Luca Pinto

Patterns of party switching in the Italian Chamber of Deputies 2008-2011

Party switching has been defined as an «umbrella label for any recorded change in party affiliation on the part of a politician holding [...] elective office» (Heller and Mershon 2009, 10). Although party switching is not a widespread phenomenon in legislatures, it has recently become the object of an expanding literature within political science. The literature has emphasized «normative, theoretical and substantial implications» of party switching (Heller and Mershon 2009, 4) insofar as party switching (a) deals with accountability, responsibility and representation, (b) provides new and powerful leverage on party discipline and on the dynamics of party systems, (c) matters because, at least potentially, it alters policy bargaining in the legislature and even government composition. Data show that in the last two decades party switching occurred both in new democracies or weakly institutionalized party systems such as Brazil, Russia, Poland and Ukraine and in established democracies facing institutional changes and electoral realignment such as Italy and Japan1.

The Time Path of Legislative Party Switching and the Dynamics of Political Competition: The Italian Case (1996–2011)

Political competition is more realistically described as a dynamic process rather than as a series of static stages in which parties compete over policy and government formation. This paper focuses on legislative party switching as the main manifestation of this endogenously evolving process, linking individual switching behaviour to policy and office incentives that are assumed to evolve throughout the life of the entire legislature. Using a new data set tracking the timing of MPs’ changes in party affiliations between 1996 and 2011 in Italy, it is found that switching is mainly motivated by policy reasons and that it is more likely during government formation periods and budget negotiations. These results are a consequence of the interplay between MPs’ ambition and the alternation of key phases in the legislative cycle.

Party System Change in Italy: Politicising the EU and the Rise of Eccentric Parties

Abstract Using expert survey data covering the 2001–13 period, this article investigates the changing shape and structure of the Italian policy space over time, as well as parties’ shifting policy positions. Our results show the emergence of a distinct pro-/anti-EU (European Union) dimension structuring party competition and a change in the meaning of EU related attitudes. The increasing importance of the pro-/anti-EU dimension is due to the entry of brand new parties in 2013. Our findings also speak to the Euroscepticism literature, as they question the hypothesis according to which Euroscepticism is confined to peripheral parties located at the extremes on the left–right scale.

More than post-election cabinets: Uncertainty and the “magnitude of change” during Italian government bargaining

The existence of political uncertainty has been identified in the literature as one of the main determinants of cabinet bargaining delays. Still, practically all studies on the topic expect uncertainty to play a relevant role only during the immediate post-election period, ignoring the variety of different government experiences, especially in countries characterized by a high cabinet turnover in the between-elections period, such as Italy. To overcome this shortcoming, we estimate the “magnitude of change” in the bargaining environment as a determinant of bargaining delays, taking into account partisan, ideological and institutional variations that can happen across two subsequent formation processes. Our results help to better explain the variance in the Italian government bargaining experience throughout almost 70 years of history. Moreover, once we control for the effect of such changing circumstances, the relevance of the timing of negotiations disappears.

Setting Parliamentary Calendars: How Parties Allocate Time for Plenary Debates on Bills

Compared to other aspects of agenda control, the organisation of legislative calendars has received scarce scholarly attention. However, setting the floor timetable affects parliament’s decisions and may therefore become crucial for understanding the policy-making process better. This article examines the allocation of speaking time for plenary debates on bills by combining an interparty perspective with a focus on the agenda-setting powers of collective directing bodies in the parliament. It shows that, due to time pressures, parties have to make explicit trade-offs among bill proposals. Using an original dataset including information about 472 bill proposals scheduled for floor debates in three Italian legislative terms in the period 2001–13, the article provides evidence that parties agree to schedule longer debates for divisive and salient issues, while they decide to move more quickly on less divisive proposals.

