Mahesh Poudyal

Ecological and economic analysis of poaching of the greater one-horned rhinoceros (Rhinoceros unicornis) in Nepal.

Nepals greater one-horned rhinoceros (Rhinoceros unicornis) faces serious threats from poaching. Poaching of these rhinos is a complex problem, influenced by such diverse factors as the price of rhino horn on the international market, local socioeconomic factors, and the population dynamics of the species. Few studies have attempted to address this complexity. In this study, we model the poaching and population dynamics of the one-horned rhinoceros within an integrated framework of ecological, socioeconomic, political, and legal dimensions. The poaching model for rhinos in Royal Chitwan National Park (RCNP) in Nepal is combined with the population model for the species within a simulation framework and explored under various alternative policy scenarios with differing external socioeconomic and political conditions as well as internal policy response. We predict that, under the current (2003-2005) rhino conservation strategy, poaching would continue to be a major threat to the rhino population in RCNP. Furthermore, the internal policy response must begin to consider external factors such as socioeconomic conditions within the park buffer zone to be more effective in the long run. Finally, we find that, for long-run control, antipoaching policies should be directed at increasing the opportunity costs of poaching by creating better alternative economic opportunities, and at antipoaching enforcement.

Chiefs and Trees: Tenures and Incentives in the Management and Use of Two Multipurpose Tree Species in Agroforestry Parklands in Northern Ghana

Amid growing concerns about the perceived population decline of shea (Vitellaria paradoxa) and locust bean (Parkia biglobosa) trees in the agroforestry parklands, this article explores the impacts of differing tree tenure regimes on their management and use. Using a case study of two communities in Northern Region, Ghana, the study shows that the differing institutional arrangements governing the ownership, access, and use of these two species have led to different sets of incentive structures that have contrasting effects on the management of these species. Shea, in general, seemed to fare much better than locust bean under the current customary regulations. The research finds that in the absence of proper incentives, old and dying locust bean trees might not be replaced by young ones, thereby further jeopardizing its population, and along with it a variety of benefits it accrues to these rural communities.

Economic Incentives and Poaching of the One-Horned Indian Rhinoceros in Nepal: Poaching of the One-Horned Indian Rhinoceros in the Chitwan Valley, Nepal - A Retrospective Econometric Analysis

Despite a relatively successful conservation programme for the endangered one-horned rhinoceros in the National Parks of the Terai region, poaching remains one of the major threats to its survival in Nepal. In recent years, there has been an alarming rise in the number of rhinos poached; over 100 rhinos were taken in and around the Royal Chitwan National Park (RCNP) between 1998 and 2003. Although rhino poaching levels are influenced by the price of rhino horn on the international black market (amongst a host of other socio-economic factors), there have not been any attempts to study the reasons behind poaching in Nepal using econometric models developed and applied elsewhere. This study uses econometric models to explain changes in the level of poaching in the RCNP over a 30-year period. Factors that are thought to influence the number of rhinos poached in the RCNP include: (i) rhino population; (ii) effectiveness of antipoaching measures; (iii) penalties for poaching; (iv) availability of alternative economic opportunities (i.e., opportunity costs of poaching); and (v) the price of rhino horn. The results indicate that anti-poaching units (APUs), in their original organisational and operational form were highly successful in controlling the level of poaching in the RCNP. Furthermore, the availability of local economic opportunities seemed to reduce the level of poaching significantly. However, the penalties imposed on the convicted poachers were found to have little or no effect on the level of rhino poaching in the RCNP. The results also indicate a sharp rise in the number of rhinos poached during the years of the Maoist insurgency in the country, compared to the years before. Although the analysis is still very simplistic, it provides valuable insights into the factors that have affected the level of poaching in the RCNP over the years. It is hoped that these insights will be helpful in formulating effective policies to tackle rhino poaching, especially in and around the RCNP where Nepal’s largest population of one-horned rhinoceros is found.

Economic Incentives and Poaching of the One-Horned Indian Rhinoceros in Nepal: Simulation Modelling of Policies to Combat the Poaching of Rhino in Royal Chitwan National Park, Nepal

Abundant in the past, the one-horned rhinoceros that inhabits the low-lying Terai region of Nepal has come under pressure due to the loss of habitat and poaching. Efforts to protect the species continue to face considerable challenges, including: (i) economic constraints associated with protecting these species in one of the poorest countries in the world; and (ii) the ineffectiveness of current policies due to a number of socio-economic and political factors. This study models poaching behaviour to provide information about the effectiveness of current interventions and to simulate alternative policies. Our goal is to help design more effective policies to combat poaching, while at the same time ensuring that local livelihoods are supported. This study considers some salient features of the rhino conservation/poaching problem in Nepal, such as: rhino population dynamics, crop damage due to rhinos, park-community revenue sharing programmes, the collection of resources from the park, tourism employment, etc., when running a simulation model. Indeed, all of these factors were entered as sub-models within the overarching simulation model. The simulation model was run over a ten-year period from 2004-2013 (inclusive) for four policy scenarios. The current policy scenario represents the baseline and the three other hypothetical scenarios represent three distinct policy alternatives. The simulation results indicate that although a conventional conservation strategy, emphasising the role of anti-poaching units (APUs), is likely to increase the rhino population to a greater extent than the other strategies, it produces less overall benefits to local communities. Conversely, incentive-based conservation strategies that target farming and non-farming households through economic incentives (such as compensation for crop damage, increased employment opportunities, and greater access to park resources), along with some anti-poaching enforcement, are likely to increase the rhino population and at the same time produce greater overall benefits for local communities. It is inherently difficult to ensure all stakeholder groups simultaneously benefit from a single policy measure. However, the simulation results show that any policy that tries to incorporate the concerns of different stakeholders by providing different economic incentives is more likely to help protect rhinos, and at the same time improve local livelihoods.