Lyle Brenner

Consumer Control and Empowerment: A Primer

This paper introduces consumer empowerment as a promising research area. Going beyond lay wisdom that more control is always better, we outline several hypotheses concerning (a) the factors that influence the perception of empowerment, and (b) the consequences of greater control and the subjective experience of empowerment on consumer satisfaction and confidence.

Comparison, Grouping, and Preference

How does the attractiveness of a particular option depend on comparisons drawn between it and other alternatives? We observe that in many cases, comparisons hurt: When the options being compared have both meaningful advantages and meaningful disadvantages, comparison between options makes each option less attractive. The effects of comparison are crucial in choice problems involving grouped options, because the way in which options are grouped influences which comparisons are likely to be made. In particular, we propose that grouping focuses comparison, making within-group comparisons more likely than between-group comparisons. This line of reasoning suggests that grouping should hurt, and we observe that it does: An option is more likely to be chosen when alone than when part of a group.

On the Evaluation of One-sided Evidence

We examine predictions and judgments of confidence based on one-sided evidence. Some subjects saw arguments for only one side of a legal dispute while other subjects (called ‘jurors’) saw arguments for both sides. Subjects predicted the number of jurors who favored the plaintiff in each case. Subjects who saw only one side made predictions that were biased in favor of that side. Furthermore, they were more confident but generally less accurate than subjects who saw both sides. The results indicate that people do not compensate sufficiently for missing information even when it is painfully obvious that the information available to them is incomplete. A simple manipulation that required subjects to evaluate the relative strength of the opponent’s side greatly reduced the tendency to underweigh missing evidence.

Feeling and Thinking in Memory-Based versus Stimulus-Based Choices

We contrast memory-based and stimulus-based choices, using dual-process theories such as Kahneman and Fredericks system 1/system 2 dichotomy. Systems 1 and 2 are conceptualized as distinct modes of thought, the former automatic and affective, the latter controlled and deliberate. Cognitive load impedes system 2, yielding greater reliance on system 1. In memory-based choice, consumers must maintain relevant options in working memory. Thus, memory-based choices are associated with greater cognitive load than stimulus-based choices. Indeed, we find that memory-based choices favor immediately compelling, affect-rich system 1 options, whereas stimulus-based choices favor affect-poor options whose attractiveness emerges from deliberative system 2 thought. (c) 2007 by JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH, Inc..

A random support model of the calibration of subjective probabilities

Abstract A stochastic model of the calibration of subjective probabilities based on support theory ( Rottenstreich and Tversky, 1997 , Tversky and Koehler, 1994 ) is presented. This model extends support theory—a general representation of probability judgment—to the domain of calibration, the analysis of the correspondence between subjective and objective probability. The random support model can account for the common finding of overconfidence, and also predicts the form of the relationship between overconfidence and item difficulty (the “hard–easy effect”). The parameters of the model have natural psychological interpretations, such as discriminability between correct and incorrect hypotheses, and extremity of judgment. The random support model can be distinguished from other stochastic models of calibration by: (a) using fewer parameters, (b) eliminating the use of variable cutoffs by mapping underlying support directly into judged probability, (c) allowing validation of model parameters with independent assessments of support, and (d) applying to a wide variety of tasks by framing probability judgment in the integrative context of support theory.

The enhancement effect in probability judgment

Research has shown that the judged probability of an event depends on the specificity with which the focal and alternative hypotheses are described. In particular, unpacking the components of the focal hypothesis generally increases the judged probability of the focal hypothesis, while unpacking the components of the alternative hypothesis decreases the judged probability of the focal hypothesis. As a consequence, the judged probability of the union of disjoint events is generally less than the sum of their judged probabilities. This article shows that the total judged probability of a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses increases with the degree to which the evidence is compatible with these hypotheses. This phenomenon, which we refer to as the enhancement eAect, is consistent with a descriptive account of subjective probability called support theory. #1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Focus, repacking, and the judgment of grouped hypotheses

Previous research has found that judged probabilities of two complementary singleton hypotheses sum to one. However, there may be important differences between judgment of singleton and disjunctive hypotheses. We suggest that because of a general preference for singletons as the focus of judgment, disjunctions are more likely to be repacked into singletons when focal than when alternative. This prediction of differential repacking implies that a given disjunction will be perceived as less likely when focal. Thus, we predict that when disjunctions are under consideration, the sum of judged probabilities for two complementary hypotheses will be less than one. We observe this pattern in judgment of both probability and relative frequency, and for both externally-generated and self-generated hypotheses. Copyright

On Decisions That Lead to Decisions: Direct and Derived Evaluations of Preference

Many consumer choices lead to subsequent decisions. In such situations, any choice option may be evaluated based on its own characteristics (direct evaluations), or evaluated based on the characteristics of alternatives it makes available in subsequent decisions (derived evaluations). We contrast direct and derived evaluations in the context of two consumer research issues. First, in choices between a lone option and a group of alternatives, direct evaluations bias preferences toward the group, whereas derived evaluations bias preferences away from the group. Second, in choices between stores, sensitivity to price is greater under derived than direct evaluations.

Accentuate the Negative The Positive Effects of Negative Acknowledgment

Three studies investigated the capacity of negative acknowledgment, the admission of an unfavorable quality, to elicit relatively positive responses. In Study 1, an acknowledgment that a written paragraph was confusing led individuals to rate the paragraph as clearer than they did when no acknowledgment was offered. In Study 2, a foreign speaker was rated as possessing a clearer voice when he acknowledged his strong accent than when he did not. In Study 3, a hypothetical college applicants acknowledgment of receiving less than stellar high school grades resulted in a more positive evaluation of those grades. The interpersonal risks and benefits of negative acknowledgment as an impression-management strategy are discussed.

CONFIDENCE AND ACCURACY IN TRAIT INFERENCE : JUDGMENT BY SIMILARITY

We examined the confidence and accuracy with which people make personality trait inferences and investigate some consequences of the hypothesis that such judgments are based on similarity or conceptual relatedness. Given information concerning a target persons standing on three global personality dimensions, American and Israeli subjects were asked to estimate the targets self-ratings of 50 trait adjectives and to express their confidence by setting a 90 percent uncertainty range around each estimate. The estimates were positively correlated with the actual ratings obtained from subjects who had evaluated themselves in terms of the 50 traits, but were far too extreme. Furthermore, confidence was negatively correlated with accuracy: Peoples estimates were most inaccurate and made with greatest certainty when the trait in question was highly similar to the information provided as a basic for judgment. We suggest that intuitive personality judgments overestimate the coherence of the structure underlying trait constructs.