Officer Authority and Small Business Lending: Evidence from a Survey

A vast literature has emphasized that small banks are at a comparative advantage in small business lending. In this paper, we show that apart from size, which is negatively correlated with bank specialization in small business lending, organizational characteristics affect bank loan portfolio choices. By using a unique dataset based on a recent survey of Italian banks, we find that after having controlled for bank size, a branch loan officer’s authority has a key role in explaining bank specialization in small business lending. In particular, banks which delegate more decision-making power to their branch loan officers are more willing to lend to small firms than other banks. We approximate loan officers’ authority by controlling for several factors which shape their incentives: loan officer turnover, the amount of money up to which they are allowed to lend autonomously, their role in loan approval and in setting loan interest rates, the kind of information (soft versus hard information) used for screening and monitoring borrowers, and the structure of their compensation schemes.

Informal loans, liquidity constraints and local credit supply: evidence from Italy

Using data from the Italian Survey on Household Income and Wealth from 1995 to 2014, we study the relation between informal credit (loans from relatives and friends) and a households access to bank credit. While most of the literature has focused on the substitutability channel, we highlight that even households with full access to the formal credit market are more likely to be indebted to relatives or friends when compared to those not interested in formal loans. This complementarity is stronger for households who have problems paying back their loans, suggesting the presence of a caretaker effect on the part of relatives and friends towards distressed families. Finally, we estimate the overall impact of an expansion of local credit supply on the diffusion of informal loans, using an IV approach. The results suggest that the complementarity effect prevails, but the positive effect on informal loans is economically very small.

The Right to Decide and the Effective Control Over Small Business Lending Decisions: A Look into Loan Officers’ Real Authority

A vast literature has emphasised that small banks are at a comparative advantage in lending to small businesses. In this paper, we show that, in addition to bank size, loan officers’ authority affects banks’ specialisation in small business lending. By using a unique dataset based on a survey of Italian banks, we find that loan officers’ authority has a key role in explaining bank specialisation in small business lending. In particular, banks that delegate more decision‐making power to their loan officers are more willing to lend to small firms than other banks. We use several proxies for measuring loan officers’ authority: their discretion in loan approval and in setting loan interest rates, the amount of money up to which they are allowed to lend autonomously, their turnover, their compensation schemes and the kind of information (soft vs. hard information) used both for screening and monitoring purposes.