Luciano Menezes Bezerra Sampaio

Eficiência dos estados brasileiros e do Distrito Federal no sistema público de transplante renal: uma análise usando método DEA (Análise Envoltória de Dados) e índice de Malmquist

The objective of this study was to evaluate the efficiency of Brazilian States and the Federal District in the public kidney transplant system and their productivity trends from 2006 to 2011. The authors used Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) with slack and the Malmquist index with slack. Inputs included spending on hospital services and health professionals in the system. The output was the number of kidney transplants performed in each State. The data showed a significant discrepancy between States in the number of kidney transplants. The transplant systems inefficiency may result from inadequate management, failure to comply with national guidelines, inactive hospital transplant committees, and overburdened hospital staff. Institutional changes promoted by the Brazilian Ministry of Health (procedures improvement and standardization) failed to increase productivity in most States during this period.O objetivo foi avaliar a eficiencia dos estados brasileiros e do Distrito Federal no sistema publico de transplante renal e a mudanca de produtividade deles entre 2006 e 2011. Utilizou-se a Analise Envoltoria de Dados (DEA) baseada em folgas e o indice de Malmquist com folgas. Os inputs usados foram os gastos dos servicos hospitalares e dos profissionais no sistema. Como output, o numero de transplantes renais realizados por cada estado. Existe uma discrepância significativa em relacao a captacao e ao numero de transplantes renais entre os estados. Evidencia-se uma ineficiencia nesse sistema, que poder ser causada por sua gestao inadequada; nao seguimento de regras nacionais; comissoes intra-hospitalares nao ativas e equipes hospitalares sobrecarregadas. As mudancas institucionais promovidas pelo Ministerio da Saude (aperfeicoamento e padronizacao dos processos) nao geraram aumento de produtividade na maioria dos estados nesse periodo.

Efficiency of Brazilian States and the Federal District in the public kidney transplant system based on DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) and the Malmquist index

The objective of this study was to evaluate the efficiency of Brazilian States and the Federal District in the public kidney transplant system and their productivity trends from 2006 to 2011. The authors used Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) with slack and the Malmquist index with slack. Inputs included spending on hospital services and health professionals in the system. The output was the number of kidney transplants performed in each State. The data showed a significant discrepancy between States in the number of kidney transplants. The transplant systems inefficiency may result from inadequate management, failure to comply with national guidelines, inactive hospital transplant committees, and overburdened hospital staff. Institutional changes promoted by the Brazilian Ministry of Health (procedures improvement and standardization) failed to increase productivity in most States during this period.O objetivo foi avaliar a eficiencia dos estados brasileiros e do Distrito Federal no sistema publico de transplante renal e a mudanca de produtividade deles entre 2006 e 2011. Utilizou-se a Analise Envoltoria de Dados (DEA) baseada em folgas e o indice de Malmquist com folgas. Os inputs usados foram os gastos dos servicos hospitalares e dos profissionais no sistema. Como output, o numero de transplantes renais realizados por cada estado. Existe uma discrepância significativa em relacao a captacao e ao numero de transplantes renais entre os estados. Evidencia-se uma ineficiencia nesse sistema, que poder ser causada por sua gestao inadequada; nao seguimento de regras nacionais; comissoes intra-hospitalares nao ativas e equipes hospitalares sobrecarregadas. As mudancas institucionais promovidas pelo Ministerio da Saude (aperfeicoamento e padronizacao dos processos) nao geraram aumento de produtividade na maioria dos estados nesse periodo.

Competição entre postos de gasolina em pequenos municípios brasileiros: uma análise a partir de um modelo de entrada empírico

This study uses a traditional empirical entry model to investigate the degree of competition in local gas stations markets in Brazil. The model shows how the number of firms in an oligopolistic market varies with changes in demand and market competition with data for 2.590 geographically isolated markets. The results demonstrate that competitive conduct changes as the number of gas stations increases, especially before the entry of the fifth firm. The model used does not require price data and, through other market characteristics such population and number of firms, it can indicate if there is a global anti-competitive pattern in the wholesale gasoline industry at small Brazilian municipalities.

