Magda Osman

An evaluation of dual-process theories of reasoning.

Current theories propose that reasoning comprises two underlying systems (Evans & Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000). The systems are identified as having functionally distinct roles, differ according to the type of information encoded, vary according to the level of expressible knowledge, and result in different responses. This article evaluates the arguments and the evidence from a select number of key tasks that have been supportive of dual-reasoning theorists’ proposals. The review contrasts the dualist approach with a single-system framework that conjectures that different types of reasoning arise through the graded properties of the representations that are utilized while reasoning, and the different functional roles that consciousness has in cognition. The article concludes by arguing in favor of the alternative framework, which attempts to unify the different forms of reasoning identified by dual-process theorists under a single system.

Controlling uncertainty: a review of human behavior in complex dynamic environments

Complex dynamic control (CDC) tasks are a type of problem-solving environment used for examining many cognitive activities (e.g., attention, control, decision making, hypothesis testing, implicit learning, memory, monitoring, planning, and problem solving). Because of their popularity, there have been many findings from diverse domains of research (economics, engineering, ergonomics, human-computer interaction, management, psychology), but they remain largely disconnected from each other. The objective of this article is to review theoretical developments and empirical work on CDC tasks, and to introduce a novel framework (monitoring and control framework) as a tool for integrating theory and findings. The main thesis of the monitoring and control framework is that CDC tasks are characteristically uncertain environments, and subjective judgments of uncertainty guide the way in which monitoring and control behaviors attempt to reduce it. The article concludes by discussing new insights into continuing debates and future directions for research on CDC tasks.

Sequence learning by action, observation and action observation.

The serial reaction time (SRT) task was used to compare learning of a complex sequence by action (participants responded to sequential stimuli), by observation (participants watched but did not respond to sequential stimuli), and by action-observation (participants watched an expert model responding to sequential stimuli). Each of these groups was compared with an untrained control group. Experiment 1 indicated that both observation and action-observation were sufficient to support learning of a 12-item second-order conditional (SOC) sequence. Experiment 2 confirmed these findings, and showed that, as indexed by reaction time (RT), the extent of learning by observation and by action-observation was comparable to that of action-based learning. Using a recognition test, Experiment 2 and 3 also provided evidence that, whereas learning by stimulus observation was explicit, learning by action-observation was implicit. These findings are consistent with a connection between motor systems and implicit learning, but do not support the hypothesis that overt action is necessary for implicit learning.

Development of intuitive rules: evaluating the application of the dual-system framework to understanding children's intuitive reasoning.

Theories of adult reasoning propose that reasoning consists of two functionally distinct systems that operate under entirely different mechanisms. This theoretical framework has been used to account for a wide range of phenomena, which now encompasses developmental research on reasoning and problem solving. We begin this review by contrasting three main dual-system theories of adult reasoning (Evans & Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000) with a well-established developmental account that also incorporates a dual-system framework (Brainerd & Reyna, 2001). We use developmental studies of the formation and application of intuitive rules in science and mathematics to evaluate the claims that these theories make. Overall, the evidence reviewed suggests that what is crucial to understanding how children reason is the saliency of the features that are presented within a task. By highlighting the importance of saliency as a way of understanding reasoning, we aim to provide clarity concerning the benefits and limitations of adopting a dual-system framework to account for evidence from developmental studies of intuitive reasoning.

Action observation supports effector-dependent learning of finger movement sequences

Practising a motor skill can result in effector-dependent learning (learning that does not transfer from the set of muscles used in training to a new set of muscles). Proceeding from neurophysiological evidence of motor activation during action observation, this study asked whether observational learning, learning through observation of skilled performance, can also be effector-dependent. Adult human participants observed a model’s right hand as the model responded to an eight-item sequence in a serial reaction time (SRT) task. Their sequence learning was then compared in two tests with that of controls who had observed the model’s right hand responding to random targets during training. All participants performed the SRT task with their right hand in the first test and with their left hand in the second. Evidence of observational learning was obtained in the right hand test but not in the left hand test. This implies that sequence learning based on observation of right hand performance did not transfer to the left hand, and therefore that observational learning can support effector-dependent learning of finger movement sequences. A second experiment used the same procedure to assess learning by a group of participants who observed a sequence of response locations only. This group did not observe the model’s responses. Results suggested that action observation was necessary for the effector-dependent observational learning demonstrated in Experiment 1.

