Daniela Giannetti

Patterns of party switching in the Italian Chamber of Deputies 2008-2011

Party switching has been defined as an «umbrella label for any recorded change in party affiliation on the part of a politician holding [...] elective office» (Heller and Mershon 2009, 10). Although party switching is not a widespread phenomenon in legislatures, it has recently become the object of an expanding literature within political science. The literature has emphasized «normative, theoretical and substantial implications» of party switching (Heller and Mershon 2009, 4) insofar as party switching (a) deals with accountability, responsibility and representation, (b) provides new and powerful leverage on party discipline and on the dynamics of party systems, (c) matters because, at least potentially, it alters policy bargaining in the legislature and even government composition. Data show that in the last two decades party switching occurred both in new democracies or weakly institutionalized party systems such as Brazil, Russia, Poland and Ukraine and in established democracies facing institutional changes and electoral realignment such as Italy and Japan1.

Electoral Reform and Factional Politics in Italy and Japan

Italy and Japan have often been compared on the basis of the fact that they both had a highly factionalized dominant party that maintained control of national government for long periods of time. While the Italian Christian Democratic Party (DC) was typically the dominant party in multiparty coalitions, in Japan the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was able to form single-party majority governments (Scheiner 2006).

Introduction: Long-Run Consequences of Electoral Rules Change: Comparing Italy and Japan

In the modern era, representation is the hallmark of democracy, and electoral rules structure how representation works and how effectively governments perform. Moreover, of the key structural variables in constitutional design,1 it is the choice of electoral system that is usually the most open to change.

The Changing Bases of Party Support in Italy and Japan: Similarities and Differences

This chapter explores the link between electoral reforms and structural changes in the social bases of party support in Italy and Japan. Italy and Japan offer important case studies as they underwent significant electoral reform in the early 1990s as part of a more general process of political change. Both in Italy and Japan, corruption scandals and increasing public dissatisfaction with politicians resulted in demands for electoral reform. Electoral reform was seen as an institutional means of changing the system of political representation to promote alternation of parties in power, increase transparency and efficiency in government, and reduce the opportunities and incentives for corruption (Katz 2001; Reed and Thies 2001a).