Luis Simón

CSDP, Strategy and Crisis Management: Out of Area or Out of Business?

The EUs ineffectiveness vis‐à‐vis Libya and the southern Mediterranean crises more broadly is largely explained by the CSDPs narrow mandate centred on crisis management. The EUs emphasis on external crisis management was strategically sound given the geopolitical context of the 1990s. CSDPs quiet drift towards a ‘softer’ kind of crisis management from the middle of the first decade of the 2000s was also instrumental in highlighting the EUs differences from post‐11 September US unilateralism. That said, (soft) crisis management has become progressively obsolete in the light of a rapidly changing geopolitical environment characterised by an overall retreat of Western power globally, a weakening of Americas commitment to European security, an increasingly tumultuous European neighbourhood, and Europes financial troubles. In order to meet the demands of a changing geopolitical environment, CSDP must break away from its distinctively reactive approach to security to include all the functions normally associated with the military including, chiefly, deterrence and prevention. This would allow the EU to actively shape its regional and global milieu.

Europe, the rise of Asia and the future of the transatlantic relationship

This article examines how, in a global strategic context presided by the rise of Asia and the US rebalance towards that region, Europeans are contributing to transatlantic burden-sharing—whether individually or through the EU/NATO. As Asian powers reach westward and the US shifts its strategic priorities eastward, classical geostrategic delimitations become gradually tenuous. Particularly important are the ‘middle spaces’ of the Indian Ocean, central Asia and the Arctic, in that they constitute the main avenues of communication between the Asia–Pacific and the European neighbourhood. The article seeks to understand how evolving geostrategic dynamics in Europe, the ‘middle spaces’ and the Asia–Pacific relate to each other, and how they might impinge on discussions on transatlantic burden-sharing. It is argued that the ability of Europeans to contribute to a more equitable transatlantic burden-sharing revolves around two main tenets. First, by engaging in the ‘middle spaces’, Europes key powers and institutions are helping to underpin a balance of power in these regions. Second, by stepping up their diplomatic and economic role in the Asia–Pacific, strengthening their security ties to (US) regional allies and maintaining an EU-wide arms embargo on China, Europeans are broadly complementing US efforts in that key region. There are a number of factors that stand in the way of a meaningful European engagement in the ‘middle spaces’ and the Asia–Pacific, including divergent security priorities among Europeans, the impact of budgetary austerity on European defence capabilities and a tendency to confine foreign policy to the immediate neighbourhood. The article discusses the implications of those obstacles and outlines some ways in which they might be overcome.

The ‘Third’ US Offset Strategy and Europe’s ‘Anti-access’ Challenge

ABSTRACT Over the last two decades, a number of countries (most notably China, Russia and Iran) have been developing so-called anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, such as ballistic and cruise missiles, offensive cyber-weapons, electronic warfare, etc. The development of A2/AD capabilities by non-Western countries undermines the foundations of US power projection and global military-technological supremacy. In order to overcome, or at least mitigate, the impending A2/AD challenge, the US Department of Defense (DoD) began to roll out its so-called ‘third’ offset strategy in late 2014. The strategy aims to bring about innovative operational concepts and technologies and spur new doctrinal and organisational debates. This article assesses which of the operational concepts and capabilities informing current US discussions on offset may be relevant in the context of the A2/AD challenges Europeans face on their eastern ‘flank‘ and in their ‘extended southern neighbourhood‘, and which may not. Europeans must grapple with the same conceptual puzzle as the US: how to strike the right balance between defeating A2/AD capabilities and hedging against them, i.e. through alternative strategies that are less dependent on unhindered access and resort to asymmetric forms of warfare. However, they must take into account the geographical features of their eastern flank and extended southern neighbourhood, the level of technological maturity of their challengers, and their own military-technological prowess and political limitations. This suggests a somewhat different approach to offsetting A2/AD than that adopted by the US.

THE RETURN OF EUROPEAN GEOPOLITICS

Abstract As the Eurozone wobbles and the United States retreats from the continent, Europe must look hard in the mirror. Into the current political vacuum has stepped a confident Germany; France has also upped its game, seeking new regional partners, including Russia. Luis Simón and James Rogers argue that the United Kingdom is the one player better placed than any other to ensure the maintenance of European order and security.

Understanding US Retrenchment in Europe

Notwithstanding the crisis in Ukraine, the US will strive to maintain a maximum degree of influence in Europe through minimal presence and effort.

Britain, the European Union and the Future of Europe: A Geostrategic Perspective

Any discussion of a potential ‘Brexit’ should be set against the backdrop of an increasingly convulsive European landscape. The merits and shortcomings of the European Union should be judged not in isolation, but through the lens of their implications upon a broader postwar European order that Britain has helped to build and sustain for nearly seven decades. US strategic retrenchment, Germanys economic and political pre-eminence within the EU, and Russias attempts to recreate a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe are likely to disrupt the European balance. Luis Simón argues that ‘Brexit’ could exacerbate each of these disruptive trends – with negative ramifications for UK national security. Conversely, he contends, by leveraging its membership of and influence within the EU, Britain could help revitalise the transatlantic relationship, mitigate the spectre of a German-dominated EU, and check Russian revisionism in Eastern Europe.

Neorealism, Security Cooperation, and Europe's Relative Gains Dilemma

ABSTRACT Most neorealists argue that relative decline constitutes a systemic incentive for European security cooperation. Although this claim is broadly accepted, I argue that the relationship between relative decline and European security cooperation is complicated by a number of factors. First, European calculations about relative decline bear both a global and a regional (that is, intra-European) component. If a European country is to effectively mitigate relative decline, cooperation is not sufficient. It is just as important that cooperation develops in a way that underscores that countrys comparative strengths and minimizes its weaknesses. In this regard, European countries are often in direct competition with each other. Secondly, when Europeans are thinking about their relative power position, some countries matter more than others: a given European country may accept to incur a relative loss vis-à-vis another country (European or otherwise) but not others. These calculations are further complicated by issue linkage. Some countries may accept relative losses on some issues (for example, security) in exchange for gains on others (economic). This article examines how intra-European considerations of relative gains affect the way in which Europes main powers seek to cope with relative decline and assesses how those considerations affect security cooperation in a European Union (EU) framework. In doing so, it aims to unpack the otherwise vague notions of relative decline and European security cooperation.

Setting the Tone

The 2013 French defence White Paper presents a strategic analysis and capability assessment that address the pressing concerns posed by austerity cuts to defence budgets, instability in Europes neighbourhood, and US rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific. It proposes ways in which France – and Europe – can remain strategically relevant in this changing environment. In doing so, argues Luis Simón, the White Paper provides a useful blueprint for the European Council meeting in December 2013.

BRITISH GEOSTRATEGY FOR A NEW EUROPEAN AGE

For decades, European security has been assured by a grand, Anglo-American inspired political and economic project on the continent. Today, there is a risk that the old certainties are unravelling. In a previous RUSI Journal article, Luis Simón and James Rogers warned of the new risks in Europe; now, the authors offer a strategy for Britain to retain its vital place at the crux of an open, liberal European system.

‘Back to Basics’ and ‘Out of Area’

As Allied combat forces return from Afghanistan, Russias annexation of Crimea has reminded NATO that the security of a rules-based international system in Europe cannot be taken for granted. Efforts to reassure Allies and partners in Eastern Europe have thus become a top priority. This, however, should not lead the Allies to turn their backs on broader, global geostrategic developments – particularly at a time when Asia is emerging as the worlds economic and geopolitical centre of gravity. If the West is to prosper in a changing world, argues Luis Simón, it should be able to both defend Europe and project security globally.