Luiz Ricardo Kabbach de Castro

Family Firms and Compliance: Reconciling the Conflicting Predictions Within the Socioemotional Wealth Perspective:

We draw on the socioemotional wealth perspective to examine the influence of family ownership on firms’ noncompliance with corporate governance codes. Our results yield an inverted U-shaped effect of family ownership on noncompliance. While the family influence and control dimension leads to high levels of noncompliance, socioworthiness stemming from image and reputation dimension lessens noncompliance. In the presence of potential agency conflict, the control dimension prevails over reputation, even in countries with strong governance institutions. Our findings have critical implications for family business theory, for governance policy making and also for better understanding corporate governance in family firms.

Corporate Ownership in Latin American Firms: A Comparative Analysis of Dual-Class Shares

We assemble a new data on dual-class firms in Latin America and analyze the relationship between the largest shareholder characteristics and its decision to leverage voting rights. First, we describe who are the largest shareholders in Latin American firms. Second, we find that both the type and origin of the largest shareholder, together with firm- and country-level characteristics, are key determinants to explain the decision to separate voting from cash-flow rights. To tackle the determinants of ownership in Latin American publicly listed firms has both managerial and policy implications, because the largest shareholders are those in charge to define business strategies and the allocation of firms’ resources.

An organizational economics approach on the pursuit of socioemotional and financial wealth in family firms: Are these competing or complementary objectives?

Purpose The purpose of this study is to analyze the contribution of the paper by Martin and Gomez-Mejia and propose complementary approaches and ways to test their hypotheses. Design/methodology/approach This study compares different theoretical approaches that complement socioemotional wealth to explain manager’s decisions and firm performance. Findings The authors of this study argue that progress could be achieved by combining Martin and Gomez-Mejia’s propositions with elements of existing organizational theories that are grounded on economics such as the resource-based view, transactional cost and property rights. Originality/value This study provides a new perspective of the work of Martin and Gomez-Mejia published in this issue.

Efeitos da vinculação de conselheiros ao acordo de acionistas no valor da firma

This study analyzes the effect of shareholders’ agreement binding provisions on firm value. Using a database of 181 publicly listed firms from the special segments of the BM&FBovespa, between 2008 and 2012, we analyze the effect of the inclusion of generic and specific clauses into the shareholder agreement bind director’s vote to the agreement on firm value. The results indicate a negative effect of the shareholders’ agreement on firm value. This effect is higher in the presence of generic clauses and lower in the presence of specific clauses, even after controlling for the endogeneity of the shareholders’ decision to adopt shareholder agreements. The results allow us to conclude that controlling shareholders use the shareholder agreements as a mechanism to enhance control at the expense of firm value (entrenchment effect). This article contributes to the literature on governance and corporate finance to reveal practices that weaken the role of one of the main pillars of governance, the board of directors.

Effects of the involvement of counselors to the agreement of shareholders to the values of the firm

This study analyzes the effect of shareholders’ agreement binding provisions on firm value. Using a database of 181 publicly listed firms from the special segments of the BM&FBovespa, between 2008 and 2012, we analyze the effect of the inclusion of generic and specific clauses into the shareholder agreement bind director’s vote to the agreement on firm value. The results indicate a negative effect of the shareholders’ agreement on firm value. This effect is higher in the presence of generic clauses and lower in the presence of specific clauses, even after controlling for the endogeneity of the shareholders’ decision to adopt shareholder agreements. The results allow us to conclude that controlling shareholders use the shareholder agreements as a mechanism to enhance control at the expense of firm value (entrenchment effect). This article contributes to the literature on governance and corporate finance to reveal practices that weaken the role of one of the main pillars of governance, the board of directors.

Efectos de la vinculación de consejeros al acuerdo de accionistas en el valor de la firma

This study analyzes the effect of shareholders’ agreement binding provisions on firm value. Using a database of 181 publicly listed firms from the special segments of the BM&FBovespa, between 2008 and 2012, we analyze the effect of the inclusion of generic and specific clauses into the shareholder agreement bind director’s vote to the agreement on firm value. The results indicate a negative effect of the shareholders’ agreement on firm value. This effect is higher in the presence of generic clauses and lower in the presence of specific clauses, even after controlling for the endogeneity of the shareholders’ decision to adopt shareholder agreements. The results allow us to conclude that controlling shareholders use the shareholder agreements as a mechanism to enhance control at the expense of firm value (entrenchment effect). This article contributes to the literature on governance and corporate finance to reveal practices that weaken the role of one of the main pillars of governance, the board of directors.