A política afirmativa "Argumento de Inclusão" como forma de acesso à universidade pública: o caso da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte

Antes de la aprobacion de la Ley no 12.711/2012 que instituye constitucionalmente la reserva de cupos en las universidades federales, los modelos de inclusion fueron ampliamente discutidos y aplicados en diferentes instituciones publicas de ensenanza superior. El trabajo aqui expuesto analiza y discute el Argumento de Inclusion (AI) - politica de accion afirmativa que otorgaba un puntaje adicional a los alumnos provenientes de escuelas publicas - existente en la Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN) entre los anos 2006-12. A partir de una amplia base de datos, fue utilizada la tecnica de los Minimos Cuadrados Ordinarios (MCO) y una Regresion Cuartilica considerando como control las variables de las caracteristicas personales, socioeconomicas y escolares de los candidatos del examen de ingreso del ano 2010 en la UFRN. Los resultados muestran la relevancia del sistema de puntaje adicional como incentivo para el acceso inclusivo a la ensenanza superior y apuntan nuevas evidencias acerca de las variables que afectan positiva y negativamente a este acceso.

[Analysis of contractual incentives for kidney transplants in Brazil using the principal-agent model].

The aim of this article was to analyze contractual incentives for kidney transplants in Brazil based on the principal-agent model. The approach assumes that the Brazilian Ministry of Health is the principal and the public hospitals accredited by the National Transplant System are the agent. The Ministry of Healths welfare depends on measures taken by hospitals in kidney uptake. Hospitals allocate administrative, financial, and management efforts to conduct measures in kidney donation, removal, uptake, and transplantation. Hospitals may choose the levels of effort that are consistent with the payments and incentives received in relation to transplantation costs. The solution to this type of problem lies in structuring an optimal incentives contract, which requires aligning the interests of both parties involved in the transplantation system.The aim of this article was to analyze contractual incentives for kidney transplants in Brazil based on the principal-agent model. The approach assumes that the Brazilian Ministry of Health is the principal and the public hospitals accredited by the National Transplant System are the agent. The Ministry of Healths welfare depends on measures taken by hospitals in kidney uptake. Hospitals allocate administrative, financial, and management efforts to conduct measures in kidney donation, removal, uptake, and transplantation. Hospitals may choose the levels of effort that are consistent with the payments and incentives received in relation to transplantation costs. The solution to this type of problem lies in structuring an optimal incentives contract, which requires aligning the interests of both parties involved in the transplantation system.

Análisis de los incentivos contractuales de trasplantes de riñón en Brasil mediante el modelo agente-principal

The aim of this article was to analyze contractual incentives for kidney transplants in Brazil based on the principal-agent model. The approach assumes that the Brazilian Ministry of Health is the principal and the public hospitals accredited by the National Transplant System are the agent. The Ministry of Healths welfare depends on measures taken by hospitals in kidney uptake. Hospitals allocate administrative, financial, and management efforts to conduct measures in kidney donation, removal, uptake, and transplantation. Hospitals may choose the levels of effort that are consistent with the payments and incentives received in relation to transplantation costs. The solution to this type of problem lies in structuring an optimal incentives contract, which requires aligning the interests of both parties involved in the transplantation system.The aim of this article was to analyze contractual incentives for kidney transplants in Brazil based on the principal-agent model. The approach assumes that the Brazilian Ministry of Health is the principal and the public hospitals accredited by the National Transplant System are the agent. The Ministry of Healths welfare depends on measures taken by hospitals in kidney uptake. Hospitals allocate administrative, financial, and management efforts to conduct measures in kidney donation, removal, uptake, and transplantation. Hospitals may choose the levels of effort that are consistent with the payments and incentives received in relation to transplantation costs. The solution to this type of problem lies in structuring an optimal incentives contract, which requires aligning the interests of both parties involved in the transplantation system.

Análise dos incentivos contratuais de transplantes de rins no Brasil pelo modelo agente-principal

The aim of this article was to analyze contractual incentives for kidney transplants in Brazil based on the principal-agent model. The approach assumes that the Brazilian Ministry of Health is the principal and the public hospitals accredited by the National Transplant System are the agent. The Ministry of Healths welfare depends on measures taken by hospitals in kidney uptake. Hospitals allocate administrative, financial, and management efforts to conduct measures in kidney donation, removal, uptake, and transplantation. Hospitals may choose the levels of effort that are consistent with the payments and incentives received in relation to transplantation costs. The solution to this type of problem lies in structuring an optimal incentives contract, which requires aligning the interests of both parties involved in the transplantation system.The aim of this article was to analyze contractual incentives for kidney transplants in Brazil based on the principal-agent model. The approach assumes that the Brazilian Ministry of Health is the principal and the public hospitals accredited by the National Transplant System are the agent. The Ministry of Healths welfare depends on measures taken by hospitals in kidney uptake. Hospitals allocate administrative, financial, and management efforts to conduct measures in kidney donation, removal, uptake, and transplantation. Hospitals may choose the levels of effort that are consistent with the payments and incentives received in relation to transplantation costs. The solution to this type of problem lies in structuring an optimal incentives contract, which requires aligning the interests of both parties involved in the transplantation system.