Unconscious task application

The nature of unconscious information processing is a heavily debated issue in cognitive science (e.g., Kouider & Dehaene, 2007), and neuroscience (e.g., Crick & Koch, 1998). Traditionally, it has been thought that unconscious cognitive processing is restricted to knowledge that is strongly prepared by conscious processes (e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998). In three experiments, we show that the task that is performed consciously can also be applied unconsciously to items outside the current task set. We found that a same-different judgment of two target stimuli was also performed on two subliminally presented prime stimuli. This was true for target and prime stimuli from entirely different categories, as well as for prime and target stimuli at different levels of abstraction. These results reveal that unconscious processing can generalize more widely than previously accepted.

The Bitter Truth About Sugar and Willpower: The Limited Evidential Value of the Glucose Model of Ego Depletion.

The idea behind ego depletion is that willpower draws on a limited mental resource, so that engaging in an act of self-control impairs self-control in subsequent tasks. To present ego depletion as more than a convenient metaphor, some researchers have proposed that glucose is the limited resource that becomes depleted with self-control. However, there have been theoretical challenges to the proposed glucose mechanism, and the experiments that have tested it have found mixed results. We used a new meta-analytic tool, p-curve analysis, to examine the reliability of the evidence from these experiments. We found that the effect sizes reported in this literature are possibly influenced by publication or reporting bias and that, even within studies yielding significant results, the evidential value of this research is weak. In light of these results, and pending further evidence, researchers and policymakers should refrain from drawing any conclusions about the role of glucose in self-control.

A Case Study: Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition—Commentary on Evans & Stanovich (2013)

Dual-process theories of higher order cognition (DPTs) have been enjoying much success, particularly since Kahneman’s 2002 Nobel prize address and recent book Thinking, Fast and Slow (2009). Historically, DPTs have attempted to provide a conceptual framework that helps classify and predict differences in patterns of behavior found under some circumstances and not others in a host of reasoning, judgment, and decision-making tasks. As evidence has changed and techniques for examining behavior have moved on, so too have DPTs. Killing two birds with one stone, Evans and Stanovich (2013, this issue) respond to five main criticisms of DPTs. Along with addressing each criticism in turn, they set out to clarify the essential defining characteristics that distinguish one form of higher order cognition from the other. The aim of this commentary is to consider the defining characteristics of Type 1 and Type 2 processing that have been proposed and to suggest that the evidence can be taken to support quantitative differences rather than qualitatively distinct processes.

Positive transfer and negative transfer/antilearning of problem-solving skills.

In problem-solving research, insights into the relationship between monitoring and control in the transfer of complex skills remain impoverished. To address this, in 4 experiments, the authors had participants solve 2 complex control tasks that were identical in structure but that varied in presentation format. Participants learned to solve the 2nd task on the basis of their original learning phase from the 1st task or learned to solve the 2nd task on the basis of another participants learning phase. Experiment 1 showed that, under conditions in which the participants learning phase was experienced twice, performance deteriorated in the 2nd task. In contrast, when the learning phases in the 1st and 2nd tasks differed, performance improved in the 2nd task. Experiment 2 introduced instructional manipulations that induced the same response patterns as those in Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, further manipulations were introduced that biased the way participants evaluated the learning phase in the 2nd task. In Experiment 4, judgments of self-efficacy were shown to track control performance. The implications of these findings for theories of complex skill acquisition are discussed.

Observation can be as effective as action in problem solving

This study discusses findings that replicate and extend the original work of Burns and Vollmeyer (2002), which showed that performance in problem-solving tasks was more accurate when people were engaged in a non-specific goal than in a specific goal. The main innovation here was to examine the goal specificity effect under both observation-based and conventional action-based learning conditions. The findings show that goal specificity affects the accuracy of problem solving in the same way when the learning stage of the task is observation-based as when it is action-based. In addition, the findings show that, when instructions do not promote goal specificity, observation-based problem solving is as effective as action-based problem solving.