Maarten Allers

Weight-based pricing in the collection of household waste: the Oostzaan case

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the effects of weight-based pricing in the collection of household waste. Using a comprehensive panel data set on all households in a Dutch municipality we estimate short-run as well as long-run price effects for the amounts of both compostable and non-recyclable household waste. We find significant and sizeable price effects, with the elasticity for compostable waste being four times as large as the elasticity for non-recyclable waste. Long-run elasticities are about 30% larger than short-run elasticities.

Partisan influence on the local tax burden in the Netherlands

This paper analyses the role of partisan politics in determiningthe local tax burden. Property taxes are the most important revenuesource which municipalities in the Netherlands can decide uponthemselves. Using a new data set on Dutch local property taxes in1996, it is concluded that municipalities with a council dominatedby left wing parties have a higher tax burden. We also find thatlarger coalitions have lower levels of taxation. Finally, taxexporting increases tax rates.

A Simultaneous Equations Model of Fiscal Policy Interactions

Existing studies of fiscal policy interactions are based on single equation (SE) models of either taxation or expenditures, without specifying the underlying social welfare function, without taking account of budget constraints and without allowing for cost differences between jurisdictions. Taking all this into account, we derive an extended version of the linear expenditure system with policy interaction effects. We use this system to simultaneously estimate interactions in both taxation and different spending categories among Dutch municipalities. Our interaction parameters tend to be higher than those estimated using conventional SE models.

The Effects of Local Government Amalgamation on Public Spending, Taxation, and Service Levels: Evidence from 15 Years of Municipal Consolidation

We study how municipal amalgamation affects local government spending, taxation, and service provision in the Netherlands. Employing different models, different control groups, and a number of robustness tests, we find no significant effect on aggregate spending or taxation, although spending on administration is reduced. We explore whether this finding might hide amalgamation effects working in opposite directions for different types of municipalities (e.g., small versus large, or homogeneous versus heterogeneous), cancelling each other out. This does not seem to be the case. We also investigate whether amalgamation leads to better public services instead of lower spending, but find no evidence.

Intermunicipal cooperation, municipal amalgamation and the price of credit

ABSTRACT In many countries, local government size is increasingly thought to be insufficient to operate efficiently. Two possible solutions to this problem are amalgamation and intermunicipal cooperation. This paper applies a novel methodology to shed light on the efficiency implications of this choice. Using a unique and rich micro-level dataset, we find that intermunicipal organisations (IOs) in the Netherlands consistently pay higher interest rates than municipalities, while there is no economic reason to do so. We interpret this as a form of inefficiency. Municipal amalgamation, on the other hand, does not result in higher interest rates. Our analysis eliminates one possible explanation, dispersed ownership of IOs, as the number of partners cooperating in an IO does not affect interest rates (no ‘law of 1/n’). This leaves the introduction of extra hierarchical layers as a result of cooperation, and the ensuing reduction in monitoring, as the most probable explanation.

Do Formulas Reduce Political Influence on Intergovernmental Grants? Evidence from Tanzania

Abstract Sub-national governments usually depend on the central government for a large share of their revenues. Therefore, a fair allocation of intergovernmental grants is essential for financing vital local services like education and healthcare. In Tanzania, and many other countries, regions that are better represented in the national parliament receive significantly more funds than others. Recently, Tanzania replaced the previously existing discretionary method of grant allocation by allocation formulas. We study whether this has reduced the effect of malapportionment on grant allocation. Surprisingly, we find that formula allocation does not significantly change this effect. This has important policy implications.

Using Survey Data To Test for Ricardian Equivalence

Drawing on nationwide and representative survey data for the Netherlands, this article tests, first, to what degree economic subjects are aware of the level of both government debt and deficits, and, second, examines whether fiscal policy relates to individual saving decisions. The results presented suggest that one of the central assumptions of the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis must be refuted: most individu als have little knowledge of the governments indebtedness. Furthermore, their saving behavior appears not to be influenced by the fiscal policy stance. The authors show that individual responses vary with age, education, income, and employment status, but not with having offspring.

Equalising Spending Needs of Subnational Governments in a Developing Country: The Case of Tanzania

Decentralisation of government creates fiscal disparities: some subnational governments can provide their citizens with more public services than others. Many countries try to equalise fiscal disparities by targeting grants at disadvantaged jurisdictions. This is especially difficult for developing countries, where data are scarce. We develop a method to estimate spending needs of local governments in developing countries. We apply this method to health spending by Tanzanian districts, but it can be used in other areas and other countries as well. We use our estimates to derive an equalising grant allocation formula. A comparison with the existing grant allocation indicates that more deprived districts should receive higher grants than they obtain now.

Fiscal Capacity Equalisation in Tanzania

Abstract Fiscal equalisation aims at enabling decentralised governments to supply similar services at similar tax rates. In order to equalise fiscal disparities, differences in both fiscal capacities and in fiscal needs have to be measured. This paper focuses on the measurement of fiscal capacity in a developing country. The current intergovernmental transfer system in Tanzania does not take differences in fiscal capacity into account. As a result, local governments in rich areas are able to generate considerably more revenue per capita than those in poor areas. Public services in poor areas are hard to finance. We propose a way of measuring fiscal capacities of local governments in Tanzania using poverty data. We use this measure to derive an equalisation grant that would support local governments that have a low fiscal capacity.

Intermunicipal cooperation, public spending and service levels

ABSTRACT Local governments can increase size in particular policy fields through cooperation with other local governments. This is often thought to improve efficiency, but there is little empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis. We study the case of the Netherlands, which has been a veritable laboratory of intermunicipal cooperation (IMC), using panel data for 2005–2013. We find no evidence that IMC reduces total spending of the average municipality. Indeed, IMC seems to increase spending in small and large municipalities, leaving spending in mid-sized municipalities unaffected. In one specific field, tax collection, spending may be reduced through IMC. Spending in this field is low, which may explain why total spending is unaffected. Instead of lowering spending, municipalities may have used possible cost savings as a result of IMC to improve public service levels. We do not find evidence substantiating this hypothesis, however.