Breaking the inertia: Government formation under the shadow of a core party. The Italian case throughout the First Republic

Despite its theoretical relevance, the role played by the existence of a core party in explaining the partisan composition of governments represents an understudied area in the empirical research on coalition formations. This article addresses the gap in the literature by focusing on the Italian case between 1946–1993. The role of the core party not only finds corroboration in the data, but it also clarifies the role played by political inertia. In this sense, the nature of the cabinet-bargaining process appears to be qualitatively different when a core party is present. Beyond better accounting for the patterns of government formation, our results help to identify the necessary (spatial) conditions under which the cycle of a government formula can be expected to be broken.Despite its theoretical relevance, the role played by the existence of a core party in explaining the partisan composition of governments represents an understudied area in the empirical researches on coalition formations. The current paper aims to cover this lack in the literature by focusing on the Italian case between 1946 and 1993. The core party not only finds a strong empirical corroboration in the data, but it also clarifies the role played by political inertia. In this sense, the nature of the cabinet-bargaining process appears to be qualitatively different when a core party is present. Beyond better accounting for the patterns of government formation, our results help to identify the necessary (spatial) conditions under which the cycle of a government formula can be expected to be broken.

Government formation under the shadow of a core party

Despite its theoretical relevance, the role played by the existence of a core party in explaining the partisan composition of governments represents an understudied area in the empirical research on coalition formations. This article addresses the gap in the literature by focusing on the Italian case between 1946–1993. The role of the core party not only finds corroboration in the data, but it also clarifies the role played by political inertia. In this sense, the nature of the cabinet-bargaining process appears to be qualitatively different when a core party is present. Beyond better accounting for the patterns of government formation, our results help to identify the necessary (spatial) conditions under which the cycle of a government formula can be expected to be broken.Despite its theoretical relevance, the role played by the existence of a core party in explaining the partisan composition of governments represents an understudied area in the empirical researches on coalition formations. The current paper aims to cover this lack in the literature by focusing on the Italian case between 1946 and 1993. The core party not only finds a strong empirical corroboration in the data, but it also clarifies the role played by political inertia. In this sense, the nature of the cabinet-bargaining process appears to be qualitatively different when a core party is present. Beyond better accounting for the patterns of government formation, our results help to identify the necessary (spatial) conditions under which the cycle of a government formula can be expected to be broken.

Economic crisis and lawmaking. The impact of crisis on legislative agenda in Italy

ABSTRACT Major economic crises are focal events that often drive changes in various aspects of political systems. Although extensive work has been done to investigate the effect of exogenous shocks on political phenomena such as government termination, public opinion and policy outcomes, the impact of major crises on the process of policymaking has so far received scarce attention. Building on existing literature on policy agendas and legislative organization, this paper explores how the Eurozone crisis has affected the legislative agenda of the Italian parliament. The data used include information on the 1,110 bills submitted to parliament during Legislature XVI (2008–2013). Our analysis shows that, with the worsening of the crisis, bill proposals related to macroeconomic issues become increasingly more likely to enter the legislative agenda, displacing legislation dealing with other topics. Our argument is corroborated by a comparison between Legislature XVI and a pre-crisis legislature (2001–2006), as in the latter term the legislative agenda follows different patterns.

Like Leaves in the Wind? Economic Conditions and Government Survival in Italy (1946–2015)

Abstract In Italy the coincidence between the constitutionally mandated cycle of regular elections and the government mandate has never been realised: the standard has been represented by frequent government terminations during the inter-electoral period. Explanations for this instability mainly focus on cabinet and systemic attributes. This paper shifts the attention to the relationship between government stability and critical events such as economic crises. Results show that increasing job insecurity contributes to undermine government stability. This effect is stronger for governments formed after 1994, when a series of reforms have reshaped the political system, allowing voters to more easily reward or punish the incumbents for their management of the economy.

Coalition Patterns in Italian Regional Governments 1970–2015

This research explores the dynamics of coalition formation at the regional level in Italy from 1970 to 2015. Our goal is twofold. First, we provide an in-depth analysis of Italian regional politics which, after a number of reforms in the 1990s, acquired a central role. Second, the study of party coalescence at the regional level provides an alternative invaluable source of data, still under-explored, for testing coalition theories. Furthermore, the study of regional coalitions can offer a better understanding of the sub-national political dynamics within the broader national political game by exploring the vertical congruence between coalitions formed at the regional and national levels. To test our hypotheses, we conducted an analysis of potential coalitions in regional councils over an extended time period of five decades. Our results show that regional council coalitions have a higher chance of forming when they mirror the national one, while other important features of regional governments do not differ very much from those implied by the existing models of coalition formation.