Mahvash Saeed Qureshi

Regulating Capital Flows at Both Ends: Does it Work?

This paper examines whether cross-border capital flows can be regulated by imposing capital account restrictions (CARs) in both source and recipient countries, as was originally advocated by John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White. To this end, we use data on bilateral cross-border bank flows from 31 source to 76 recipient (advanced and emerging market) countries over 1995–2012, and combine this information with a new and comprehensive dataset on various outflow and inflow related capital controls and prudential measures in these countries. Our findings suggest that CARs at either end can significantly influence the volume of cross-border bank flows, with restrictions at both ends associated with a larger reduction in flows. We also find evidence of cross-border spillovers whereby inflow restrictions imposed by countries are associated with larger flows to other countries. These findings suggest a useful scope for policy coordination between source and recipient countries, as well as among recipient countries, to better manage potentially disruptive flows.

Words vs. Deeds: What Really Matters?

This paper revisits the link between the nominal exchange rate regime and inflation, based on a sample of 145 emerging market and developing countries (EMDCs) over the period 1980-2010. We contend that, just as a de jure peg that is not backed by a de facto peg will have little value, de facto pegs that lack the corresponding de jure will likewise reap few of the low inflation benefits associated with pegging the exchange rate. To test our hypothesis, we exploit a novel dataset of both de jure and de facto exchange rate regime classifications. We find that pegged exchange rates are associated with significantly lower inflation in EMDCs than flexible exchange rates, and that this effect is much stronger for de facto pegs that are matched by de jure pegs than for those that are not. When it comes to anchoring expectations and delivering low inflation, therefore, both deeds and words matter.

Africa's Oil Abundance and External Competitiveness: Do Institutions Matter?

This paper examines the structural competitiveness of oil-rich economies in sub-Saharan Africa relative to other major oil-exporting developing countries, and investigates reasons for systematic differences in the non-oil export performance across these economies. The analysis reveals that oil-rich Africa lags behind other oil-exporters in terms of diversification, global market share and the overall investment climate. The poor performance of their nonoil sector can be largely attributed to weak infrastructure and institutional quality. The results also show that institutional quality is a significant determinant of the extent to which oil abundance affects the competitiveness of the non-oil sector; thereby explaining the divergent experiences of oil-rich economies across the world. This implies that oil wealth does not necessarily weaken the non-oil tradable sector; countries may mitigate the impact of Dutch disease and benefit from oil booms if revenues are used prudently to reduce oil dependence.

A Tie That Binds; Revisiting the Trilemma in Emerging Market Economies

This paper examines the claim that exchange rate regimes are of little salience in the transmission of global financial conditions to domestic financial and macroeconomic conditions by focusing on a sample of about 40 emerging market countries over 1986–2013. Our findings show that exchange rate regimes do matter. Countries with fixed exchange rate regimes are more likely to experience financial vulnerabilities—faster domestic credit and house price growth, and increases in bank leverage—than those with relatively flexible regimes. The transmission of global financial shocks is likewise magnified under fixed exchange rate regimes relative to more flexible (though not necessarily fully flexible) regimes. We attribute this to both reduced monetary policy autonomy and a greater sensitivity of capital flows to changes in global conditions under fixed rate regimes.

What's in a Name? That Which We Call Capital Controls

This paper investigates why controls on capital inflows have a bad name, and evoke such visceral opposition, by tracing how capital controls have been used and perceived, since the late nineteenth century. While advanced countries often employed capital controls to tame speculative inflows during the last century, we conjecture that several factors undermined their subsequent use as prudential tools. First, it appears that inflow controls became inextricably linked with outflow controls. The latter have typically been more pervasive, more stringent, and more linked to autocratic regimes, failed macroeconomic policies, and financial crisis—inflow controls are thus damned by this “guilt by association.” Second, capital account restrictions often tend to be associated with current account restrictions. As countries aspired to achieve greater trade integration, capital controls came to be viewed as incompatible with free trade. Third, as policy activism of the 1970s gave way to the free market ideology of the 1980s and 1990s, the use of capital controls, even on inflows and for prudential purposes, fell into disrepute.

Managing the Tide : How Do Emerging Markets Respond to Capital Flows?

This paper examines whether—and how—emerging market economies (EMEs) respond to capital flows to mitigate their untoward consequences. Based on a sample of about 50 EMEs over 2005Q1–2013Q4, we find that EME policy makers respond proactively to capital inflows by using a combination of policy tools: central banks raise the policy interest rate to address economic overheating concerns; intervene in the foreign exchange market to resist currency appreciation pressures; tighten macroprudential measures to dampen credit growth; and deploy capital inflow controls in the face of competitiveness and financial-stability concerns. Contrary to conventional policy advice to EMEs, we find no evidence of counter-cyclical fiscal policy in the face of capital inflows. Overall, policies are more likely to respond, and used in combination, during inflow surges than in more normal times.

Capital Flows and Capital Controls in India: Confronting the Challenges

This chapter examines India’s experience with capital account liberalization, and management of capital flows. Aware of the risks posed by capital flows, Indian policy makers have taken a cautious approach to capital account liberalization—with inflows liberalized before outflows, and within inflows, equity flows, especially direct investment, preferred over debt flows. This approach has protected the domestic economy from financial contagion and crisis, while the liberalization of FDI flows has been beneficial for economic growth. Yet, as India has gone down the path of liberalization, the volatility of capital flows has increased. India has responded to this volatility by deploying multiple policy tools—including foreign exchange intervention, prudential measures, and adjustment of capital controls. Going forward, Indian policy makers need to carefully calibrate the pace of further liberalization, especially of short-term debt flows.

Capital Inflow Surges and Consequences

While capital flows to emerging markets bring numerous benefits, they are also known to create macroeconomic imbalances (economic overheating, currency overvaluation) and increase financial vulnerabilities (domestic credit growth, bank leverage, foreign currency-denominated lending). But are all inflows the same? In this paper, we examine whether the source of the inflow—residents repatriating foreign assets or nonresidents investing in the country—or the type of inflow (foreign direct investment, portfolio, other investment) makes any difference to the consequences of the capital flow. Our results, based on a sample of 53 emerging markets over 1980–2013, show that when it comes to the source of the inflow, the macroeconomic and financial-stability consequences of flows driven by residents (asset flows) and nonresidents (liability flows) are broadly similar in economic terms. Formal statistical tests, however, suggest that liability flows are more prone to causing economic overheating and domestic credit expansion than asset flows. On the types of inflows, we find that compared to direct investment, portfolio debt and other investment flows are associated with larger macroeconomic imbalances and financial vulnerabilities. We conclude that policy should try to mitigate the untoward consequences of inflows, and shift their composition from risky to safer forms of liabilities.