M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro

Modification of the Banzhaf value for games with a coalition structure

In this paper we introduce a new coalitional value in the context of TU games with an a priori system of unions, which it is called the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value. This value satisfies the property of symmetry in the quotient game, the quotient game property, and it is a coalitional value of Banzhaf. Several characterizations are provided and two political examples illustrate the differences with respect to the Owen value and the Banzhaf–Owen value.

On the Convexity of Games Corresponding to Sequencing Situations with Due Dates

This paper considers sequencing situations with due date criteria. Three different types of criteria are considered: the weighted penalty criterion, the weighted tardiness criterion and the completion time criterion. The main focus is on convexity of the associated cooperative games. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment

In this paper we answer a question posed by Sertel and Sanver (2002) on the manipulability of optimal matching rules in matching problems with endowments. We characterize the classes of consumption rules under which optimal matching rules can be manipulated via predonation of endowment.

Centralized Inventory in a Farming Community

A centralized inventory problem is a situation in which several agents face individual inventory problems and make an agreement to coordinate their orders with the objective of reducing costs. In this paper we identify a centralized inventory problem arising in a farming community in northwestern Spain, model the problem using two alternative approaches, find the optimal inventory policies for both models, and propose allocation rules for sharing the optimal costs in this context.

Some Structural Properties of a Lattice of Embedded Coalitions

Abstract In this paper we investigate some structural properties of the order on the set of embedded coalitions outlined in the paper de Clippel G. and R. Serrano (2008) “Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value.” Econometrica 76: 1413–1436. Besides, we characterize the scalars associated to the basis they proposed of the vector space of partition function form games.

Nontransferable Utility Bankruptcy Games

In this paper, we analyze bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility (NTU) from a game theoretical perspective by redefining corresponding NTU-bankruptcy games in a tailor-made way. It is shown that NTU-bankruptcy games are both coalitional merge convex and ordinal convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility (TU) games to NTU-games, we also show that each NTU-bankruptcy game is compromise stable. Thus, NTU-bankruptcy games are shown to retain the two characterizing properties of TU-bankruptcy games: convexity and compromise stability. As a first example of a game theoretical NTU-bankruptcy rule, we analyze the NTU-adjusted proportional rule and show that this rule corresponds to the compromise value of NTU-bankruptcy games.

Coalition Configurations and the Public Good Index

In games with a coalition structure, players organize themselves in coalitions that form a partition of the set of players. In games with a coalition configuration, the union of the coalitions is the whole set of players but the coalitions are not necessarily disjoint. We introduce two variations of the Public Good Index for games with a coalition configuration, provide axiomatic characterizations of them, and apply them to a real world example.

Perfectly almost strict equilibria for finite games in strategic form

Abstract In this paper we introduce the perfectly almost strict equilibrium concept for finite games in strategic form. Such a new concept is a strict refinement of the perfect equilibrium which rejects completely mixed Nash equilibria which are not self-enforcing. We prove that the mixed extension of a finite game in strategic form has at least one perfectly almost strict equilibrium.

Estimation of the Owen Value Based on Sampling

In this paper we introduce a procedure based on sampling to estimate the Owen value of a cooperative game. It is an adaptation of an analogous procedure for the estimation of the Shapley value, and it is specially useful when dealing with games having large sets of players. We provide some results in order to choose a sample size guaranteeing a bound for the absolute error with a given probability, and illustrate our procedure with an example taken from the game theoretical literature.

Placing Joint Orders When Holding Costs Are Negligible and Shortages Are Not Allowed

In this paper we analyse multi-agent inventory systems where each agent has a deterministic demand and a capacitated warehouse with constant holding costs. Additionally, shortages are not allowed, the leadtime is constant and the cost of placing an order has two components: a fixed cost and a variable cost. We consider that agents cooperate by placing joint orders and that the variable cost is not necessarily additive. For this model we obtain the optimal policy and propose an allocation rule for the joint ordering costs.