La política afirmativa "Argumento de Inclusión" como una forma de acceso a la universidad pública: el caso de la Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte

Antes de la aprobacion de la Ley no 12.711/2012 que instituye constitucionalmente la reserva de cupos en las universidades federales, los modelos de inclusion fueron ampliamente discutidos y aplicados en diferentes instituciones publicas de ensenanza superior. El trabajo aqui expuesto analiza y discute el Argumento de Inclusion (AI) - politica de accion afirmativa que otorgaba un puntaje adicional a los alumnos provenientes de escuelas publicas - existente en la Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN) entre los anos 2006-12. A partir de una amplia base de datos, fue utilizada la tecnica de los Minimos Cuadrados Ordinarios (MCO) y una Regresion Cuartilica considerando como control las variables de las caracteristicas personales, socioeconomicas y escolares de los candidatos del examen de ingreso del ano 2010 en la UFRN. Los resultados muestran la relevancia del sistema de puntaje adicional como incentivo para el acceso inclusivo a la ensenanza superior y apuntan nuevas evidencias acerca de las variables que afectan positiva y negativamente a este acceso.

The affirmative action policy "Argument of Inclusion" as a form of access to the public university: the case of Rio Grande do Norte Federal University

Antes de la aprobacion de la Ley no 12.711/2012 que instituye constitucionalmente la reserva de cupos en las universidades federales, los modelos de inclusion fueron ampliamente discutidos y aplicados en diferentes instituciones publicas de ensenanza superior. El trabajo aqui expuesto analiza y discute el Argumento de Inclusion (AI) - politica de accion afirmativa que otorgaba un puntaje adicional a los alumnos provenientes de escuelas publicas - existente en la Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN) entre los anos 2006-12. A partir de una amplia base de datos, fue utilizada la tecnica de los Minimos Cuadrados Ordinarios (MCO) y una Regresion Cuartilica considerando como control las variables de las caracteristicas personales, socioeconomicas y escolares de los candidatos del examen de ingreso del ano 2010 en la UFRN. Los resultados muestran la relevancia del sistema de puntaje adicional como incentivo para el acceso inclusivo a la ensenanza superior y apuntan nuevas evidencias acerca de las variables que afectan positiva y negativamente a este acceso.

Eficiencia de los estados brasileños y el Distrito Federal en el sistema público de trasplante de riñón: un análisis utilizando el procedimiento DEA (Análisis de Involucrados de Datos) e índice Malmquist

The objective of this study was to evaluate the efficiency of Brazilian States and the Federal District in the public kidney transplant system and their productivity trends from 2006 to 2011. The authors used Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) with slack and the Malmquist index with slack. Inputs included spending on hospital services and health professionals in the system. The output was the number of kidney transplants performed in each State. The data showed a significant discrepancy between States in the number of kidney transplants. The transplant systems inefficiency may result from inadequate management, failure to comply with national guidelines, inactive hospital transplant committees, and overburdened hospital staff. Institutional changes promoted by the Brazilian Ministry of Health (procedures improvement and standardization) failed to increase productivity in most States during this period.O objetivo foi avaliar a eficiencia dos estados brasileiros e do Distrito Federal no sistema publico de transplante renal e a mudanca de produtividade deles entre 2006 e 2011. Utilizou-se a Analise Envoltoria de Dados (DEA) baseada em folgas e o indice de Malmquist com folgas. Os inputs usados foram os gastos dos servicos hospitalares e dos profissionais no sistema. Como output, o numero de transplantes renais realizados por cada estado. Existe uma discrepância significativa em relacao a captacao e ao numero de transplantes renais entre os estados. Evidencia-se uma ineficiencia nesse sistema, que poder ser causada por sua gestao inadequada; nao seguimento de regras nacionais; comissoes intra-hospitalares nao ativas e equipes hospitalares sobrecarregadas. As mudancas institucionais promovidas pelo Ministerio da Saude (aperfeicoamento e padronizacao dos processos) nao geraram aumento de produtividade na maioria dos estados nesse periodo.